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Abstract 
 
This study investigates how political interpersonal communication and opinion 
leadership on the Internet differ from face-to-face interaction. Based on evidence 
from a survey conducted on the largest online social network in Germany at the 
time of the 2009 federal election, the characteristics, sources and perceived 
influence of those conversing about politics online and offline are juxtaposed.  
The data reveals that, in aggregate, differences present in face-to-face discussions 
are amplified when people communicate online. Particularly those who are less 
active political discussants regard the Internet as a rather unpolitical medium. 
Only very few people who refrain from influencing others face-to-face act as 
opinion leaders on the Internet. In fact, it seems that online opinion leadership is 
primarily a consequence of offline opinion leadership. 
At the same time, the analysis shows that aggregate data pointing to a 
reinforcement of differences online is insufficient for refuting the mobilising 
power of the Internet. The small number of online discussants and online opinion 
leaders who are not active face-to-face are characterised by especially low levels 
of internal efficacy and political interest, suggesting that the Internet provides a 
space for political interaction for some of those who are less confident in political 
matters.  
Finally, the results demonstrate that people consider face-to-face discussions to 
have a considerably higher impact on their political views than interpersonal 
communication on the Internet and that opinion leaders make disproportionately 
more use of campaign information on the Internet than non-leaders. Since opinion 
leaders probably draw on the political information they have gathered online 
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when they influence the views of others, Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) Two-Step Flow 
Model seems to play a role in the dissemination of online campaign information. 
A noteworthy part of the campaign information available on the Internet probably 
reaches the general public via face-to-face conversations with opinion leaders. 
And, as these discussions have such a crucial impact on people’s political views, 
the Internet’s influence on political opinion formation is likely to be more 
significant than suggested by the comparison of direct effects.  
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1 Introduction 
The uptake of electronic tools for the purpose of interpersonal communication has 
been staggering in recent years. Over the last three years, the percentage of 
German citizens communicating via online social networks has doubled and now 
stands at close to a third of the population. In 2010, 42 percent of Germans 
chatted with others online. This constitutes an almost two-fold increase since 
2004. Also in 2010, email penetration among the German population reached 77 
percent (De Sombre, 2010). 
Unsurprisingly, many scholars are intrigued by the question of how interpersonal 
communication on the Internet differs from face-to-face interaction. Some of them 
have focused on what I call first-level differences: the disparities in attributes 
between the two modes of communication (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1986; Dennis & 
Valacich, 1999; Burgoon et al., 2000; for an overview see Kumar & Benbasat, 
2002). These academics point out that face-to-face situations typically enable 
conversation pairs to respond to each other in a speedier fashion than is possible 
in an electronic environment. When people exchange emails, for example, 
feedback is not as immediate as when one interacts in person. What is more, most 
forms of computer-mediated communication limit the variety of signals that can 
be used. Gesture, mimic, posture, and other non-verbal cues cannot be employed 
in many kinds of online communication. In contrast to face-to-face 
communication, computer-mediated interaction can take place independent of 
time and space barriers. And, despite the significantly higher reach in terms of 
number of people, the cost of online communication is lower than that of in-
person interaction (Lupia & Sin, 2003). 
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Another, somewhat more complex line of research examines the effects of the 
above disparities in characteristics on communication activity. While systematic 
analysis of these second-level differences is still lacking in the field of political 
science, a number of political scholars have discussed potential differences in 
discussion participation. One popular camp draws on the relative anonymity of 
online communication to suggest that the Internet motivates those to discuss 
politics who are too shy to do so in person. Shah, Cho, Eveland, Kwak, and Kwak 
(2005), for example, expect that many people find it easier to participate in 
political discussions and to share their personal views on the Internet. Similarly, 
Dahlgren (2005, p. 156) asserts that “the Internet seems to offer opportunities to 
participate for many people who otherwise find that there are too many taboos and 
too much discomfiture in talking about politics in their own face-to-face 
environments”. And, by encouraging those to talk about politics who remain 
passive offline, the Internet has an equalizing effect on discussion participation. 
Such equalisation would be particularly significant, as many consider 
interpersonal political communication to be beneficial for the functioning of our 
democratic system. Citizens who discuss politics are more politically informed as 
well as more likely to vote and to engage in other forms of participation, which 
leads Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999, p. 362) to conclude that “conversation is the 
soul of democracy”. At present, the hypothesized equalisation of interpersonal 
communication is not sufficiently backed by evidence. Hence, this study will 
examine whether those who refrain from discussing politics with others face-to-
face instead engage in interpersonal political communication on the Internet. 
Dressler and Telle (2009) extend the notion of increased participation of the less 
active to the exercise of influence in interpersonal discussions about politics, 
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suggesting that the Internet may motivate those to influence the political opinions 
of others who refrain from doing so face-to-face. This issue may not be as central 
to the functioning of democracy, but it certainly is of great interest to those 
running political campaigns. Individuals who exert influence on the views of 
others are traditionally called opinion leaders. Political campaigners seek to 
provide these opinion leaders with suitable information and to mobilize them to 
spread the information within the electorate. Hence, political campaigners require 
a thorough understanding of the characteristics and sources of opinion leaders. 
With this in mind, the present study will assess whether, as Dressler and Telle 
(2009) propose, there are indeed opinion leaders whose influence is confined to 
the online realm. Moreover, the attributes and information sources of opinion 
leaders on the Internet will be analysed in detail.  
The examination of opinion leadership activity leads on to a third level of 
differences between communication on the Internet and face-to-face. This third 
level deals neither with the characteristics of communication nor with discussion 
participation but with the effect of interpersonal discussions on the citizens’ 
political opinions. In this respect, academics typically look at how the influence of 
communication on the Internet compares to that of face-to-face interaction. Some 
are convinced that online communication, because of its unique characteristics, 
has a more significant influence on people’s political opinions. Subramani and 
Rajagopalan (2003) assert that communication on the Internet, due to its reach, 
efficiency, and flexibility, is more persuasive than in-person interaction. 
Similarly, Sun, Youn, Wu, and Kuntaraporn (2006) claim that online 
communication has a stronger effect on people’s views than face-to-face 
interaction, because of its pace and expediency. Given the lack of empirical 
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support for the above assertions, I will compare the strength of influence of online 
and offline communication on people’s political views. It is worth noting that this 
comparison will rely solely on people’s perception of influence rather than on 
measurement of actual influence.  
 
Figure 1: Differences between online and face-to-face communication 
analysed in this study 
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The second and third-level differences between political communication online 
and face-to-face, which this study focuses on, are shown in Figure 1. In order to 
systematically assess these disparities the study is organized in three parts. The 
first two chapters explain in more detail why the selected problems merit careful 
consideration. The two subsequent sections examine the differences both 
theoretically and empirically. A final chapter concludes the study with a summary 
and a general appraisal of the results.  
Section 2 scrutinizes whether an equalisation of the citizens’ participation in 
interpersonal political communication can be regarded as beneficial for our 
democratic culture. To begin with, interpersonal communication is put into the 
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wider context of political communication research. Based on Dahlgren’s (2005) 
break down of the public sphere, interpersonal communication is located within 
the interactive dimension of political communication. Section 2.2 defines private 
interpersonal communication, the main subject of this thesis, by contrasting it 
with public deliberation, another form of interpersonal communication. While 
public deliberation is a rule-governed form of interaction with the goal of making 
political decisions, private interpersonal communication describes the informal 
day-to-day conversations among citizens. Section 2.3 highlights the existing 
inequalities in participation in face-to-face communication about politics. Women 
as well as those with low levels of education, social gregariousness, and political 
interest are less prone to discussing politics with others. In order to assess if it 
would be advantageous to encourage the inactive to engage in interpersonal 
communication about politics, sections 2.4 and 2.5 provide a detailed account of 
the effects discussion participation can have on the citizenry and how these effects 
may be evaluated. Chapter 2.4 presents substantial empirical evidence showing 
how interpersonal communication enhances people’s political knowledge and the 
quality of their opinions. As discussions broaden the range of arguments people 
take into account when forming their political opinions and motivate people to 
reflect on their views, they are likely to have a positive impact on the quality of 
political decisions. The chapter also describes the work of several researchers 
illustrating the close association of political discussion activity and engagement in 
various forms of civic and political participation, a vital element of democratic 
self-government. The subsequent section sketches out two potential negative 
effects of interpersonal communication. According to Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) 
“spiral of silence”, interpersonal discussion can lead to a silencing of minority 
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opinions and, thereby, create equality concerns. Secondly, since most political 
discussions take place between like-minded individuals, discussions tend to lead 
to a polarisation of opinions. Rather than ameliorating people’s understanding of 
different viewpoints, such conversations merely reinforce the status quo. But the 
section also explains why the applicability of the spiral of silence theory to 
interpersonal communication is highly questionable and that group polarisation is 
limited to discussions within homogeneous groups. While the majority of 
interpersonal discussions happen in homogeneous environments, many people 
discuss politics with those who hold divergent views. And, it is these 
heterogeneous interactions that are particularly valuable for the functioning of 
democracy. Considering these generally positive effects of interpersonal 
communication, it would be beneficial to encourage those individuals to 
participate who are currently less or not engaged. Before examining the Internet’s 
capacity to do so, however, the foundations need to be laid for the second subject 
of investigation: opinion leadership. 
Section 3 not only defines the term opinion leadership as it is used in the present 
study but also explains why it is important for political campaigners to understand 
the attributes and behaviour of opinion leaders. A description of the research 
origins of the opinion leadership concept in section 3.1 serves as an introduction 
to the topic. In the 1940’s, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues were the first to suggest 
that some individuals influence the political views of others in their social 
environment by providing them with advice and relaying media information to 
them. Critics have pointed out that Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s (1944) 
Two-Step Flow Model, which views opinion leaders as mediators between the 
media and the general public, needs to be seen in the context of various other 
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flows of information and influence. Based on the discussion of the Two-Step 
Flow Model, section 3.2 defines the term opinion leadership as it was conceived 
of by Lazarsfeld – the same conception that is used in the present study. For 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), opinion leadership is a behavioural variable describing 
the informal exertion of influence on others in a specific field of interest. When 
comparing different studies, it is important to clearly distinguish between this and 
other conceptions of opinion leadership, which define opinion leadership as a 
general character trait or by the level of engagement in political participation. 
Similarly, one needs to be cognisant of differences in measurement which may 
impact the quality and comparability of empirical data. Hence, section 3.3 
contrasts the self-designating method employed in the present study with 
alternative approaches. Following these methodological distinctions, section 3.4 
provides a detailed account of the role of opinion leaders in individual political 
opinion formation. It is illustrated that most media information flows directly 
from the media to the general public, but that opinion leaders have considerable 
influence on the subsequent evaluation of the received information. Three theories 
of social influence are described to explain the reasons non-leaders have to 
conform to the views of opinion leaders and why opinion leaders may be 
motivated to exercise influence. Non-leaders may follow the advice of opinion 
leaders in order to reduce the cost of information search and assessment, to be 
associated with the social group embodied by the opinion leader, or to attain 
social support. Opinion leaders, on the other hand, may give advice in order to 
attain a position of superiority and to legitimize their own viewpoints. Given the 
solid theoretical and empirical foundation of the opinion leaders’ influence 
function, it is easy to see why political campaigners are greatly interested in the 
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characteristics and information sources of opinion leaders. Prior to assessing these 
attributes of opinion leaders on the Internet, however, the existing research on 
opinion leadership in face-to-face situations needs to be examined. These findings 
from previous studies, which are presented in sections 3.5 and 3.6, serve as a 
useful point of reference for the analysis of online opinion leaders. 
Section 4 presents a theoretical analysis of interpersonal communication and 
opinion leadership on the Internet. Section 4.1 assesses the Internet’s impact on 
discussion participation by drawing on two established theories about computer-
mediated communication. Applying Social Presence Theory to interpersonal 
communication about politics provides support for the equalisation hypothesis. 
The theory suggests that those who are too shy and too introverted to discuss 
politics face-to-face express themselves with an increased forthrightness on the 
Internet. In contrast, the application of Social Network Theory to interpersonal 
political communication indicates that the Internet supplements and extends face-
to-face behaviour rather than changes the nature of discussion relationships. It is 
illustrated that the two theoretical concepts also point to different answers to the 
question whether there is a meaningful group of opinion leaders who exercise 
influence solely online. Few studies to date have examined political opinion 
leaders on the Internet. Therefore, research on marketing opinion leaders and on 
concepts similar to political opinion leadership are employed to derive hypotheses 
about the characteristics and political information sources of online political 
opinion leaders (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). These related studies suggest that 
offline opinion leaders and online opinion leaders share similar characteristics and 
rely more than non-leaders on the Internet for obtaining political information. A 
similar approach is used in section 4.3.1 to develop hypotheses regarding the third 
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major field of investigation, the comparison of the perceived influence of different 
sources on people’s political opinions. Based on Social Presence Theory as well 
as findings from the realm of marketing, I propose that online communication is 
less impactful than face-to-face interaction. Before the hypotheses are tested, 
however, section 5.1 describes the sample and methodology used. Detail is 
provided on the VZ networks, the online social network on which the data for the 
present study was collected. Following a comparison between the VZ sample and 
representative surveys, the results of the empirical analysis are presented in 
section 5.2. 
18 
 
2 Interpersonal communication 
 
2.1 Within the context of political communication research 
Habermas’ (1962) concept of the public sphere is one of the key reference points 
for political communication theory and research, as it provides a useful 
framework for the academic debate about politics, interpersonal discussion, and 
the media. The public sphere entails the spaces, independent of the economy and 
the state, in which citizens get together to deliberate and exchange ideas about 
current political affairs (Calhoun, 1992). Within such spaces the media and 
interpersonal discussions shape political opinions.  
According to Habermas (1962), the public sphere developed for the first time in 
the salons of late-eighteenth-century France as a counterbalance to the state and 
sought to make public policy more accountable to the citizens (Fraser, 1990). 
Spreading literacy, the rise of mass media, the ascent of the middle class, and 
growing importance of democratic institutions contributed to the development of 
the public sphere. The enactment of individual rights guaranteeing freedom of 
expression, free press, and free assembly also played a crucial role in the process 
(Kinder, 1998).  
Dahlgren (2005) differentiates between three dimensions of political 
communication that together comprise the public sphere. The structural dimension 
includes all formal institutional elements of the media and the laws protecting the 
freedom of communication. At the heart of this perspective lies the requirement 
that the institutions of the public sphere must be accessible to all citizens. Hence, 
media ownership, regulation, media policy and economics, as well as the rules of 
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access are important components of the structural dimension. The representational 
dimension captures the content produced by the various types of one-to-many 
media – the mass media as well as more specific publications such as newsletters 
and campaign materials. The most critical representational issues include fairness, 
truthfulness and comprehensiveness, diversity of viewpoints, balanced 
presentation, and ideological tolerance. The structural and representational 
dimensions provide the framework for the interactive dimension. On the one 
hand, the interactive dimension includes the citizens’ interpretation and use of 
media content, the process through which individuals receive and utilize what has 
been communicated to them by the media. On the other hand, the interactive 
dimension entails the citizens’ discussions about political issues. It is these 
interpersonal discussions that the next section will focus on. 
2.2 Public versus private interpersonal communication 
The academic dialogue about interpersonal communication has been complicated 
by the use of different conceptions of political talk. The spectrum of definitions 
ranges from casual, informal interaction to rule-governed, structured encounters 
(Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000). The former are typically referred to as private 
interpersonal communication, the later as public interpersonal communication. 
Tarde’s ([1899] 1989) notion of conversation about political events among people 
sitting in coffee houses is a classical example of the private kind. In contrast, 
public interpersonal communication typically refers to debates within a formal 
context such as a civic forum. 
Public interpersonal communication usually denotes the process of public 
deliberation, in which informed citizens exchange rational arguments on a given 
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policy issue (Scheufele, 2000). Deliberation is an inclusive problem-solving 
process that provides citizens with the opportunity to acquire meaningful political 
judgements. It is characterized by non-dominance, logical argumentation, and 
reciprocal comprehension. After individual viewpoints have been voiced and 
assessed, the goal is to resolve conflicts and to converge on a mutually acceptable 
solution. Deliberation seeks to provide people with new arguments which lead 
them to revise their attitudes and arrive at well-informed views (Moy & Gastil, 
2006). According to Chambers (2003), deliberation does not necessarily aim at 
consensus, as citizens are free to pursue their own interests. Nonetheless, citizens 
involved in deliberation are committed to justifying decisions to the other 
discussants.  
Procedurally, deliberation typically requires careful problem analysis, 
specification of evaluation criteria, and weighing of alternative solutions (Dewey, 
1954). Coleman and Gøtze (2001, p. 6) list a number of conditions of ideal public 
interpersonal communication, namely “access to balanced information”, “an open 
agenda”, “time to consider issues expansively”, “freedom from manipulation or 
coercion”, “a rule-based framework for discussion”, “participation by an inclusive 
sample of citizens”, “scope for free interaction between participants”, and 
“recognition of differences between participants, but rejection of status-based 
prejudice”.  
Schudson (1997) is probably the most vocal proponent of the importance of 
public interpersonal communication. He believes that informal discussions among 
intimates happen only for their own sake and do not provide benefits to society. In 
his view, political discussion is inherently complicated and conflict-ridden, which 
is why rules are required to guide the interaction. To be beneficial, political 
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conversations need to follow a set agenda and need to be oriented towards making 
decisions. Political discussions need to be a problem-solving process among 
people from different backgrounds rather than simply a sociable exchange among 
like-minded individuals. Only through public deliberation will people develop 
sensible judgements and will sound government become possible (Kim et al., 
1999). 
Although few are as pessimistic as Schudson (1997) about private interpersonal 
communication, numerous other scholars are convinced that public deliberation 
creates certain benefits. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) point to the positive 
effect on tolerance for other people’s views. Chambers (1996) believes that 
deliberation enhances the citizens’ understanding of and ability to justify their 
preferences. Fishkin (1995) anticipates an increase in social capital. Deliberation 
fosters communication networks and enhances political expertise enabling 
citizens to engage more effectively in community affairs. Overall, the equal and 
open exchange of arguments inherent in deliberation is bound to promote empathy 
among citizens (Mendelberg, 2002).  
Despite these potential advantages, public deliberation has limited practical 
relevance. In reality, it is often not possible to include all the individuals affected 
by a policy decision in the deliberative process. The introduction of online rule-
based public forums has raised hopes of enabling public deliberation on a large 
scale. But even online public forums are hard to scale up and usually reach only a 
core group of activists (Kavanaugh et al., 2006). For effective deliberation to take 
place, the number of participants needs to be restricted. Dahlberg’s (2001) 
analysis reveals that online deliberation projects fail to activate representative 
samples of citizens and shows problems in attracting participation. The inability 
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to incorporate all affected views creates inequality concerns (Ryfe, 2005). 
Furthermore, many people are unwilling to participate in public deliberation due 
to doubts about their argumentative abilities and fear of being isolated in the 
discussion. As public interpersonal communication is rather demanding, it has 
been limited to a small number of highly politically active citizens (Schmitt-Beck, 
2008). 
Private interpersonal communication, in contrast, is more personally satisfying, 
because discussants are less exposed than in public deliberation (Conover, 
Searing, & Crewe, 2002). An experiment conducted by Wyatt, Katz, Levinsohn, 
and Al-Haj (1996) shows that people are more willing to speak up in private 
settings than they are in public deliberation. Since opinion expression is less 
inhibited by social factors, private interpersonal communication seems 
particularly powerful.  
What is more, private interpersonal communication is a much more common form 
of interaction. Private interpersonal communication is often spontaneous and 
melds together with everyday conversations about issues other than politics 
(Wyatt et al., 2000). Many people talk about politics with family members, with 
friends, and with colleagues at work. In several Western European and North 
American countries, as much as 40 percent of citizens report to discuss political 
issues several days a week or every day. Germany has one of the highest rates of 
political discussion activity with 47 percent talking about politics with high 
frequency (Schmitt-Beck, 2008). It is this prevalent form of interaction, private 
interpersonal communication, that constitutes this study’s principal subject of 
investigation (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Focus of this study within the context of political 
communication research 
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2.3 Who participates in interpersonal communication? 
While private discussion activity in Germany is high by international standards, 
the figures indicate that not everyone participates in political discussions to a 
similar extent. In fact, research shows that certain individuals are less likely than 
others to engage in interpersonal communication about politics. Women are less 
prone to discuss politics than man. Those who are less well-educated, less socially 
integrated, and less politically interested are also less disposed to communicate 
about politics.  
Gender and the level of education are considered to be the most important socio-
demographic determinants of private interpersonal political communication. A 
number of studies show that males are more prone to discuss politics (e.g., 
Brickell, Huckfeldt, & Sprague, 1995; Bennett et al., 2000). Kornelius and Roth 
(2004) differentiate between political discussions at home and political talk with 
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friends and acquaintances. A study they conducted in Germany in 2003 reveals 
that men and women discuss politics to a similar extent at home, but that women 
are significantly less likely to have conversations about political matters with their 
friends. According to Kornelius and Roth (2004), educational differences are even 
more pronounced than gender disparities, however. Those holding a high school 
degree, the German Abitur, are not only substantially more likely to talk about 
politics with their friends but also converse more frequently with other family 
members. Several other researchers confirm that education is linked to 
interpersonal political interaction (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). As Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) point out, those with insufficient education often 
lack the skills necessary to contribute to political discussion. Well-educated 
individuals are typically better at absorbing intricate political information 
(Rosenberg, 1988). The lower one’s education level, the higher is the cost of 
participating in political interaction, reducing the incentive to contribute (Downs, 
1957). La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998), who find a statistically relevant 
relationship between education and frequency of political discussion, assert: 
“Education creates the human capital resources that lead to effortless engagement 
within the political system” (p. 568).  
Unsurprisingly, those who are not well-integrated within their social environment 
are also less prone to converse about politics with others. Kornelius and Roth 
(2004) illustrate that those engaged in volunteer organisations are significantly 
more prone to discuss politics with friends and family members. Leighley (1990) 
points out that the likelihood of being exposed to politically active citizens 
increases with the size of an individual’s social network. Social integration is 
usually accompanied by higher levels of trust and engagement in community 
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organisations, both of which are associated with participation in political 
discussions (Price & Cappella, 2002). Members of civic organisations and 
voluntary associations have ample opportunity to meet people, to discuss social 
and political issues with them, and to develop additional social relationships 
(Verba et al., 1995). Stamm, Emig, and Hesse (1997) regard interpersonal 
communication as the principal mechanism of community integration.  
Political interest can be seen as the motivational basis for interpersonal 
communication activity. Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi (2000) assert that a person’s 
level of political interest is possibly the best predictor of political discussion 
activity. Similarly, Beck (1991) stresses the importance of political attentiveness, 
as measured by attention to election campaigns, concern about election outcome, 
and level of political information. He finds a significant positive correlation 
between political attentiveness and exchange with personal sources. Bennett et al. 
(2000) confirm that psychological involvement in public affairs, measured by 
attention to the election as well as general interest in politics, is a potent 
determinant of political discussion.  
In summary, some citizens are less likely than others to engage in private 
discussions about political matters. A low level of education hampers a person’s 
participation in interpersonal communication about politics. If a person’s social 
network does not provide sufficient opportunities for interaction, engagement in 
political discussions is unlikely. Those who are less interested and less involved in 
the subject matter naturally are less motivated to discuss public policy issues.  
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2.4 Individual effects of interpersonal communication 
These inequalities in discussion participation raise the question whether it would 
be desirable to motivate those who are currently less active or inactive to talk 
about politics. Many academics claim that interpersonal communication about 
politics is beneficial for the health of a democracy. Most of them, however, do not 
articulate the criteria they use for judging whether a given effect is positive. In my 
view, clear valuation standards are a precondition for the proper assessment of 
outcomes. Hence, before evaluating the effects of private interpersonal 
communication on our democratic system, I will outline the valuation standard 
applied in this study.  
Aristotle (6.1317b) describes democracy as the “government of each by all, and of 
all by each” in accordance with the principles of equality and liberty. To him 
democracy is intrinsically valuable, because its procedures treat citizens as free 
and equal and facilitate self-government. Others see the value of democracy in its 
ability to bring about the best outcomes. Arneson (2003, p. 122), for example, 
asserts that “what renders the democratic form of government for a nation morally 
legitimate (when it is) is that its operation over time produces better consequences 
for people than any feasible alternative mode of governance”. For the purpose of 
this analysis, I see no need to debate the relative merits of procedural and 
consequential arguments. Instead, I take it for granted that there is both intrinsic 
value in the free and equal rule of the people and instrumental value in its good 
outcomes. Hence, I will evaluate the effects of interpersonal communication 
based on whether such communication advances or hinders the citizens’ ability to 
govern themselves and on whether it can be expected to improve or worsen the 
quality of the outcomes of the democratic process. Both of these are ultimately 
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subjective matters, but unfortunately political philosophy does not provide us with 
an objective set of criteria.  
With this yardstick in mind, let us turn to the assessment of the effects of private 
political discussions. Many scholars point to the capacity of interpersonal 
communication to render citizens more knowledgeable about politics. Sietman 
(2005) highlights that private discussions, unlike public ones, do not always entail 
logical argumentation. Nonetheless, she stresses that private discussions increase 
the quality of people’s opinions and their comprehension of political questions. A 
study conducted by Moy and Gastil (2006) illustrates that informal discussion 
among citizens is significantly associated with political know-how. Bennett, 
Flickinger, and Rhine (2000) studied empirical evidence over the last 30 years and 
found the relationship between political knowledge and discussion to be stable 
across the time period. Schmitt-Beck (2000) reveals positive correlations between 
the intensity of discussion activity across a range of different types of discussion 
relationships and political involvement among West-German citizens. De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden (2006) emphasize the relationship between private 
interpersonal communication and political sophistication. Discussion engagement 
enhances people’s capability and motivation to gain a deeper understanding of 
political issues (cf. Finkel, 1985). 
It is Wyatt et al. (2000) who establish a significant correlation between political 
conversation and “consideredness”, a more specific measure of competence based 
on the quality of the reasons a respondent quotes for holding certain political 
views. Similarly, Price and Cappella (2002) find that interpersonal 
communication extends the range of arguments taken into account when forming 
one’s opinion. And, they point out that the enlarged repertoire of arguments 
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produces political views of higher quality. Price, Nir, and Cappella (2006) show 
that not only face-to-face discussants but also those who engage in political 
discussions on the Internet score higher on “argument repertoires” scales.  
Kim et al. (1999) establish a relationship between political discussion activity and 
the clarity, consistency, and ideological coherence of a person’s arguments. It is 
often only when people have a chance to discuss their views with others that they 
realize their conflicting nature. Expressing their opinions vocally makes it easier 
to organize them in a coherent way. Scheufele (2001) even suggests that 
interpersonal political communication is a necessary condition for fully grasping 
political issues and for incorporating them into one’s existing knowledge.  
While one may not agree that it is a necessary condition, the above studies 
illustrate that political talk is associated with an improved understanding of 
political matters and of the different views individuals may hold. Since the 
citizenry has the power to elect politicians who govern in a way the citizens deem 
appropriate, one would expect enhanced political knowledge among the electorate 
to have an indirect positive impact on the quality of the outcomes of the 
democratic system. And, even if one doubts this indirect instrumental benefit, it is 
hard to deny that a more politically savvy citizenry is better able to realize its right 
of self-government.  
More fundamentally, political discussions advance the realization of this right by 
connecting individual citizens with political life. As Bryce ([1888] 1973) pointed 
out many decades ago, it is this connection that constitutes one of the most crucial 
functions of private political talk. Citizens incorporate the information they 
receive from the political realm into private conversations. These private 
conversations shape their opinions, voting decisions, and participatory behaviour. 
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All of these factors, in turn, impact the political domain. Because of this 
connecting function, private interpersonal communication can be seen as a 
prerequisite of informed self-government (cf. Wyatt et al., 2000). 
Finally, it is worth examining the relationship between political discussion 
activity and political participation, because political participation is probably the 
most direct form of the citizens’ self-government in today’s democracies. Böhnke 
(2011) puts it bluntly: “When people say democracy they mean political 
participation” (p. 18, translated from German). 
Many academics have shown that political talk promotes political participation 
(De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). Kornelius and Roth (2004) illustrate that 
those regularly engaged in political discussions with friends and family are more 
likely to vote. Schenk (1982) reveals a correlation between political conversation 
activity and engagement in citizens’ initiatives in Germany. La Due Lake and 
Huckfeldt (1998) establish a positive relationship between political discussion 
frequency and a number of traditional forms of political participation: 
Campaigning for a candidate or party, being present at candidate or party rallies, 
putting signs, buttons or bumper stickers on show, donating money, and voting. 
La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) make reference to Putnam’s (1995) idea of 
social capital. They argue that “social capital is realized through networks of 
political communication, thereby enhancing the likelihood that individuals will 
become politically engaged” (p. 569). McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) 
examine two forms of participation. Institutionalized participation includes voting 
and contacting government officials. Non-traditional participation is measured by 
one’s willingness to partake in and to speak up at civic forums on an important 
social or political issue. Public forums enable citizens to discuss their views on a 
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given subject with government officials as well as with other citizens. McLeod et 
al.’s (1999) analysis establishes statistically relevant relationships between talk 
and each form of participation. Moy and Gastil (2006) also find evidence for a 
link between interpersonal political talk and both partaking is public forums and 
sustained campaign involvement. Overall, there is strong evidence for the 
relationship between political discussion and various forms of political 
participation.  
2.5 Collective effects of interpersonal communication 
Schudson’s (1997) comments outlined in section 2.2 illustrate that not everyone 
regards private political discussions as beneficial for democratic societies. Among 
the potential drawbacks of interpersonal communication, two aggregate level 
effects have received considerable attention among scholars. Firstly, Noelle-
Neumann’s (1974) spiral of silence suggests that private political discussions may 
contribute to a silencing of the minority. Such an effect could be considered to 
violate the equality principle at the heart of self-government. Secondly, group 
polarisation theory holds that interpersonal communication within homogeneous 
groups tends to amplify prevailing individual opinions. And, because most 
interpersonal communication takes place within homogeneous environments, 
these discussions more often than not enforce the status quo. It is difficult to judge 
the impact of group polarisation on the functioning of democracy. Intuitively, it 
seems that the resulting bias in favour of the prevailing political view within the 
social group is more likely to impair than to enhance the quality of the output of 
the political system. At the same time, individuals with more firmly held political 
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opinions are more prone to vote, an essential part of the citizens’ self-government 
(Binder, Dalrymple, Brossard, & Scheufele, 2009).  
2.5.1 Spiral of silence 
According to Price et al. (2006), the most renowned theory of collective social 
influence effects is Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) spiral of silence, which is based on 
conformity research, most prominently that of Asch (1956). Noelle-Neumann 
(1974) postulates that the “climate of opinion” conveyed by the media and 
through personal conversations influences people’s willingness to voice their 
views. Those who see themselves as belonging to the majority are more prepared 
to speak up. In contrast, those who perceive their views to be contrary to the 
majority opinion are less eager to voice them. In a spiral of silence, the 
disproportionate communication activity of the majority shifts the perceived 
public opinion further in the majority’s favour. As minorities refrain from voicing 
their opinion, the majority view becomes yet stronger. 
It is worth highlighting that the silencing of the minority is driven as much by the 
current perceived climate of opinion as by the expected changes in public opinion. 
Those who recognize their viewpoint as gaining traction are more likely to be 
eager to engage in political discussions, whereas those who see support for their 
opinion on a political issue fading are less likely to plan to voice their view 
(Binder, et al., 2009). The desire not to become isolated is stronger than the wish 
to stand up for one’s own judgements (Noelle-Neumann, 1977). 
Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) theory has many facets, some of which do not deal 
with social influence but focus on media effects. Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) initial 
research shows, for example, how biased media coverage that misrepresents the 
32 
 
prevailing majority opinion can trigger a shift in public opinion. While the 
theory’s contribution to the study of media effects on public opinion formation is 
remarkable, I will focus on the spiral of silence’s conclusions with regards to 
personal opinion expression. According to Noelle-Neumann (1974), the 
relationship between personal opinion expression and perceived public opinion is 
reciprocal. Interpersonal discussions contribute to the perceived climate of 
opinion. In turn, the climate of opinion influences people’s willingness to speak 
up. Hence, the social effect of interpersonal discussions is that they indirectly 
contribute to the silencing of the minority. As it is difficult to test the first element 
of the relationship, namely the influence personal opinion expression has on the 
perceived climate of opinion, research has concentrated on the second element. 
Most academics interested in the social effects postulated by the theory 
investigate whether the perceived majority opinion influences people’s 
willingness to voice their views. If this link would be refuted, this would at the 
same time disprove the supposed indirect effect. 
Empirical results regarding this connection are mixed. Taylor (1982) found that 
perceived public support is related to willingness to express one’s opinion for 
those that are part of the majority. In contrast, Katz and Baldassare (1992) who 
analysed respondents’ readiness to speak to a reporter on a given issue found no 
proof for the spiral of silence. A meta-analysis of numerous survey studies 
conducted by Glynn, Hayes, and Shanahan (1997, p. 452) concludes that there is a 
“very small, but statistically significant, relationship between the degree to which 
a person believes others hold similar opinions and the willingness to express those 
opinions”. 19 out of the 25 analysed studies established a correlation between 
willingness to speak up and perception of prevailing public opinion. The impact 
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of the perception of future public support was confirmed by eight out of 11 
enquiries. The mean Pearson r was only .05 for both relationships, though.  
It is worth pointing out that, although Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) initial work 
analysed people’s willingness to contribute to casual conversations, most research 
on the spiral of silence has focused on public opinion expression rather than 
historical private interpersonal communication (Binder et al., 2009). Willingness 
to talk to a newspaper reporter, to donate for a certain cause, and to display 
bumper stickers are among the measures of opinion expression. These studies 
have not investigated what I understand as interpersonal political communication 
between individuals. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis I will focus on studies 
examining interpersonal political discussions rather than the above forms of 
opinion expression.  
Again, empirical findings are inconclusive. Glynn and McLeod’s (1984) analysis 
of individual expectations of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election and 
stated likelihood of engaging in future political discussion provides confirmatory 
evidence for the spiral of silence. Those who perceive support for their viewpoints 
to be fading are less willing to engage in interpersonal political discussion, while 
more of those who believe that their political party is gaining momentum plan on 
talking to others. Fuchs, Gerhards, and Neidhardt’s (1992) study of German 
citizens reveals no significant differences in willingness to engage in casual 
discussions with others between those opposing and those supporting the 
perceived majority opinion on immigration policy. Scherer (1990) even found that 
Germans who perceive themvelves to support a minority position are somewhat 
more eager to participate in interpersonal discussions about the 1987 population 
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census. Overall, the empirical evidence casts doubt on the supposed link between 
interpersonal communication and the silencing of the minority.  
Research showing people positioned at the extremes of the political spectrum to 
be more talkative raises further questions regarding the applicability of the spiral 
of silence to interpersonal communication. Schmitt-Beck (2008, p. 345) refers to 
cross-national research which illustrates “that supporters of minority parties as 
well as persons who are ideologically more extreme engage more readily in 
political discussion than adherents of the governing majority and ideologically 
moderates”. If those positioned at the extremes of the left/right scale and those 
favouring a minority party are generally more actively involved in political 
discussions than moderates, it is unlikely that interpersonal political discussion 
really has a silencing effect. Opinion intensity and involvement in the subject, 
both of which are associated with extreme political positions, apparently outweigh 
the negative effect that the perceived lack of support for one’s position has on 
one’s willingness to speak up (Hellevik & Bjørklund, 1991). 
2.5.2 Group polarisation 
Another core concept of discussion effects is group polarisation. It focuses on the 
development of opinions within individual social groups rather than at the level of 
the society. Whereas media effects play a central role in the spiral of silence 
theory, group polarisation deals only with the effects of interpersonal 
communication. It can be differentiated from Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) theory in 
a few other important respects. According to the spiral of silence, there is a 
relationship between the extent to which a person shares the perceived majority 
opinion and her planned opinion expression. Political discussion leads to a 
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perceived strengthening of the already most widely held view. Group polarisation, 
on the other hand, postulates that discussions within a homogeneous group tend to 
strengthen the group members’ opinion intensity. The concept of group 
polarisation does not conflict with findings that those with more extreme political 
views are more active in discussions. Even if supporters of minority parties are 
generally more talkative in their immediate social environment, discussion within 
homogeneous social groups may well strengthen the opinions people already hold. 
What is more, in contrast to spiral of silence studies, group polarisation research 
examines effects of historical interpersonal communication.  
Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) define group polarisation as “the phenomenon 
whereby the mean postdiscussion opinion of a group (i.e., the average of all group 
members’ opinions) is more extreme than the mean prediscussion opinion” 
(Binder et al., 2009, p. 317). The extremity of the opinion is understood as the 
intensity of the agreement or disagreement with a certain opinion. It is assessed by 
asking group members to what extent they concur with a specific statement 
regarding a current political topic.  
The group setting is a crucial determinant of the extent to which opinions become 
polarized. Brown (1986b) emphasizes the importance of pre-discussion similarity 
of opinions among group members and firmness of pre-discussion attitudes. If 
many group members already hold strong positions on a given issue, polarisation 
tends to be amplified. Homogeneous discussion groups are predisposed to 
produce more extreme collective views, as existing opinions simply need to be 
reinforced (Sunstein, 2000). The connection between homogeneous discussion 
and opinion extremity is unsurprising. Discussion with like-minded people 
provides a space for thinking about one’s attitudes and for reflecting on additional 
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arguments in favour of one’s viewpoint. Research on heterogeneous groups, in 
contrast, shows that opinions in such settings are not prone to polarisation 
(Brown, 1986b; Mutz, 2002). Discussion within diverse groups may even lead to 
a reduction in attitude extremity (Binder et al., 2009). 
Hence, whether interpersonal communication, in aggregate, leads to political 
opinions of higher intensity seems to depend on the nature of the majority of 
discussion relationships. If most conversations take place with like-minded others, 
then, political discussions more often than not should produce more polarized 
views. Thus, it is worth examining whether heterogeneous or homogeneous 
relationships are more prevalent. 
Early scholars in the field of political communication, most prominently 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), viewed interpersonal political communication as taking 
place primarily between firmly connected individuals. These relationships are 
characterized by adherence to shared social norms as well as mutual sympathy 
and trust. But in 1973 Granovetter famously emphasized the importance of 
weakly-tied connections between people. According to Granovetter (1973), the 
strength of affiliation is judged based on factors such as the time spent together, 
emotional proximity, and mutual understanding. Strong ties usually include 
connections between spouses, relatives, and friends. Weak ties normally comprise 
neighbours, acquaintances, and colleagues. Granovetter (1973) points out that 
these types of relationships are particularly important, because they provide 
discussants with new information from outside their own circle of contacts.  
Although trends towards individualisation and greater geographic mobility are apt 
to augment the importance of political communication through weak ties, most 
political discussions today still take place between family members and friends 
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(Bennett et al., 2000; Wyatt et al., 2000). In a study on the 1988 presidential 
election conducted by Beck (1991), 42 percent of respondents named their spouse, 
26 percent their relatives, and 15 percent their friends as their main discussant 
about politics. Only 14 percent regarded co-workers as their primary political 
conversation partners. Meffert’s (1999) analysis of Cross-National Election 
Survey data showed an average of 52 percent of a person’s political discussants to 
be spouses and other relatives. What is more, the vast majority of non-relative 
discussion partners were considered to be close friends.   
The data shows that family and close friends form the lion’s share of a person’s 
political communication network. This primary group is typically composed of 
like-minded individuals with similar social and political views (Wyatt et al., 
2000). Lenart (1994) refers to evidence showing that family members share the 
same candidate preference in 80 percent of cases. What is more, whenever 
persons freely choose their discussion partners, they tend to deliberately select 
others with compatible viewpoints. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987) point out that 
discussion relationships tend to be homogeneous, because people select to connect 
with some individuals while they avoid others. People choose to discuss political 
issues with some and refrain from doing so with others (cf. Schenk, 1994). 
MacKuen (1990) asserts that the alleged friendliness of the conversation 
environment, defined as the likelihood of meeting views resembling one’s own, is 
correlated with the willingness to engage in political discussion. As political 
disagreement produces dissonance, one would expect people to avoid those who 
hold divergent viewpoints in order to avert dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  
Consequently, we find a high level of agreement among discussants (Beck, 1991). 
Beck, Dalton, Greene, and Huckfeldt’s (2002) analysis of a nationwide 1992 
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election survey showed that a significant majority of Americans find themselves 
in homogeneous personal networks favouring one of the two candidates. Darr and 
Graf (2007) found 58 percent of the nearly ten-thousand respondents to their 
survey to agree or agree somewhat with political opinions of the other individuals 
in their social network. Schmitt-Beck’s (1994) analysis of a representative 
German study reveals a high degree of homogeneity across discussion 
relationships. Among married couples the agreement in terms of voting intentions 
is as high as 81 percent in Western Germany. Even with “other contacts” – the 
type of discussion relationship with the lowest level of homogeneity – agreement 
is as high as 50 to 59 percent.  
Nonetheless, people’s discussion networks are usually not entirely homogeneous 
for a number of reasons (Jones, 1986). One cannot freely choose one’s relatives 
and co-workers, for example. Few people would change jobs in order to have 
more politically like-minded colleagues. Moreover, people normally don’t check 
others’ political views before starting to interact with them. One can typically 
only choose between a limited number of discussants, and characteristics other 
than political orientation will contribute to the choice (Schmitt-Beck, 2008). Most 
relational choices, in fact, are driven by factors besides political preferences 
(Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). Research shows that discussions with co-workers 
and neighbours are not characterized by an overwhelming degree of similarity of 
viewpoints (Niemi, 1974).  
Overall, it seems that most political discussions happen within homogeneous 
environments, even though a significant minority of discussion dyads expose 
citizens to opposing political views. Hence, we would expect interpersonal 
discussions to foster a polarisation of opinions in the majority of cases. But Price 
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et al. (2006) object that group polarisation research may not be applicable to real 
life interpersonal political discussion. According to Price et al. (2006), group 
polarisation studies are confined to investigations of groups which are expected to 
reach some sort of agreement or shared judgement. Hence, doubt is cast on the 
transferability of the findings to private interpersonal political communication.  
Contrary to what Price et al. (2006) claim, a number of academics have examined 
the relationship between attitude extremity and real life political discussion 
activity outside an experimental group setting. In five independent studies, 
Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, and Carnot (1993) surveyed undergraduates 
regarding their strength of opinion and discussion frequency on various social and 
political issues. Their evidence reveals a positive relationship between self-
reported opinion extremity and the level of interpersonal political discussion. 
Binder et al.’s (2009) analysis of multi-wave nationwide U.S. mail panel data 
even established a causal connection between the two factors, with political 
conversations driving attitude extremity. 
Thus, we can conclude that interpersonal political communication tends to 
produce more intense political views. But an overall assessment of opinion 
polarisation also depends on the reasons underlying polarisation. It would be 
worrying, if people’s views become more intense primarily due to normative 
pressures. It would be more reassuring, if the additional information received 
during the discussions was the main driver behind increased opinion intensity. In 
this case, the more intense views would be accompanied by enhanced political 
knowledge.  
Social Identity Theory provides a possible explanation for the phenomenon of 
group polarisation from a normative perspective. People seek to enhance their 
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self-image by differentiating themselves from other groups as clearly as possible. 
The desire for stronger differentiation tends to produce more extreme group 
opinions. What is more, group members compete with one another to enact 
prevailing group norms in order to be most closely associated with the “normative 
ideal” of the group. The drive to outperform other group members in terms of 
norm compliance amplifies existing opinions (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1982). Maybe 
the strongest support for these processes comes from studies showing that “mere-
exposure effects” can bring about opinion reinforcement (e.g., Goethals & Zanna, 
1979; Pruitt, 1971a, 1971b). They demonstrate that the mere awareness of other 
group members’ opinions even in absence of any exchange of arguments can 
produce polarisation.  
At the same time, many scholars have examined the relation between information 
processing and polarisation (e.g., Bishop & Myers, 1974; Kaplan, 1977). Among 
these, Persuasive Arguments Theory features prominently thanks to its 
sophistication and empirical backing (Burnstein, Vinokur, & Trope, 1973; 
Burnstein & Vinokur, 1975). The theory postulates that a person’s opinion is 
determined by the quantity and quality of arguments the person reflects on when 
forming her opinion. Group settings polarize attitudes, because they provide 
arguments that are incorporated into the members’ opinion formation. The 
validity and novelty of the arguments are important determinants of informational 
influence on polarisation. Summarizing the findings of 21 published articles, 
Isenberg (1986) concludes that both persuasive argumentation and social factors 
contribute to polarisation but that the power of arguments tends to be stronger.  
In summary, there is sufficient evidence that interpersonal political 
communication tends to reinforce people’s political opinions. As most political 
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discussions about politics take place between like-minded individuals, more often 
than not they sustain or even strengthen the status quo rather than challenge 
prevailing opinions (cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). Fortunately, in 
many cases this process is accompanied by an increase in the quantity and quality 
of arguments supporting people’s views. Nonetheless, discussions within a 
homogeneous environment are unlikely to foster a better understanding of and 
tolerance for conflicting views. 
It seems that only discussions with people holding opposing political views are 
able to create an appreciation for conflicting opinions and empathy among 
citizens. Since these discussions typically take place among weakly-tied 
individuals, Beck (1991) concludes that the “strength of weak ties” identified by 
Granovetter (1973) lies in their capacity to expose people to alternative views. 
According to Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995), people regularly discuss political 
issues with weakly tied partners and that these exchanges contribute positively to 
the substance of the political community. Heterogeneous political discussions 
may be less frequent than communication with like-minded others but they are of 
considerable importance for our democratic system.  
Overall, we find that interpersonal communication is beneficial for our democratic 
culture. It enhances people’s political knowledge and the quality of their opinions 
and also promotes political and civic engagement. This can be considered 
advantageous both from a proceduralist and from an instrumentalist perspective. 
Arguments suggesting that interpersonal communication has a silencing effect on 
minorities and, thus, creates equality concerns, are not adequately supported 
empirically. While it is true that discussions with like-minded others tend to 
reinforce existing opinions, the impact this has on the functioning of democracy is 
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difficult to judge. Moreover, there is ample evidence for interaction between those 
holding opposing views nurturing the citizens’ understanding of alternative 
standpoints. Given that interpersonal communication is primarily associated with 
positive effects, it would be desirable to motivate previously passive individuals 
to discuss politics. But before investigating whether the Internet is able to do so, I 
will turn to the second principal subject of this thesis, opinion leadership. 
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3 Opinion leadership 
Opinion leaders are considered particularly important for the study of 
interpersonal communication, because it is through interpersonal discussions that 
they exercise influence on the views and behaviour of others. This section 
describes the relevant theoretical concepts and empirical findings regarding 
opinion leadership in face-to-face situations. After presenting the Two-Step Flow 
Model that introduced the idea of opinion leadership, I will contrast the definition 
of opinion leadership used in this study with alternative conceptions. Similarly, 
the technique employed herein for identifying opinion leaders will be contrasted 
with other methods of measurement. Following these definitional and 
methodological distinctions, both the reasons for non-leaders to conform to the 
views of opinion leaders and the motivation behind the opinion leaders’ exercise 
of influence will be examined in detail. Finally, the present section summarizes 
the current state of research regarding the characteristics and sources of opinion 
leaders. This information forms the foundation for the subsequent analysis of 
opinion leadership on the Internet. 
3.1 The Two-Step Flow Model 
The concept of opinion leadership originates from research on media effects. With 
the rise of mass communication in the 1920’s, academics began to examine the 
impact of mass media on political opinion formation. It was then that Walter 
Lippmann and Harold Lasswell laid the foundations of modern political 
communication study. Lippmann’s (1922) famous book Public Opinion analysed 
political propaganda, which was seen as dangerously influential at the time. 
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Contrary to popular current opinion, Lippmann (1922) highlighted the positive 
role of the media in a democracy (Rogers, 2004). He pointed out that free media 
are vital for creating a lively exchange of opinions and for fostering citizen 
participation. Similarly, Lasswell (1927) focused on the effects of messages 
disseminated through mass communication channels.  
Like Lippmann (1922) and Lasswell (1927), Lazarsfeld and his colleagues 
planned on assessing direct media effects, which at the time were seen as the most 
important determinant of people’s opinions. In the first quantitative study 
examining changes in voting preferences, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) interviewed a 
panel of 600 voters in Erie County. Every month over the six months before the 
presidential election, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) queried the respondents about their 
political opinions and sources of information. Although most questions focused 
on media sources, subjects were also asked with whom they had talked recently 
about politics and whether they had listened to friends and family members 
discussing political issues.  
To the surprise of the researchers, people reported more frequently to be exposed 
to and persuaded by personal political discussions than political newspaper or 
radio content. Particularly those with relatively little political interest, those who 
made their voting decision relatively late, and those who changed their preference 
during the six months revealed a strong dependence on personal discussions. 
People who were more open to influence, thus, relied more heavily on personal 
discussions to inform their voting decision. When asked to name the sources most 
critical to their opinion formation, those who had changed their voting preference 
more commonly quoted friends and family members.  
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Moreover, certain individuals were identified as particularly influential in their 
social environment. 21 percent of respondents reported having tried to convince 
others of their political ideas or having been asked for political advice. These 
individuals were labelled “opinion leaders” by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). Opinion 
leaders were characterized by high levels of political interest, frequent 
participation in political discussions, and higher exposure to the media. In 
addition, they perceived mass media to have a significantly higher than average 
influence on their opinions.  
These findings for the first time established a complementary relationship 
between interpersonal communication and the media in political opinion 
formation (Rogers, 2004). The evidence led Lazarsfeld et al. (1944, pp. 151-2) to 
suggest “that ideas often flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from 
them to the less active sections of the population ... The person-to-person 
influence reaches the ones who are more susceptible to change, and serves as a 
bridge over which formal media of communications extend their influence”. 
These remarks in the closing pages of The People’s Choice constitute the 
foundation of the Two-Step Flow Model. The rationale behind the model runs as 
follows: Personal influence is an important factor. It is primarily exercised by 
individuals who are more attentive to the media than those they influence. Hence, 
influential individuals take information from the media and pass them on to those 
less exposed to newspapers and the radio. 
Since Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) had only discovered the importance of interpersonal 
influence by coincidence, five years later Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) conducted a 
more systematic and comprehensive investigation of the Two-Step Flow Model. 
Their findings published in Personal Influence more firmly established the 
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concept of opinion leadership. Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) Erie Study relied on one 
end of each self-reported conversation tie. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), in contrast, 
analysed both ends of a communication dyad. Not only randomly sampled 
individuals but also their conversation partners were interviewed. 800 women in 
Decatur, Illinois, were queried in panels to determine the sources of influence on 
various routine decisions in the areas of politics, fashion, marketing, and cinema 
going. The researchers identified instances of opinion change and asked the 
respondents to describe the factors that had influenced those changes. People who 
were often quoted as having influenced others were sought for confirmatory 
interviews. For those individuals who reported to have influenced others, their 
counterparts were contacted for confirmation.  
In this different experimental setting, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) confirmed the 
core conclusions drawn from the Erie Study. Interpersonal influence was reported 
to be more important than media influence. Furthermore, the findings validated 
the crucial role of opinion leaders in the process of opinion formation. They 
confirmed that there is a group of individuals in any social setting who act as a 
source of information and guidance for their immediate environment. Through 
their guidance function, these opinion leaders direct the process of opinion 
formation and change. Leadership here is understood as the informal and often 
unconscious day-to-day exercise of influence within small social groups of family 
members, friends, and neighbours. The opinion leaders’ influence is based on 
their capacity to select and modify the information they transmit. They are not 
impartial reporters, but send on only certain pieces of information (Trepte & 
Scherer, 2005). 
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Despite its continuing influence to the present day, the Two-Step Flow Model has 
been criticized on a number of accounts. Gitlin (1978) disapproves of the 
theoretical foundations the model rests on. The Two-Step Flow Model 
conceptualizes persuasion as distinct individual instances of interaction. As Gitlin 
(1978) points out, this view of persuasion ignores patterns of influence that are 
structural and persist over time. What is more, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) assume 
the comparability of decisions in domains as different as consumer buying and 
politics, an assumption that Gitlin (1978) puts into question. In addition, the Two-
Step Flow Model takes attitude change to be the single dependent variable. Only 
when attitudes change, they are considered to have been influenced. This 
definition inevitably ignores instances where opinions are reinforced or where a 
change in opinion is prevented. Finally, personal and media influence are 
presumed to be measurable in the same way and, hence, comparable. But, 
according to Gitlin (1978), the two modes of influence serve different functions 
and cannot be quantified and directly contrasted. Therefore, the model fails to 
account for the media’s power to set the public agenda and to activate entire 
networks of support for certain opinions. As this last point of critique is of 
particular relevance to the present study, it will be discussed in more detail in the 
below.  
Other scholars have criticized the Two-Step Flow Model by pointing out that 
influence does not just flow from the media to opinion leaders and then to non-
leaders. The criticism is only valid, however, if Lazarsfeld and his colleagues 
regarded the two-step process as the sole flow between people. In my view, this is 
not the case. Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) explicitly say that media content “often” 
reaches the general public via opinion leaders. Hence, they allow for the fact that 
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ideas may also flow in other directions. Moreover, Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) 
own data points to a more complex pattern of influence. In the Decatur study, 
opinion leaders in three out of four domains were more frequently subject to 
interpersonal influence than to influence from the media, for example. Similarly, 
the Elmira Study carried out in 1948 as a follow-up to the Erie investigation 
provides evidence for the opinion leaders’ reliance on personal sources of 
influence (Berelson et al., 1954). Both studies indicate that there is an exchange of 
influence in which certain individuals are both recipients and senders of influence. 
Thus, subsequent research has focused on investigating the kinds of flows that 
complement the two-step process.  
In line with the results of the Elmira and the Decatur study, Troldahl and Van 
Dam (1965) emphasize the importance of opinion sharing. Their analysis of 
interpersonal discussions about public affairs reveals a significant amount of 
reciprocal rather than one-sided exercise of influence. In three quarters of the 
examined conversations, the person reported as the opinion giver also claimed to 
have asked the other person for her opinion. Moreover, pair-wise comparison of 
conversation partners showed little meaningful difference between alleged 
opinion giver and opinion seeker. They were similar in terms of media exposure, 
knowledge of news, and most attributes of social gregariousness. Troldahl and 
Van Dam (1965) conclude that a considerable amount of political discussion goes 
on between individuals who are equally well-informed by the media. Schenk’s 
(1993) analysis of a representative German sample confirms that a large 
proportion of communication relationships are characterized by opinion sharing 
rather than unidirectional influence.   
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In another article, Troldahl (1966) points out that the Two-Step Flow Model does 
not differentiate properly between influence and information and instead assumes 
a standardized measure for both. The distinction is crucial in any analysis of 
interpersonal flow, though. Troldahl (1966) suggests that influence is likely to 
flow in steps, but that information often flows directly also to those who are not 
opinion leaders. Discussions with opinion leaders are particularly important when 
the directly received media content is inconsistent with the current view held by a 
non-leader. Besides the two-step flow of influence on opinions there is a one-step 
flow of information. Trohdahl’s (1966) one-step model of information is based on 
findings of earlier scholars. Deutschmann and Danielson (1960) demonstrated that 
opinion leaders play only a secondary role in the distribution of news information, 
as most information flows directly from the media. In a second step, the content 
received from the media induces discussions. Rogers (2003) highlights a study in 
which two-thirds of subjects ascribed their awareness of a major news event to the 
media rather than to interpersonal discussions.  
As Troldahl and Van Dam (1965) point out, not everyone participates in 
interpersonal political discussions. There is an important group of people who 
receive information only from the media but do not engage in political discussions 
at all. These “inactives” have little news knowledge, consume hardly any print 
news, come from low educational backgrounds, and are often fairly socially 
isolated. Wright and Cantor (1967) called such people, who refrain from seeking 
others’ advice, “opinion avoiders”. Wright and Cantor (1967) confirmed that 
opinion avoiders not only abstain from discussing politics with others but also use 
media sources to a lesser degree. Similar to Troldahl and Van Dam (1965), they 
emphasize that opinion leaders typically also engage in opinion seeking. In fact, 
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53 percent of opinion seekers in the area of investigation, foreign affairs, were at 
the same time opinion leaders. Weimann (1994) concludes from these findings 
that opinion leaders are mediators only to a subset of the population (cf. Merten, 
1986).  
Robinson (1976) was the first to combine the Two-Step Flow Model with the 
ideas of opinion sharing, opinion avoiding, and direct media effects into a 
comprehensive Multi-Step Flow Model (see Figure 3). Like Lazarsfeld et al.’s 
(1944) model, Robinson’s (1976) construct is based on a study of voting 
behaviour in national elections. It confirms that interpersonal communication 
tends to have a significantly stronger impact on voting preferences than the mass 
media, when people are exposed to both sources of influence. Those who engage 
in political discussion were found to be virtually unsusceptible to media influence. 
Robinson (1976) stresses, however, that not all people who consume media 
content are also engaged in political discussions. Hence, he differentiates between 
two groups of individuals with different patterns of influence: Opinion seekers, 
who are willing to discuss politics with others and are often affected by those 
discussions, and opinion avoiders, who are not interested in politics and are more 
open to the direct influence of the media. For those engaged in interpersonal 
communication, Robinson (1976) distinguishes the awareness stage, during which 
opinion leaders and non-leaders receive information from the media, from the 
subsequent evaluation stage, in which opinion leaders exert influence on others. 
Moreover, Robinson (1976) finds 68 percent of opinion givers to also receive 
opinions from others, confirming the importance of opinion sharing. His model 
allows for the fact that interpersonal influence may flow directly between two 
actors or indirectly, linking two parties via other persons.  
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Figure 3: Robinson’s (1976) Multi-Step Flow Model 
 
 
Source: Robinson (1976) 
 
Finally, Robinson (1976) mentions two further streams of influence. He did not 
include them in his Multi-Step Flow Model, however, because his data set did not 
allow him to verify them. Opinion seekers do not report to have attempted to 
influence someone or to have been asked for political advice. Nonetheless, these 
non-leaders talk to each other. In such instances, no formal influence exchange is 
identified by the model, but more subtle processes of influence may be at work. 
Even if no political topics are discussed, the discussants’ silence on political 
matters may lead to the reinforcement of their political inactivity. Furthermore, 
when opinion leaders are asked for advice or actively try to persuade others, non-
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leaders are likely to respond in some way, for example by providing feedback. As 
Robinson (1976, p. 309) points out, “it would be difficult to imagine a completely 
unilateral influence relationship”. Hence, two further flows could be added to the 
below model. 
To sum up, the Two-Step Flow Model is of considerable importance to the study 
of political opinion formation. Subsequent research was necessary, however, to 
portray the full complexity of the flow between citizens. As Huckfeldt et al. 
(2000, p. 193) point out, “any single ‘two-step flow’ of political information is 
best seen in the context of all the other two-step flows that a citizen experiences”. 
And, one may add that opinion leaders play a role not just in the dissemination of 
information but also in the assessment of that information. What is more, when 
analysing media and interpersonal influence, one need bear in mind that the two 
may not be of comparable nature. The assessment of media and interpersonal 
effects may be more complex than assumed by models which view the two as 
essentially competitive – an issue I will get back to later (see section 4.3.2). 
3.2 The concept of opinion leadership 
Notwithstanding justified criticism and evidence for direct media effects, one of 
the central conclusions of the Two-Step Flow Model continues to enjoy wide 
support. It is generally acknowledged that certain individuals – the opinion 
leaders – influence others through interpersonal communication. Since Lazarsfeld 
et al.’s (1944) initial work, countless studies have analysed various facets of 
opinion leadership. Not all of them, however, employ the same definition of the 
concept. To be able to compare their findings, it is necessary to clearly identify 
the definitional differences as well as their implications.  
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Unfortunately, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) did not provide a clear and concise 
definition of the concept they introduced. The only description of opinion 
leadership they provide reads as follows: “In every area and for every public issue 
there are certain people who are most concerned about the issue as well as most 
articulate about it” (p. 49). This description, however, does not include some of 
the most crucial elements of Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) conception of opinion 
leadership. In my view, Trepte and Scherer (2005, p. 1) summarize much more 
fittingly how Lazarsfeld and his colleagues conceived of opinion leadership: 
 
Opinion leaders are termed as people who are more influential within their 
social networks than others. They consider themselves experts in a specific 
area of interest ... and are asked for advice in this area ... Opinion leaders 
are selecting information in these areas of interest and then pass it on to 
others. 
 
Opinion leaders are not necessarily those who are most involved in and who talk 
most frequently about a certain subject matter. What defines them as opinion 
leaders is that they influence the opinions of others in their social environment 
within a specific area of interest. As Dressler and Telle (2009) rightfully 
emphasize, opinion leadership as understood by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) is not a 
personality trait or general characteristic but a type of behaviour. This defining 
behaviour can either take the form of active advice giving or it can mean 
passively being asked for advice. When exercising influence, opinion leaders 
typically select and transmit pieces of information. Finally, it is worth 
highlighting that the influence of opinion leaders is exerted informally as part of 
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the day-to-day interaction within familiar social settings (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 
1955). 
Unsurprisingly, most of those who subsequently examined opinion leadership 
adopted Lazarsfeld’s early conception. Kingdon (1970, p. 256), for example, 
defines political opinion leaders as “those to whom others turn for advice and 
information on public affairs”. Or, as Black (1982, p. 170) puts it: “For any given 
subject, there are some individuals to whom others are more likely to turn for 
advice.” According to Rogers and Cartano (1962, p. 435), opinion leaders are 
“individuals who exert an unequal amount of influence on the decisions of others” 
and “from whom others seek advice and information”. 
The above definitions illustrate that Lazarsfeld as well as those who followed his 
conception consider opinion leadership to be confined to a single domain of 
expertise, politics for example. Merton (1949) termed such subject-specific 
influence “monomorphic”. In contrast, “polymorphic”, or generalized opinion 
leadership extends across different spheres, such as fashion and public affairs. 
Even though Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) conceived of opinion leadership as 
monomorphic, they were interested in assessing the degree of overlap between 
opinion leadership in different domains. Therefore, they conducted an analysis 
contrasting the number of individuals who act as opinion leaders in multiple areas 
with the amount of overlap that would be expected if opinion leadership in 
different domains was statistically independent. They found no evidence for 
polymorphic leadership. Marcus and Bauer (1964), however, recalculated their 
data set to find a small but statistically significant crossover between categories. 
Fashion and public affairs leadership as well as marketing and public affairs 
leadership was found to be related.  
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Eisenstein (1994) suggests that opinion leaders in the realm of politics are more 
likely to be polymorphic, because politics is interconnected with many other areas 
of interest. Hellevik and Bjørklund (1991) show that the percentage of political 
opinion leaders who also exert influence in domains such as health and cars is 
higher than among the general public. Being an opinion leader in matters of 
public affairs increases the chances of being an opinion leader in other areas of 
interest. Nonetheless, for most of the combinations studied, the majority of 
opinion leaders in one domain do not exert influence in the other. Overall, it 
seems that opinion leadership is neither entirely polymorphic nor purely domain-
specific (Dressler & Telle, 2009). 
It was Noelle-Neumann (1983) who, 40 years after Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) 
study, introduced one of the first and certainly the most renowned polymorphic 
concept related to opinion leadership. Like previous definitions, Noelle-
Neumann’s (1983) “personality strength” assesses the degree to which people 
consider themselves to be a source of advice and influence. But, the notion of 
personality strength is wider than the traditional conception of opinion leadership. 
It extends beyond behavioural variables, such as advice giving and influencing, 
and includes psychological characteristics like self-assertiveness, responsibility, 
and self-assurance (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). Personality strength reflects a 
person’s confidence as a leader, her general ability to influence others, and her 
perceived impact on political and social outcomes. Personality strength is a 
general disposition or character trait that predicts a person’s level of generalized 
opinion leadership. When combined with interest in a certain area, personality 
strength leads to domain-specific opinion leadership. Since people with high 
personality strength usually have multiple fields of interest, opinion leadership 
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typically extends into several spheres (Noelle-Neumann, 1983). Thus, personality 
strength is best understood as an antecedent of opinion leadership as defined by 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). 
Although Noelle-Neumann (1983) clearly distinguished personality strength from 
opinion leadership and used appropriate terminology, some academics have 
adopted Noelle-Neumann’s (1983) concept as a definition of opinion leadership. 
Hence, one has to be careful when juxtaposing the findings of these scholars with 
the results of those who use the traditional definition of opinion leadership. Such 
comparisons contrast opinion leadership with an antecedent of opinion leadership, 
which may create discrepancies.  
Keller and Berry’s (2003) “influentials” are another prominent conception of 
opinion leaders. Influentials are not defined by their influence on others within 
their social environment or by their personality traits. They are those individuals 
who engage most actively in civic and political participation. For Keller and Berry 
(2003) whether someone is an opinion leader depends on whether he has recently 
contacted a politician, worked for a political party, or participated politically or 
socially in other ways. This “engagement model of opinion leadership” does not 
take into account if an influential has given advice to others (Nisbet, 2005). But 
“influentialness” has been shown to be closely associated with the early 
behavioural conception of opinion leadership. Like Noelle-Neumann’s (1983) 
concept, Keller and Berry’s (2003) has been taken up by other academics. Not all 
of them, however, clearly distinguish between influentials and opinion leaders. 
Some claim to study opinion leadership, despite employing Keller and Berry’s 
(2003) definition. 
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The above discussion illustrates why it is essential to review the definitions of 
opinion leadership used, before comparing the work of different researchers. The 
present study is based on Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) original definition of opinion 
leadership. Opinion leadership is understood as a behavioural variable that 
includes both the active and the passive exercise of influence on the political 
opinions of others in interpersonal discussions (monomorphic opinion leadership). 
In the below, I will highlight whenever reference is made to a study that uses a 
different definition of opinion leadership.  
3.3 Measuring opinion leadership 
Researchers differ not only in how they define opinion leadership but also in how 
they measure it. Even those who define opinion leadership in the same way as 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), rely on different methodologies of measurement. Since 
discrepancies in measurement can impact the quality and comparability of the 
results, I will briefly compare the self-designating technique used in the present 
study to alternative approaches, namely the key informant and the socio-
metric/network techniques. Moreover, I will summarize the techniques used to 
assess personality strength as well as the operationalization of the engagement 
model of opinion leadership. 
3.3.1 Key informant method 
The key informant technique proceeds in two steps. First, individuals who are 
particularly well-informed about the flow of influence between group members 
are identified. These individuals are then asked to report which persons within the 
group act as opinion leaders (Weimann, Tustin, Van Vuuren, & Joubert, 2007). Of 
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the three methods described here, the key informant technique is used least 
frequently in practice.  
Jacoby (1974) is one of the few who employed it, among other methodologies, in 
his study of opinion leadership for different consumer product categories. Jacoby 
(1974) studied influence flow within college fraternities and sororities. His work 
shows that it is a precondition for the application of key informant procedures that 
the group members know each other. The president and the social chair of each 
organisation served as key informants about the patterns of influence. They were 
asked to report whom the majority of group members would go to for advice.  
The above example points to one of the fundamental drawbacks of the key 
informant technique. Its use is limited to small cohesive social groups, in which 
the members, or at least the informants, are knowledgeable about existing 
influence relationship. There is a substantial risk that the perception of the key 
informants is not an accurate reflection of reality. Those who are chosen as 
informants often have a relatively high social position which tends to produce 
biased judgements (Eurich, 1976). Dressler and Telle (2009) assert that detailed 
data about influence structures within the group is necessary to assess the validity 
of the reports of the key informants. Ironically, if this evidence is available, key 
informants are no longer required to identify opinion leaders. At the same time, 
the methodology is especially time and cost-effective, as only a few individuals 
need to be surveyed (Weimann et al., 2007).  
3.3.2 Socio-metric and network techniques 
Socio-metric procedures require all members of a social group to report whom 
they turn to for guidance and information. The opinion leaders are those 
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individuals who are identified most often by others as givers of advice and 
information. In a second step, network analysis is applied to systematically map 
the communication structure of the group. A sociogram can help to illustrate the 
patterns of influence as well as the relative strength of flows between discussants 
(Schenk & Döbler, 2002).  
Weimann (1982), for example, obtained a socio-metric mapping of an Israeli 
Kibbutz community by interviewing each of its 270 members. Each individual 
was asked to report the importance, frequency, and duration of each of his 
conversation ties with other members of the community. Scores given by each 
conversation partner were added together to rate the strength of each dyad. In a 
next step, communication groups within the community were identified by a 
repeated reorganisation of the communication matrix. The members of each such 
clique were grouped into those located at the centre of the group, those at the 
margins – with few connections within the group – and ordinary members.  
To identify opinion leaders, each member was interviewed regarding his 
awareness of certain news items as well as the source of this knowledge. The data 
allowed the researchers to establish which individuals within each group had 
activated certain information and influence flows. The study revealed that 
influence within cliques is exerted primarily by centrally positioned persons 
acting as opinion leaders. Centrality comprises three elements: The number of 
direct connections, the closeness to other members of the group, and the extent to 
which one serves as a bridge for the information and opinion exchanges of others, 
i.e. betweenness.  
The socio-metric technique is considered the most reliable, as its complex design 
permits the investigation of the relationship between opinion leaders and 
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followers (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). Network analysis enables the researcher to 
examine the direction as well as the strength of the communication relationships 
(Kim, 2007). Rogers (2004) emphasizes the high validity of the method. At the 
same time, he points out that a significant number of subjects need to be 
interviewed in order to identify a relatively small number of influencers. 
Consequently, the procedure is relatively expensive and harder to administer 
(Weimann et al., 2007). More importantly, socio-metric techniques are limited to 
the relatively rare cases where all the members of a communication network can 
be questioned. Hence, the method is primarily employed in the analysis of small 
entities (Eurich, 1976). 
More recently, researchers have combined network analysis with text mining 
techniques in order to identify opinion leaders within electronic discussion 
groups. Such methods are promising as they are expected to provide high quality 
information, but do not require extensive surveys. Bodendorf and Kaiser (2010), 
for example, describe a three-step process through which opinion leaders can be 
discovered in online forums. First, text mining is used to classify each forum 
user’s opinion regarding a certain topic as positive, negative, or neutral. Then, 
relationships among participants are established based on the references users 
make to each other’s postings. Lastly, the evidence on communication 
relationships forms the basis on which each user’s centrality in the network is 
assessed. Although further studies are required to test the validity of electronic 
text mining and network analysis for the identification of opinion leaders, the 
work conducted to date indicates that such methods may play a significant role in 
future opinion research. 
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3.3.3 Self-designating method 
The self-designating technique employed in the present study relies on people’s 
judgements of their own level of opinion leadership. People are asked to rate the 
extent of their opinion leadership on certain scales. Self-designation is the only 
technique that can be used for large random samples which permit neither the 
interviewing of all members of the communication network nor the identification 
of individuals who are cognisant of the entire system of influence within the 
group. The applicability in the analysis of extensive survey data accounts for the 
popularity of the method (Trepte & Scherer, 2005).  
Clearly, the quality of the results depends on the accuracy of people’s self-image 
(Rogers, 2004). As Schenk and Döbler (2002) point out, though, subjects have a 
tendency to overestimate the strength of their own influence. Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955), for example, conducted follow-up interviews to confirm the results of 
their self-designation survey. 36 percent of the influence attempts reported by 
opinion leaders were not confirmed by the designated influencees. Similarly, 
Schenk (1993) used the socio-metric technique to validate self-reported data, 
finding evidence for people’s tendency to overestimate their own opinion 
leadership qualities. In another study carried out by Yale and Gilly (1995), 
information seekers confirmed only a third of self-reported opinion leaders. It 
seems that the self-designating method “sacrifices a moderate degree of accuracy 
for the sake of economics and expediency“ (Weimann et al., 2007, p. 177).  
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) as well as many studies that followed utilized a two-item 
self-report scale to measure opinion leadership. Respondents were asked whether 
they had recently attempted to persuade anyone of their political ideas and 
whether anyone had asked them for guidance on political issues lately. Individuals 
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who answered either of the two questions affirmatively were categorized as 
opinion leaders with the remainder of persons being called followers. Rogers and 
Cartano (1962) criticized that Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) dichotomous answer scale 
does not reflect the fact that opinion leaders differ in the frequency and force with 
which they influence others. I agree that opinion leadership is best understood as a 
continuous variable. Hence, the present study uses a five-point answer scale for 
each of the two questions Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) employed to measure opinion 
leadership. In the below, I will clearly identify any study that is based on the 
socio-metric or the key informant method instead of the self-designating 
technique utilized in the present study. 
3.3.4 Measurement of related concepts 
Section 3.2 introduced two important concepts related to opinion leadership, 
which some scholars have used synonymously with opinion leadership. As I will 
make reference to both personality strength and “influentials” in my analysis, it is 
worth reviewing the self-designating scales employed to measure each concept. 
Moreover, I will describe Darr and Graf’s (2007) method for identifying “poli-
fluentials”, a concept similar to Keller and Berry’s (2003) influentials. 
In the 1980’s, the German magazine Der Spiegel tasked the Allensbach Institute 
with developing a new procedure for identifying among its readership consumers 
who are particularly active and influential within their community. For the 
Allensbach Institute, Noelle-Neumann (1983) used evidence from a representative 
German sample to test a scale originally consisting of 34 items. Initially, the scale 
was reduces to 13 self-report items, each allocated an individual weight reflecting 
its correlation with the other items. In 1984, three further questions were deleted 
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from the scale following a series of tests showing that results were not materially 
impacted by the reduction (Noelle-Neumann, 2002). The final 10-item scale 
allows placing each respondent along a continuum of personality strength (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Noelle-Neumann’s (1983) personality strength scale: Items and 
weighting 
Yes No
1. I usually rely on being successful in everything I do. 13 7
2. I am rarely unsure about how I should behave. 14 7
3. I like to assume responsibility. 15 7
4. I like to take the lead when a group does things together. 17 8
5. I enjoy convincing others of my opinions. 15 7
6. I often notice that I serve as a role model for others. 16 8
7. I am good at getting what I want. 14 7
8. I am often a step ahead of others. 18 9
9. I have many things others envy me for. 15 9
10. I often give others advice and suggestions. 15 10/5
Weight
 
Source: Noelle-Neumann (1983); items translated into English by Weimann (1991) 
 
Original validity tests have been criticized for relying solely on the correlation 
between the scale’s results and the interviewers’ impressions (Weimann et al., 
2007). Later analysis by Weimann (1991), however, confirms the validity of 
Noelle-Neumann’s (1983) concept. The output of the scale was compared to 
results from a network analysis of the same respondents. Meaningful correlations 
revealed that individuals with high scores on the scale are better connected with 
others in the community and, more specifically, with other members of their 
immediate social clique. Moreover, most of the flow of influence and information 
was activated by persons with high scores. Testing in two different cultural 
contexts, namely Israel and Germany, provides further support for the measure’s 
usefulness and efficiency in identifying opinion leaders. 
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As mentioned above, Keller and Berry (2003) designed a scale which identifies 
political opinion leaders, or “influentials”, based on their level of engagement in 
civic and political participation. Respondents are presented a list of eleven 
political and civic activities (and one dummy item) and are asked in which of 
these they have engaged in during the past year. Respondents who answer 
affirmatively with regards to at least three activities are classified as influentials 
(see Appendix A for the list of activities). Later examinations confirm that the 
results of this participation-based methodology are significantly correlated with 
behavioural measures of opinion leadership, like the one used in this study. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the individuals classified as opinion leaders by 
Keller and Berry’s (2003) method have similar attributes as the opinion leaders 
identified by traditional techniques. 
Inspired by Keller and Berry’s (2003) work, Darr and Graf (2007) designed the 
concept of “poli-fluentials” to measure political opinion leadership based on civic 
and political activities. Individuals who have engaged in at least three out of seven 
ways of publicly voicing their opinion and who have either donated money 
repeatedly or donated as well as volunteered for a political candidate are classified 
as poli-fluentials (see Appendix A). Contrary to Keller and Berry’s (2003) scale, 
Darr and Graf’s (2007) measure includes both online and offline advocacy. Like 
influentials, poli-fluentials have very similar characteristics as political opinion 
leaders identified by scales measuring advice giving and influence on others’ 
opinions. 
As has been shown, several established scales exist for measuring opinion 
leadership and related concepts based on people’s self-reports. When comparing 
different studies, one needs to pay attention to the measurement used. Self-reports 
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of political advice giving, general personality strength, and political participation 
activity may yield different results, despite significant statistical relationships 
between the three concepts. 
3.4 Functions of opinion leaders 
Now that the term opinion leadership has been defined for the purpose of the 
present study, I will assess the factors that explain the opinion leaders’ 
significance for political campaigners and for others interested in understanding 
processes of political opinion formation. First, I will separate the role of opinion 
leaders in the dissemination of information from the exertion of influence. As part 
of the analysis of the influence function of opinion leaders, I will outline the 
reasons people may have to follow their guidance and what may motivate them to 
influence others.  
As the above mentioned critics have pointed out, the Two-Step Flow Model did 
not clearly separate the analysis of the flow of influence from the examination of 
the flow of information. Even though this differentiation was not reflected in the 
research design, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) did explain that the importance of 
opinion leaders for individual political opinion formation derives from two 
functions they fulfil. Opinion leaders have a “relay function” in that they forward 
information received from the media on to other citizens. At the same time, 
opinion leaders fulfil a “reinforcement function”, which Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955, pp. 82-3) describe as follows: “When a mass media influence-attempt 
coincides with interpersonal communication, it appears to have much greater 
chance of success”. Hence, reinforcement is taken to describe the opinion leaders’ 
influence function.  
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3.4.1 Relay function 
Deutschmann and Danielson (1960) were among the first to point out that the 
Two-Step Flow Model overestimates the opinion leaders’ role in relaying 
information. They showed that most news flow directly from the media to the 
general public and are, in a second step, discussed with others. According to 
Deutschmann and Danielson (1960), it is at that stage that opinion leaders who 
tend to be more knowledgeable about the subject matter provide non-leaders with 
additional information. Deutschmann and Danielson (1960) conclude that opinion 
leaders primarily have a supplementary relay function. They add to, correct, and 
validate the information received from the media.  
Subsequent research on news diffusion has generally confirmed the importance of 
this one-step flow of information (Troldahl, 1966), but has also shown that the 
extent to which media information is relayed by opinion leaders depends on its 
news value. Rosengren (1973, p. 84) defines the news value of a report of an 
event as “the number of persons that feel involved in the report of the event (and, 
indirectly, in the event itself)”. News value refers to reports “as perceived and 
used by the audience”. Deutschmann and Danielson’s (1960) investigation 
focuses on information with average news value. Several studies support the view 
that opinion leaders have only a negligible or supplementary role in conveying 
information of low or average importance (Hill & Bonjean, 1964; Eurich, 1976; 
Basil & Brown, 1994). 
When news have well above-average value and stand out from the daily news 
flow, however, opinion leaders play a more significant role in the transmission of 
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information (Rosengren, 1973). Hill and Bonjean (1964) find a relationship 
between news value of information and the importance of personal discussion for 
information diffusion. According to their evidence, more than half of respondents 
have heard about the Kennedy assassination through interpersonal sources. A 
meta-analysis of 34 studies on news diffusion conducted by Basil and Brown 
(1994) reveals a positive association between the probability of hearing the 
information from personal sources and the importance of the news event. 
Moreover, they find interpersonal communication to be almost as important as the 
media in the dissemination of “Magic” Johnson’s HIV test results. Müller (1970) 
explains that, if news is perceived as important by opinion leaders, they are more 
likely to forward it on, assuming that others will also consider the news as 
essential.  
Notwithstanding wide support for the positive relationship between news value 
and the role of opinion leaders in relaying media information, a number studies 
find media sources to be more important even for information of high news value. 
Larsen and Hill (1954) investigated the diffusion of news about the death of 
Senator Taft in 1953, an important news event at the time. The data showed that 
only 35 percent of university faculty members learned about the news from 
personal sources. Among residents of a low-rent housing community, the second 
surveyed group, 83 percent were first informed by the media. Weibull, Lindahl, 
and Rosengren (1987) examined diffusion of the news in Sweden that the Prime 
Minister had been murdered. They found that only a third of respondents learned 
about the event from other individuals. In Rogers and Seidel’s (2002) U.S. study 
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 59 percent of respondents heard the news 
on television or on the radio. 40 percent were told about the event through 
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interpersonal communication. In Germany, only 23 percent learned about the 
attacks through discussions with others. 73 percent received the news from 
television or from the radio, while 2 percent were informed first via the Internet 
(Emmer, Kuhlmann, Vowe, & Wolling, 2002). 
Greenberg (1964) also analysed the dissemination of the report of the Kennedy 
assassination, obviously a news item of extremely high value. Similar to Hill and 
Bonjean (1964), he found that personal sources were just as important as media 
sources for hearing about the event. Greenberg (1964) highlights that when people 
are at home they tend to learn about an important event via the media. When they 
are out they are more likely to receive the news through discussions with others. 
Mayer, Gudykunst, Perrill, and Merrill (1990) show that approximately half the 
people learned about the Challenger explosion from others. Summarizing a 
number of different studies, Eurich (1976) concludes that personal and media 
sources play an equally important role in the dissemination of information of very 
high news value (cf. Eisenstein, 1994). To sum up, the relay function of opinion 
leaders is minimal for information of low or average value, but it is at least of 
some significance for highly important news.  
3.4.2 Reinforcement function 
Whereas the importance of opinion leaders in the flow of information is limited, 
they are acknowledged to play a significant role in the flow of influence (Schenk 
& Döbler, 2002). Most information is not filtered by opinion leaders, but received 
directly from the media. In a second step, however, opinion leaders often exert an 
influence on the information evaluation and opinion formation of non-leaders, for 
example by reinforcing media messages. Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) were the first to 
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propose that interpersonal conversations have more persuasive force than mass 
media effects. When asked to name the sources most essential to their political 
opinion formation, people rank family, friends, and acquaintances higher than 
newspapers and the radio. Similarly, respondents in Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) 
study reported interpersonal influence to be more important than the media. Keller 
and Berry (2003) have shown that even opinion leaders value personal sources 
more highly than traditional media sources. Today, it is widely accepted that in-
person discussions have more direct influence than the different types of mass 
media (Dressler & Telle, 2009). 
Kiecker and Cowles (2002, p. 73) define such social influence as “any change, 
whether deliberate or inadvertent, in an individual’s beliefs, attitudes, and/or 
behaviors, that occurs as the consequence of interpersonal communications”. 
Academics quote a number of differences between media messages and 
interpersonal communication in order to explain the strong influence of 
discussions with others, most notably with opinion leaders. Unlike more casual 
interpersonal discussions, media messages are often perceived only selectively, 
not correctly interpreted, or even outright rejected (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). 
Interpersonal exchange tends to be regarded more favourably, because it is more 
informal and often less overtly aimed at persuasion (Eisenstein, 1994). Face-to-
face communication is more flexible as it allows for feedback between opinion 
leader and recipient. The recipient’s questions and doubts can be addressed 
instantaneously (Dressler & Telle, 2009). In contrast, the adaptive capacities of 
the media are limited. The message cannot be tailored and adjusted in the same 
way as in face-to-face interaction (Kotowski, 2007). What is more, interpersonal 
interaction is not limited to verbal and visual statements but has a larger capacity 
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for socio-emotional messaging. Ball-Rokeach and Reardon (1988, p. 142) point 
out that interpersonal discussions have “higher sensory authenticity than the mass 
form because it may simultaneously appeal to sight, sound, kinaesthetic, smell, 
taste, and touch senses”.  
At the same time, media messages differ from the information conveyed through 
conversations in terms of objectivity. Analyses of U.S. media content suggest that 
American newspaper and television coverage is characterized by neutrality rather 
than favouritism. Graber (1980) finds explicit bias to be very rare in U.S. 
newspapers. This is particularly noteworthy as many newspapers were originally 
set up as vehicles for party propaganda (Beck, 1991). Robinson and Sheehan 
(1983) identify only a small number of value judgements and direct comments 
about the qualities and prospects of individual candidates on U.S. television. Even 
though Patterson and Donsbach (1996) find evidence for a measurable 
relationship between a journalist’s partisanship and his news decisions, they 
acknowledge that the relationship is not robust.  
Studies of German media reports paint a different picture. Almost unanimously, 
they find partisan coverage across the German media universe (see Schönbach, 
1977; Hagen, 1992) with a bias towards to left side of the political spectrum 
(Kepplinger, 2002). While the discrepancy between U.S. and German findings 
regarding actual partisanship is noteworthy, for the purpose of judging the relative 
influence of the media and of interpersonal discussions another variable is more 
critical, namely perceived objectivity. Independent of actual partisanship, if 
citizens perceive the media to be objective, they find it hard to utilize its messages 
in their political opinion formation, because allegedly neutral information is 
difficult to incorporate into one’s belief system (Huckfeldt et al., 2000). And, as 
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Schmitt-Beck’s (1994) survey of East-German and West-German citizens shows, 
the majority of people do not perceive television and newspapers to be biased 
towards any political party. In East-Germany, for example, less than a quarter of 
the population regards either news source as partisan. In contrast, political 
discussions tend to carry a recognizable bias and, thus, are a more efficient source 
of political direction (Eisenstein, 1994). Because the sender often provides not 
only facts but also his explicit evaluation of these facts, it is easier for the 
recipient to accept or reject the transmitted information (Merten, 1988). 
In order to better understand the influence function of opinion leaders that 
explains their particular relevance for political campaigners, it is worth reviewing 
the major theories about why people are susceptible to their influence. Deutsch 
and Gerard’s (1955) Dual Process Theory draws the important distinction 
between informational and normative reasons behind influence. Park and Lessig 
(1977) separate the normative element into a value-expressive and a utilitarian 
component. When influence is utilitarian, the influencee adjusts his behaviour to 
avoid punishment or to attain rewards from the influencer. When influence is 
value-expressive, behaviour change is motivated by the desire to be associated 
with a positive reference group.  
3.4.2.1 Dual-Process Theory 
Conceptualizing findings of various small group experiments, Deutsch and Gerard 
(1955) differentiate between informational and normative influence. Influence is 
informational, if the perceived validity and quality of the conveyed information 
motivates the subject to conform. It is normative, when the person subject to the 
influence conforms simply to be viewed favourably by the influencer or his social 
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environment. Informational influence rests on convincing arguments, while 
normative persuasion is based on compliance with social norms (Kaplan & Miller, 
1987).  
Attempts to compare the persuasive force of normative and informational 
influence yield conflicting results (e.g., Burnstein & Santis, 1981; Nolan, Schulz, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). The difficulty of such comparison is 
not surprising, given that the two types of influence seldom occur in an exclusive 
fashion (Kelman, 1961). In most instances both kinds of influence are intertwined 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Which arguments are regarded as valid is ultimately a 
subjective question and the relationship between the discussants and the social 
setting of the interaction are bound to impact the perceived information quality. 
Whether the arguments have the shared support of their relevant social group and 
whether the informant is highly regarded within the group almost inevitably 
influences the assessment of the information. The soundness of arguments and the 
validity of information are judged within a given social context (Turner, 2005). In 
practice, it is often difficult to distinguish the normative force of a persuasive 
message from its factual content (Price et al., 2006).  
Even though the two kinds of influence usually cannot be clearly separated, their 
relative importance can differ depending on the problem at hand. Kaplan and 
Miller (1987) juxtaposed discussions about the correctness of alternative answers 
with debates about judgemental or positional topics. They show that when citizens 
conversed over which stance should be taken in cases of conflicting interests and 
values, normative influence plays a larger role.  
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3.4.2.2 Reference Group Theory 
Park and Lessig’s (1977) Reference Group Theory provides a notable extension to 
the widely accepted informational versus normative distinction. Although 
Reference Group Theory originates from the field of consumer research, its 
findings are of considerable relevance for the study of social and political 
interpersonal influence. Building on Kelman’s (1961) famous article Processes of 
Opinion Change, Park and Lessig (1977) decompose influence into three separate 
elements. Informational influence is similar to the concept proposed by Deutsch 
and Gerard (1955) and is further specified with reference to Kelman’s (1961) 
internalization process. Informational influence is internalized, or accepted, if the 
influencee recognizes it as ameliorating his knowledge about the issue in 
question. Informational influence reduces the decision uncertainty perceived by 
the influencee (Bearden & Etzel, 1982).  
The informational influence of opinion leaders is of particular importance, as 
many people refrain from conducting a comprehensive search and assessment of 
political information. Non-leaders often prefer to obtain arguments from opinion 
leaders, because otherwise they would have to incur considerable costs in terms of 
time and energy (Downs, 1957). What is more, those willing to engage in 
comprehensive search and evaluation are often hampered by limited cognitive 
abilities (Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995). As Schenk and Döbler (2002, p. 49) 
put it, “the role of opinion leaders lies in assessing and evaluating information 
seen, heard, or read in the mass media; in this way opinion leaders are an aid to 
orientation in a confusing, information-overloaded world. In terms of system 
theory, they often function to reduce complexity.” Opinion leaders can assist non-
leaders in forming opinions by providing missing data and by interpreting and 
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presenting complex information in an easily digestible fashion (Eurich, 1976). 
Huckfeldt et al. (2000, p. 175) assert that in interacting with opinion leaders 
people are able to convert the “daunting challenge” of acquiring a view on 
political issues into something enjoyable and positive.  
Normative influence is split into a utilitarian and a value-expressive category, 
both of which are linked to the person’s reference group. Park and Lessig (1977, 
p. 102) define a reference group as “an actual or imaginary individual or group 
conceived of having significant relevance upon an individual’s evaluations, 
aspirations, or behavior”. Utilitarian influence is driven by the desire to attain 
social rewards and to avert punishment from the reference group. The influencee 
conforms to the views of others, who he believes to value such compliance. Park 
and Lessig (1977) refer to Kelman’s (1961) definition of compliance, which does 
not entail deep-routed opinion change. Utilitarian influence leads only to public 
conformity, a change of behaviour without a true change in the person’s 
convictions.  
Compliance can be differentiated from identification, which is characterized by 
private acceptance – a durable conversion of opinion. When the influencee 
identifies with the source, he is truly convinced of the viewpoint or behaviour that 
he takes up. Identification forms the theoretical basis of the third type of 
influence, value-expressive influence. The influencee seeks to improve his self-
image by associating himself with a positive reference person or group. He tries to 
be similar to or feels the desire to be loyal to the group, because he has a positive 
perception of the reference entity (Bearden & Etzel, 1982). In contrast to 
compliance, identification does not hinge on the observability of the influencee’s 
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behaviour on part of the influencer. It is dependent, though, on which reference 
groups the influencee views favourably and seeks to be associated with.  
Once someone has established which groups he desires to be associated with, he 
needs information on which opinions and behaviour to adopt. And, it is often the 
opinion leaders who signal to the rest of the social group which attitudes and 
behaviours are acceptable. Opinion leaders are typically those individuals who 
most closely embody the central values of the group (Dressler & Telle, 2009). 
They tend to be particularly interested in and aware of the group’s behavioural 
standards. Moreover, opinion leaders provide legitimization and decision support 
for non-leaders by giving an appraisal of information received from the media 
(Schenk & Döbler, 2002). As Baumgarten (1975, p. 12) puts it, opinion leaders 
provide a “peer group legitimate” interpretation of new information. These 
normative functions of opinion leaders are increasingly important, as the 
alignment of social groups and political parties weakens and people’s political 
loyalties provide less and less guidance (Dalton, Flanagan, & Beck, 1984). 
3.4.2.3 Influencer characteristics 
Having laid out people’s reasons for conforming to the views of opinion leaders, 
we are now able to outline the characteristics that opinion leaders typically 
possess and that explain their persuasiveness. Social influence research 
distinguishes between three important sets of source characteristics. These 
characteristics fit well within the framework of Kelman’s (1961) processes of 
opinion change and, by extension, Park and Lessig’s (1977) Reference Group 
Theory. The effect of interpersonal discussions is a function of the credibility, 
attractiveness, and power the recipient attributes to the sender.  
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Kiecker and Cowles (2002) emphasize two dimensions of sender credibility, 
namely expertise and trustworthiness. Credibility increases with the perceived 
subject-specific experience and knowledge the source possesses, his expert power 
as Raven and French (1958) put it. At the same time, the degree to which the 
recipient regards the sender as trustworthy enhances the sender’s credibility. 
Alleged trustworthiness depends on whether the source is seen as communicating 
objectively and without bias (Hass, 1981). According to Gatignon and Robertson 
(1986), source credibility also depends on the strength of the tie between 
discussants. The higher the emotional intensity and intimacy, the greater will be 
the perceived credibility. Moreover, credibility relates to prior experience with the 
source in terms of accuracy of past recommendations (Baron & Byrne, 1984). 
Huckfeldt et al. (2000) show that trust in a person’s opinions and the extent to 
which the person is viewed as expert are correlated with the frequency of 
interaction with that person. But not only do those factors influence the frequency 
of discussion, they also impact the persuasiveness of discussion. Studies 
consistently show that sources high in trustworthiness are more persuasive (Insko, 
1967). Credible sources provoke more immediate opinion change than do those 
recognized as less credible (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). Messages from credible 
sources are more likely to be perceived as accurate reflections of facts and, thus, 
have more persuasive power (Kelley, 1967; Buda, 2003). High source credibility 
hinders counter-argumentation, which in turn makes the interpersonal 
communication more persuasive (Sternthal, Dholakia, & Leavitt, 1978). High 
source credibility tends to provoke attitude change through the process of 
internalization put forward by Kelman (1961). The information is perceived as 
correct and, hence, incorporated into the recipient’s belief system, often causing a 
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permanent effect on his attitudes. Park und Lessig (1977) also highlight that an 
apparently credible source is one that is most willingly internalized.  
Attractiveness describes how similar, familiar and likeable the source is (Shelby, 
1986). This is what Raven and French (1958) call referent power, which derives 
from the recipient’s respect and appreciation for the source. Perceived physical 
attractiveness, prestige, and amicability with the recipient are key elements of 
attractiveness (Gatignon & Robertson, 1986). Importantly, alleged attractiveness 
is also related to the degree to which discussants share common preferences, 
attitudes, and characteristics (Byrne, 1961).  
The influencee is prone to pay greater attention to the information received, 
because he views the source as attractive (Sternthal & Craig, 1982). The 
influencee sympathizes with or admires the influencer and is, hence, more likely 
to adopt his position and goals with regards to a given issue. Along the lines of 
Kelman’s (1961) process of identification, the influencee tends to take on the 
opinion and behaviour of the source in order to be associated with the source. The 
creation of a gratifying relationship has a positive impact on the self-image of the 
influencee. The attitude is adopted because of who promotes it rather than on the 
basis of the quality of the argument or information given to support the opinion 
(Hass, 1981).  
Norman (1976) provides evidence for the identification mechanism at work when 
the source is perceived as attractive. In his experiment, the influence of expert 
sources depended on the number of arguments provided to support their view. The 
persuasiveness of sources viewed as attractive varied much less with the quantity 
of arguments supplied. Chaiken (1979) found attractive sources to have better 
communication skills, more self-esteem, and a higher education level. This led her 
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to conclude that attractive influencers may also be especially influential sources of 
information-induced opinion change.  
Lastly, the persuasiveness of interpersonal communication depends on the power 
the source has over the recipient. This conception of power entails Raven and 
French’s (1958) reward power and coercive power. Reward power is the ability of 
the influencer to remunerate conforming attitudes and behaviour. Coercive power 
is measured by the influencer’s capacity to threaten to punish and to actually 
punish certain influencee behaviour. Opinion leaders often exercise social 
pressure and give social support to incentivize group members to adopt certain 
opinions (Eurich, 1976). 
A source’s power can moderate the influence of interpersonal discussions. Power 
may not augment the source’s perceived credibility, but it may increase the 
influence of the exchanged information (Gatignon & Robertson, 1986). The 
influencer’s ability to reward and punish tends to lead to the compliance of the 
influencee (Kelman, 1961). Such compliance is often not characterized by deep-
rooted acceptance but by mere public conformity. Nonetheless, according to 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory, compliance may eventually lead to true 
internalization of the opinion or behaviour change. If a person’s compliant 
behaviour goes against her convictions, the inherent conflict is likely to cause her 
discomfort. In order to reduce the discomfort the person may adjust her beliefs to 
align them with her behaviour. Through this process, the behaviour or opinion 
change may become internalized (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Maccoby, 1964).  
In summary, three key characteristics help to explain why people conform to the 
views of opinion leaders and follow their advice. When non-leaders consider 
opinion leaders to be credible, they tend to be influenced by the force of their 
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arguments and use them as a source to reduce the cost of obtaining and assessing 
information. When non-leaders seek to be associated with a given social group, 
they often adopt the views and behaviour of opinion leaders who they regard as 
attractive personifications of the group norm. In this case, opinion leaders have a 
legitimizing function. Finally, non-leaders may conform to the views of opinion 
leaders in order to avoid being subjected to social pressure or to attain social 
support from them. 
3.4.2.4 Social Exchange Theory 
Having established why non-leaders are susceptible to the influence of opinion 
leaders, I will briefly present Homans’ (1958) Social Exchange Theory to 
demonstrate why opinion leaders may be motivated to exercise influence on 
others. In contrast to the above described theories which focus first and foremost 
on the reasons of the influencee, Homans (1958) also incorporates the motivation 
of the influencer.  
Social Exchange Theory applies economic principles to the study of interpersonal 
influence and views communicative interaction as an exchange of material and 
non-material goods that tends towards equilibrium. People seek to maximize the 
rewards, such as symbols of approval or prestige, and to minimize the costs of 
influence exchange. Benefits include efficient access to information and feelings 
of social approval, whereas costs involve the time and energy invested and other 
benefits foregone (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The continuation of interpersonal 
influence is predicated on attaining a state of equilibrium in which both parties 
benefit from it to a similar extent. Blau (1964, p. 6), another prominent social 
exchange scholar, stresses the importance of reciprocity: “Social exchange ... is 
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limited to actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that 
cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming”. Only if both parties 
perceive the exchange as beneficial, will it continue.  
Based on the work of Homans (1958) and Blau (1964), Gatignon and Robertson 
(1986) designed the Exchange Theory Model of Interpersonal Communication, 
which provides further detail on the motivating and inhibiting factors the 
influencer is faced with as well as the costs and benefits of the influencee. As the 
motivation of the influncee has already been discussed at length, I will focus only 
on the influencer side of Gatignon and Robertson’s (1986) equation. According to 
Gatignon and Robertson (1986), time commitments and the risk of providing poor 
or unsuitable advice are among the costs of those exerting influence on others. 
These are more than offset, however, by several benefits that motivate the 
influencer, or opinion leader, to exercise his influence. By providing advice, the 
influencer puts himself in a superior position which is characterized by 
recognition and status. The influencee is likely to express gratitude and may 
render a service to the influencer in the future. Moreover, the influence flow 
provides legitimation for the influencer’s own opinion.  
It has been shown that the influence of opinion leaders on the views and 
behaviour of others stands on solid empirical and theoretical footing. There are 
good reasons for opinion leaders to exert their persuasive power. At the same 
time, several factors motivate non-leaders to follow the guidance of opinion 
leaders. Whereas the role of opinion leaders in the assessment of information and 
opinion formation of others is generally acknowledged, they are of less 
importance in the transmission of information. People tend to hear about most 
news events directly from the media. And, in a second step, opinion leaders often 
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complement, legitimize, and assess that information. This relative prominence of 
the influence function of opinion leaders has been reflected in the research design 
of the present study (see section 5.1.2). 
3.5 Characteristics of opinion leaders 
Given the strong support for the influence function of opinion leaders, it is not 
surprising that opinion leaders are of great interest to political campaigners. 
Providing opinion leaders with one’s arguments and information and motivating 
them to convince others of one’s political position, is crucial for the success of a 
political campaign (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). To increase the likelihood that 
opinion leaders embrace and use one’s arguments, the information needs to be 
tailored to their characteristics and transmitted via the right channels. Thus, 
knowledge about the attributes and sources of opinion leaders is of significant 
relevance to political campaigners. Before investigating these aspects of opinion 
leaders on the Internet, it is worth examining the existing research on offline 
opinion leaders. The findings about the characteristics and information sources of 
opinion leaders in face-to-face situations can then be used as the basis for the 
analysis of online opinion leaders. 
I have already established that those who engage in interpersonal political 
communication are more likely to be male and score high on scales measuring the 
level of education, social gregariousness, political interest and knowledge, 
political extremity, and political participation (see sections 2.3 and 2.4). This 
section examines whether these factors are also associated with the exercise of 
influence in interpersonal communication, i.e. opinion leadership. On the one 
hand, it seems intuitively plausible that those who discuss politics more frequently 
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with others have similar characteristics as those who tend to influence others 
through discussions. On the other hand, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) highlight that 
opinion leaders are found in all occupational categories and social milieus and 
influence others within their social group. Hence, similarity between influencer 
and influencee is, at least to some extent, a defining attribute of the opinion 
leadership concept (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). A certain similarity in terms of 
background, interest, and values between opinion leaders and non-leaders seems 
to be a prerequisite of persuasion (Weimann, 1994).  
3.5.1 Socio-demographics 
Most scholars agree that there is no noteworthy linear relationship between 
political opinion leadership and age (e.g., Carter & Clarke, 1962; Kingdon, 1970; 
Garrison & Andersen, 1978; Hellevik & Bjørklund, 1991). Research on the 
relationship between gender and political opinion leadership, however, identifies a 
stronger tendency for males than females to influence others. Carter and Clarke 
(1962) find a weak association between opinion leadership and gender. In their 
study, 46 percent of men but only 36 percent of women were designated as 
opinion leaders. Kingdon (1970) confirms that males are somewhat more likely to 
be opinion leaders. A telephone poll conducted by Garrison and Andersen (1978) 
shows that males are more disposed to being political opinion leaders than 
females. Hellevik and Bjørklund (1991) identified 36 percent of men but only 20 
percent of women as political opinion leaders.  
Troldahl and Van Dam’s (1965) data revealed no correlation between social and 
occupational status and public affairs opinion leadership and only a weak 
correlation between leadership and education. Nonetheless, most studies point to a 
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statistically significant relationship between political opinion leadership and 
social status, occupation, and education. Kingdon’s (1970) analysis of face-to-
face interaction based on a national sample illustrates that opinion leaders are not 
distributed equally across formal education categories. Only 16 percent of grade 
school-educated persons were identified as leaders, which compares to almost 50 
percent of college graduates. Moreover, 42 percent of individuals of high 
occupational status reported acting as opinion leaders. In contrast, only 23 percent 
of low-status respondents identified themselves as political opinion leaders. Carter 
and Clarke (1962) substantiate these findings highlighting that those with higher 
levels of education and income are more likely to claim opinion leadership. 
Similarly, Eurich’s (1977) study of political opinion leaders in Germany confirms 
the correlation between education and opinion leadership. Hellevik and Bjørklund 
(1991) identify 45 percent of those with more than 12 years of education but only 
20 percent of those with less than eight years of education as political opinion 
leaders. Similarly, Sietman (2005) finds that opinion leaders share many of the 
characteristics of their immediate social environment but tend to be better 
educated. A further indication for the relationship between opinion leadership and 
social status is provided by Noelle-Neumann (1983), who shows that individuals 
with high socio-economic status tend to score higher on the personality strength 
scale. 
Eurich (1976) reconciles these findings with Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) assertion 
that opinion leaders are found across educational and occupational groups. Eurich 
(1976) explains that leaders are typically those individuals with a higher level of 
education and social status relative to their immediate social environment. An 
opinion leader’s education is usually better than that of others in his social group, 
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but not to the degree that it separates him from the group. Despite their relatively 
higher standing, opinion leaders still need to be similar enough to the other group 
members to be able to exert influence (cf. Beba, 1988). As Schenk and Döbler 
(2002, p. 44) put it: “Opinion leaders … cannot be detected by an absolute 
amount of education or social status; these variables are only relative.” This 
separation of influence from general social status, at least in part, explains the 
special role of the opinion leadership concept in social science. 
3.5.2 Social gregariousness 
Even though certain educational and occupational differences have been 
established between leaders and non-leaders, other factors seem to be more 
important (Katz, 1957). Dressler and Telle (2009) list social connectedness and 
subject-specific expertise as such key differences. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) 
note that people who participate frequently in social activities and organisations 
and cultivate large social networks are more likely to act as opinion leaders.  
Early research did not support the social gregariousness thesis. Carter and Clarke 
(1962) find no evidence that opinion leaders get together with others more 
frequently to discuss politics than non-leaders. Opinion givers in Troldahl and 
Van Dam’s (1965) study even scored higher than leaders on five different 
measures of social gregariousness.  
Nevertheless, more recent research supports Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) 
findings. Weimann’s (1983) sociometric analysis of a Kibbutz community shows 
that opinion leaders occupy a central position within their social networks. They 
tend to have a larger number of social contacts and they are more active members 
of clubs and associations. Schenk (1982) confirms that opinion leaders are 
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centrally located within their communicative environment and have denser 
communication networks. According to Beba (1988), opinion leaders display 
higher frequency and higher intensity of interpersonal interaction within their 
social group. Schenk and Döbler (2002) assert that opinion leaders are more 
socially active and can reach a larger number of people in their social 
environment directly. Similar to political opinion leaders, people with high 
personality strength talk to others more frequently and cultivate larger social 
networks (Schenk & Rössler, 1997). 
3.5.3 Political interest and knowledge 
It was established in section 3.4.2 that subject-specific expertise is a vital element 
of a person’s credibility, which is an important determinant of her influence on 
others. Shah and Scheufele (2006) assert that knowledge variables are crucial for 
understanding the social force of opinion leaders. Being familiar with and 
knowledgeable about a given subject increases the likelihood of being perceived 
as credible and of effectively influencing others. Hence, one would expect to find 
a significant correlation between political opinion leadership and political 
knowledge and interest. 
A number of studies confirm that opinion leadership is associated with high levels 
of political interest, involvement, and knowledge. Kingdon’s (1970) analysis of 
1966 presidential election survey data shows that political opinion leaders are 
very interested in the campaign and care more about the election outcome. Based 
on a survey of Australian voters, O’Cass and Pecotich (2005) discovered a direct 
correlation between voter involvement and opinion leadership. Involvement here 
is understood as how central politics is to a person’s life. O’Cass (2002) sees 
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involvement as a powerful determinant of opinion leadership in the political 
domain, because it serves as the motivational basis for offering advice on the 
subject to others. A study conducted by Gruner & Jahr in Germany in 1983 
reveals a close connection between political interest and opinion leadership (as 
cited in Beba, 1988). Similarly, Schenk (1982, p. 211) finds opinion leaders active 
in citizens’ initiatives in Germany to be characterized by “enormous” political 
interest.  
Opinion leaders are not only more interested and involved in political matters, 
they also tend to have above-average political expertise. People often seek 
guidance from opinion leaders, since they view them as experts in the field 
(Weimann, 1994). Eurich (1976) finds political opinion leaders to be substantially 
more knowledgeable about political matters than non-leaders. Kingdon’s (1970) 
analysis reveals that leaders are better informed about politics than non-leaders 
with the same social, educational, and occupational background. The relationship 
between expertise and opinion leadership holds when socio-economic factors are 
controlled for. Even though Shah and Scheufele (2006) did not examine opinion 
leadership but personality strength, their evidence provides a further indication for 
the connection between political knowledge and opinion leadership. They find 
technical, cultural, and intellectual authority to be more strongly related to 
personality strength than any socio-demographic characteristics.  
Whereas the above literature focuses on the fact that opinion leaders, on average, 
have more political expertise than non-leaders, Trepte and Scherer (2005) 
distinguish between different types of opinion leaders depending on their level of 
knowledge. They do not refute the thesis that opinion leaders are better informed 
about politics in general, but they show that expertise is not distributed equally 
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among opinion leaders. Based on a survey of German university students Trepte 
and Scherer (2005) separate informed opinion leaders with significant current 
affairs knowledge from “dazzlers” who use communication skills to make up for 
their undistinguished level of expertise. Non-leaders are classified either as 
“inerts” who score low both on opinion leadership and on objective knowledge 
scales or as “silent experts” who are well-informed but do not influence others. 
Trepte and Scherer (2005) find that women are more likely to be inerts, while men 
are more often informed opinion leaders. It is worth mentioning, however, that the 
results are based on a convenience sample comprising only 139 respondents. 
Hence, the findings show only tendencies that need to be tested in future research.  
 
Figure 4: Trepte and Scherer’s (2005) typology of opinion leadership 
 
 
Source: Trepte and Scherer (2005) 
 
3.5.4 Political efficacy 
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954, p. 187) define political efficacy as “the 
feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the 
political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties”. Political 
efficacy has an internal as well as an external component. Whether citizens 
believe that they are able to comprehend and influence the political decision 
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making process is called internal efficacy. External efficacy measures whether 
people trust politicians to be responsive and to do what is in the interest of the 
citizens (McLeod et al., 1999). Studies that investigate both measures of political 
efficacy find a statistically significant positive relationship between internal 
efficacy and opinion leadership. Results regarding external efficacy, however, are 
ambiguous.  
Bockman and Gayk (1977) analysed routine political issues within a community 
using the key informant technique. Internal efficacy was defined as one’s political 
knowledge and one’s self-designated ability to influence political events and 
decision makers. Opinion leaders scored significantly higher than non-leaders on 
an internal efficacy scale, with 77 percent of leaders and only 42 percent of non-
leaders in the “high” category. External efficacy was measured by the trust in the 
outputs the political system produces. Bockman and Gayk (1977) found that 
opinion leaders are slightly more negative about the outcomes produced by the 
political institutions. 54 percent of them are low in trust, which compares to 40 
percent of non-leaders. In contrast, O’Cass and Pecotich (2005) established a 
positive relationship between opinion leadership and voting satisfaction, a concept 
that is not dissimilar to external efficacy. Voting satisfaction is operationalized as 
satisfaction with politics and political parties in general as well as approval of the 
specific candidate and party a person has voted for.  
In a study across 15 European countries, Nisbet (2005) measured internal efficacy 
by how hard the respondents found it to make political decisions, how complex 
they perceived politics to be, and if they felt able to participate actively in a 
political group. Across all nations, Nisbet (2005) found a meaningful positive 
correlation between opinion leadership and internal efficacy. In Germany, for 
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example, the correlation coefficient between the two variables was 0.46 (sig < 
0.001). People’s trust in the political leadership and institutions was assessed by 
two scales, differentiating between external efficacy and political trust. External 
efficacy assessed whether people perceived government figures to care more 
about the citizens’ interests or about being re-elected. Political trust specifically 
examined people faith in institutions like the parliament, the police force, and the 
legal system. In only half of the countries, there was a statistically significant 
positive relationship between external political efficacy and opinion leadership 
(e.g. Germany: r = .32; sig < 0.001). Political trust, in contrast, was negatively 
associated with opinion leading in almost all countries. But this relationship was 
significant only in a forth of the examined territories. In Germany, the relationship 
was slightly positive but non-significant. It is worth highlighting, however, that 
Nisbet’s (2005) results are not directly comparable to those of Bockman and Gayk 
(1977) and O’Cass and Pecotich (2005), because Nisbet (2005) employed an 
approach similar to Keller and Berry’s (2003) for identifying opinion leaders.  
In summary, there is support for a meaningful positive relationship between 
opinion leadership and internal efficacy. Results about the opinion leaders’ trust 
in the political system and institutions, their external efficacy, indicate a weak and 
potentially negative relationship.  
3.5.5 Political extremity 
Some academics have examined the association between subjective perceptions of 
efficacy and trust and political orientations. They point out that people with robust 
internal efficacy as well as high levels of trust usually hold moderate political 
views. In contrast, those who combine healthy internal efficacy with below-
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average trust in politicians and political parties tend to develop radical political 
opinions (e.g. Gamson, 1968). Paige (1971), for example, surveyed riot 
participants in New Jersey and found that those with high internal efficacy and 
low political trust are more likely to participate in riots than people who score low 
on both measures. These findings, together with the findings on efficacy and 
opinion leadership mentioned above, lead Bockman and Gayk (1977) to 
hypothesize that opinion leaders are more radical in their political dispositions 
than non-leaders.  
The proposition is confirmed by Hellevik and Bjørklund (1991), who examined 
political extremism among opinion leaders in Norway based on self-placement on 
the traditional left-right scale. The political views of the general public are 
distributed almost normally on a bell curve with the majority of respondents 
placing themselves at or close to the centre of the scale. In comparison, the 
distribution of the political positions of opinion leaders is flatter. Although further 
studies are required to firm up the results, the data provides an indication that 
opinion leaders are more politically extreme than non-leaders. 
To sum up, despite their similarity to those they influence, political opinion 
leaders diverge from the average with regards to a number of attributes. They are 
more likely to be male, slightly better educated than non-leaders, more gregarious, 
and more interested in and knowledgeable about politics. What is more, opinion 
leaders score higher on scales of internal efficacy and tend more towards the 
extremes of the political spectrum.  
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3.6 Sources of opinion leaders 
Their interest in the subject matter and their desire to keep up-to-date with current 
developments motivate opinion leaders to gather information from various 
sources (Weimann, 1994). This active information seeking in their domain of 
expertise partially explains why opinion leaders are able to provide others with 
advice (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). In order to target opinion leaders with suitable 
information, political campaigners need to understand which information sources 
opinion leaders rely on primarily.  
Carter and Clarke (1962) highlight that political opinion leaders read significantly 
more books and magazines, but do not watch more evening television or 
educational television than non-leaders. Kingdon (1970) confirms that public 
affairs opinion leaders read more printed news. Kingdon’s (1970) empirical 
evidence shows that non-leaders rely more on television as a source of current 
news. According to the survey conducted by Trepte and Scherer (2005), opinion 
leaders are more likely to frequently read daily newspapers.  
Recent studies suggest that the Internet may be an important source of 
information for political opinion leaders. Nisbet (2005) found that influentials in 
those European countries with the most developed Internet infrastructure go 
online more frequently than the general public. Kavanaugh et al. (2006, p. 80) 
assert that “influentials have been using the Internet, including e-mail, bulletin 
board systems, and web browsers from the outset to stay informed and involved in 
political issues that interest them at local, national and international levels”. 
Schenk and Döbler (2002) establish that people with a strong personality rely 
more heavily on modern information technologies than the average citizen. 
Dressler and Telle (2009) point to survey data from the Allensbach Institute 
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showing that people with high personality strength use the Internet more than the 
average population. Shah and Scheufele (2006) assert that people with a strong 
personality tend to use the Internet to supplement traditional news sources in 
order to obtain context information, further detail, and additional viewpoints. It is 
worth noting, however, that none of the above studies analysed the relationship 
between Internet use and opinion leadership as defined by Lazarsfeld et al. 
(1944). Hence, further research is necessary to confirm the relationship between 
opinion leadership and the use of online sources. 
According to Wiesner (2009), one would expect opinion leaders to more regularly 
use the Internet, because it caters efficiently to their preference for information 
over entertainment. This is not to say that online sources do not provide 
entertainment for those seeking it. But the Internet makes it easier for opinion 
leaders to locate and access informational content. Weimann (1994) found support 
for the informational preference when studying readership of various German 
newspapers and magazines. General public affairs magazines, like Der Spiegel, 
Stern, and Die Zeit, as well as economic magazines were among the most widely 
read by people with strong personalities. And, all of these are characterized by 
above-average informational and editorial quality. 
Richmond (1977) suggests that opinion leaders differ not only in their exposure to 
the media but also in the way they process the information received from different 
sources. She points out that mere exposure does not necessarily lead to absorption 
of the transmitted information. Richmond (1977) shows that opinion leaders 
absorb more information than non-leaders when exposed to the same mediated 
communication. Noelle-Neumann (2002) asserts that those with high personality 
strength tend to have higher powers of comprehension and store more 
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information. Richmond’s (1977) data suggests that this is also true for opinion 
leaders (cf. Beba, 1988).  
Research shows that opinion leaders are not only more likely to use several media 
sources than non-leaders but also more prone to rely on personal sources. The 
early studies of opinion leadership already suggested that opinion leaders seek out 
facts, arguments, and advice from others. The Decatur Study as well as the Elmira 
Study provide indications for the opinion leaders’ reliance on personal sources. 
Wright and Cantor (1967) found substantial overlap between those who seek and 
those who give opinions and information about public affairs. Trohdahl and van 
Dam (1965) also stress the reciprocal nature of interpersonal influence and 
information exchange in the field of politics. Opinion leaders do not just provide 
information and advice, they also search for both guidance and information from 
others. The later is what Feick, Price, and Higie’s (1986) have famously termed 
“opinion seeking”. 
Several other investigations provide evidence for the relationship between 
political opinion leadership and opinion seeking. Garrison and Andersen (1978) 
show that opinion leaders obtain more information about political candidates from 
personal sources than non-leaders. Weimann (1994) asserts that political opinion 
leaders are more prone to seek others’ advice. Roch’s (2005) socio-metric 
examination of opinion leadership in the area of children education reveals that, 
other things being equal, opinion leaders regard friends and acquaintances as 
more valuable information sources than non-leaders.  
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4 Computer-mediated communication 
Having carefully defined key concepts and outlined in detail why the questions 
raised at the outset of this thesis merit investigating, I will now turn to their 
theoretical and empirical assessment. It has been illustrated that interpersonal 
political communication is beneficial for our democratic culture and that an 
increase in the discussion participation of the inactive would be desirable. This 
section seeks to establish whether the Internet indeed creates this positive effect. 
Moreover, I have elaborated on the various reasons non-leaders have for 
conforming to the views of opinion leaders in order to explain the opinion leaders’ 
influence. Given their impact on individual political opinion formation, political 
campaigners have long been interested in obtaining information about opinion 
leaders. While opinion leadership in face-to-face situations has been researched 
thoroughly for decades, less is known about opinion leadership on the Internet. 
The present study contributes to filling this gap by examining the characteristics 
and sources of online opinion leaders. Lastly, I will analyse the perceived 
persuasive force of online discussion activity with a view to establishing the 
relative importance of online interaction compared to offline communication. 
4.1 Computer-mediated interpersonal communication 
Before delving into the empirical analysis, two theoretical concepts will be 
employed to derive opposing hypotheses with regards to a potential equalisation 
of discussion participation on the Internet. Neither of the theories originates from 
the realm of political communication research. But both offer insights that are of 
relevance when comparing interpersonal political communication online and 
95 
 
offline. Social Presence Theory was developed following research on 
organisational group discussions via video-conferencing. According to Social 
Presence Theory, computer-mediated communication provides protection from 
social anxiety for shy individuals and enables previously inactive persons to 
participate more easily in interpersonal communication. Social Network Theory, 
on the other hand, is based on studies which investigate non-political interaction 
online. Social Network Theory postulates that the Internet is an additional 
communication tool which is utilized within existing discussion networks rather 
than encourages new kinds of discussion relationships. 
4.1.1 Social Presence Theory 
In 1976, the Communication Studies Group at the University of London carried 
out a research programme that is widely regarded as one of the most important in 
the field of mediated communication. With funding from the British Post Office, 
Short, Williams, and Christie (1976) developed Social Presence Theory based on 
a comparison of face-to-face and mediated communication in small group 
problem-solving discussions. As per Short et al. (1976), social presence is a core 
characteristic of a communication medium. The extent to which a medium is 
personal, warm and sociable determines the way in which individuals interact 
using the medium (Rice, 1984). Social presence includes both the salience of the 
conversation partner and of the interpersonal relationship (Walther, 1993). Or as 
Kumar and Benbasat (2002, p. 6) put it, “social presence has traditionally been 
used to measure the extent to which a communication media allows a user to 
establish a personal connection with other users.” 
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Even though the work by Short et al. (1976) examined only certain types of 
mediated communication – namely telephone, audio, and video conferencing – it 
has frequently been applied to assessments of computer interaction (Spears & 
Lea, 1992). Probably the most extensive research adopting Social Presence 
Theory to computer-mediated communication was conducted by the Committee 
on Social Science Research in Computing at Carnegie-Mellon University (e.g., 
Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984; Kiesler, 1986; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & 
McGuire, 1986; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). These studies emphasize the limited 
ability of computer-mediated communication compared to face-to-face interaction 
to convey social cues. Some prefer this so-called Reduced Social Cues Approach 
to Social Presence Theory for the purpose of analysing computer-mediated 
interaction, but the majority of scholars use both terms interchangeably. Both 
theories are focused on the fact that computer-mediated communication lacks 
social context indicators – such as posture, mimic, and clothing – social status 
cues, and vocal cues (Birnie & Horvath, 2002). The fewer of these indicators a 
medium offers to a conversation pair, the less the pair will feel that it is involved 
in a joint interpersonal communicative activity. According to Walther (1992, pp. 
52-53), “the most common theoretical explanations for the difference between 
computer-mediated communication and face-to-face communication hold that 
electronic mail and computer-based conferencing systems eliminate nonverbal 
codes that are generally rich in relational information”. Both the perception and 
the interpretation of the message are affected by the social qualities of the 
communication medium.  
The reduced ability of computer-mediated communication to convey social 
presence and relational cues impacts communication in various ways. The 
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phenomenon of disinhibition is among the most prominent effects. Disinhibition 
occurs when a person’s conduct is less affected by self awareness, social anxiety, 
and concerns about public evaluation than it would be in face-to-face situations 
(Joinson, 1998). On the Internet, worries about self-presentation and the 
judgements of others are typically reduced. The most comprehensive account of 
the drivers of disinhibition is presented by Suler (2004), who combines previously 
established factors with psychoanalytic findings: There is often no direct link 
between the offline and the online world, which gives users a sense of anonymity. 
People, at times, believe that their online behaviour is not actually attributable to 
them. The perceived invisibility that computer-mediated communication provides 
makes people try things and advance into areas they would not dare to in real life. 
The asynchronicity of the Internet means that users don’t have to deal with other 
users’ feedback, at least not immediately. This decreases self awareness. As 
people can exit the unreal world of computer-mediated interaction by switching 
off the computer (dissociative imagination) and interpret textual messages more 
freely than face-to-face messages (solipsistic introjection), they feel less 
responsibility for their behaviour online than offline. Suler (2004) concludes that 
a person probably has no single “online self” but rather different selves 
communicating in different online environments. Based on this interpretation, 
people not only act differently online than offline but are also able to assume 
entirely different roles in the two environments.  
Studies of computer-mediated language learning confirm the disinhibition thesis. 
Bradley and Lomicka (2000) find that computer-mediated communication offers a 
feeling of protection against the pressure of the interaction in class. Yuen and 
Lavin (2004, p. 382) view computer-mediated communication as a “safe haven” 
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that relieves students from social discomforts. Shy students prefer computer-
mediated over face-to-face interaction. The phenomenon of disinhibition does not 
seem to be limited to distant learning environments, however, as Höflich and 
Gebhardt’s (2001) explorative study of German online chat rooms illustrates. 
Many chat room members report that the lack of awareness about each other’s 
social status and appearance enables them to approach others less anxiously.  
A concept related to that of disinhibition is deindividuation. Like disinhibition, 
deindividuation is caused by the low social presence and increased anonymity of 
computer-mediated communication. When communicating via computers, people 
find it harder to convey impressions about their temper and personality. 
Computer-mediated interaction makes it trickier to express one’s own 
individuality as well as to detect the other person’s individuality (Kiesler, 1986). 
As this definition shows, deindividuation entails reduced awareness of oneself and 
of the conversation partner. While disinhibition is primarily concerned with a 
person’s perception of how others judge her, deindividuation adds the element of 
empathy with others. Computer-mediated communication patterns make it more 
difficult to acquire an understanding of the conversation partner’s convictions, 
attitudes, and aims (Berger, Gardner, Parks, Schulman, & Miller, 1976). 
According to Sander (1998), computers facilitate interaction without any regard 
for the counterparty’s social status and normative and ideological convictions. 
Hence, comparisons with others and judgements of others play a lesser role 
(Siegel et al., 1986; Joinson, 2007).  
Matheson and Zanna (1988), who conducted a study of small discussion groups, 
claim that deindividuation is inconsistent with their empirical findings. In their 
survey, 55 discussants reported higher levels of private self-awareness online 
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compared to offline. It is worth, however, to take a closer look at the survey 
questions. Subjects were asked whether they had generally been very aware of 
themselves and their perspectives and attitudes. This type of questioning cannot 
assess the degree of anxiety and the level of social pressure experienced by the 
participants. Thus, Matheson and Zanna (1988) cannot refute the aspects of 
deindividuation that are most crucial for the purposes of this study. What is 
critical to the concepts of both disinhibition and deindividuation is that people 
show less concern for the perception and judgement of others and for their joint 
relationship.  
It is for these reasons that people seem to be more comfortable to contribute in 
computer-mediated compared to face-to-face interaction (McKenna & Bargh, 
2000). A person who may be too shy to speak up in a real world situation may be 
more prone to do so online. The resulting equalisation effect on discussion 
participation has been coined the Participation and Acceptance Theory: 
“Technology that limits access to interpersonal information and social feedback 
compromise social processes. This leads to equalized conversational participation 
patterns.” (Whittaker, 2003, p. 269)  
Empirical evidence confirms the supposed differences between the online and 
offline worlds. In multi-person face-to-face discussions, it is often an assertive or 
hierarchically superior person who dominates the conversation by disseminating a 
high proportion of messages (Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; 
Walther, 1996; Whittaker, 2003). According to Sproull and Kiesler (1991), a 
small group of people takes up so much air time that 50 percent of the discussants 
speak just 10 to 20 percent of the time. Reputation and social standing are key 
determinants of in-person discussion participation.  
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Computer-mediated group interaction produces different communication 
relationships with a larger portion of individuals actively participating (Döring, 
1999). Hiltz, Johnson, and Turoff (1986) found that computer-mediated 
discussion partners contribute more equally than they do face-to-face. Sproull and 
Kiesler (1991) confirm these findings and rationalize them based on the Reduced 
Social Cues Approach. High-ranked individuals do not dictate computer-mediated 
discussion groups in the same way as they do face-to-face, because they are 
unable to properly communicated social cues. Along the same lines, Johansen, 
Vallee, and Spangler (1979) explain the equalisation in computer-mediated 
communication by an increased forthrightness of opinions and flexibility of roles. 
Their conclusions are based on a review of a number of relevant studies. Bieber 
(1999) also points to the potential for role switching in computer-mediated 
communication. Haythornthwaite and Nielsen (2007) highlight the importance of 
reduced relational cues in computer-mediated compared to face-to-face interaction 
in bringing about more egalitarian behaviour. Text-based communication does not 
allow conversation partners to judge each other based on considerations of status 
in the same way that face-to-face situations do. Dubrovsky, Kiesler, and Sethna 
(1991) find proof of this equalisation phenomenon across a range of sources and 
confirm that remarks are distributed more equally in electronic discussions. 
Nunamaker, Dennis, Valacich, Vogel, and George (1991) believe that the 
perceived anonymity plays an important role in bringing about increased 
participation in computer-mediated discussion groups of those who remain 
inactive face-to-face. Following a quantitative summary of experimental 
literature, McLeod (1992) finds that group support systems enhance participation 
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equality and reduce the importance of single individuals. In summary, there is 
strong support for the Participation and Acceptance Theory.  
It is important to bear in mind that the evidence presented is based on 
electronically supported discussions within an organisational setting. Some 
studies, however, have tested Social Presence Theory in other fields of computer-
mediated communication. Whittaker’s (2003) work on email interaction, for 
example, reveals that contributions are more equal in electronic conversations 
than in face-to-face situations. Fietkau, Trénel, and Prokop (2005) compared face-
to-face and online groups tasked with agreeing on a solution to a German public 
planning problem. Whereas a fifth of the discussants contributed ¾ of the input in 
the face-to-face groups, participation in the online group was more equal, with 
more than a third of the discussants contributing ¾ of the input. Joinson (2004) 
suggests that shy individuals participate in computer-mediated dating more 
actively than in face-to-face dating. Papacharissi and Rubin (2000) find that 
people who feel less respected and content in face-to-face situations rely more 
strongly on online communication. Other research has identified the Internet as an 
opportunity to test one’s social skills and to overcome anxiety experienced in 
face-to-face conversations (Birnie & Horvath, 2002).  
None of the mentioned research, however, specifically addresses casual political 
discussions online. Stromer-Galley’s (2002) secondary analysis on survey data 
from the Electronic Dialogue Project, a year-long study of political discussions, 
constitutes a notable exception. She concludes her assessment in stating that there 
are people who talk about politics online but not face-to-face and that those 
individuals are relatively less politically knowledgeable and less efficacious. 
Along the lines of Social Presence Theory, Stromer-Galley (2002) asserts that 
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certain individuals prefer voicing their opinions only via computers for fear of 
being challenged or seeming uninformed in face-to-face encounters. In my view, 
however, Stromer-Galley’s (2002) conclusions are highly questionable. In the 
survey, people were asked whether they had talked about politics online during 
the past year as well as whether they had had face-to-face political discussions 
during the past week. Thus, the 15 percent that reported having had online 
discussions during the prior year but not having had face-to-face discussions 
during the past week may simply have talked about politics face-to-face a few 
weeks ago.  
 
Figure 5: Elements of Social Presence Theory applied to political 
discussion 
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We can see that a number of the questions which Social Presence Theory as well 
as Participation and Acceptance Theory raise regarding political discussion and 
opinion formation remain inconclusively answered to date (for an overview see 
Figure 5). Before designing the hypotheses to be tested in this study, it is worth 
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evaluating the counterarguments to Social Presence Theory. Given that 
Participation and Acceptance Theory is derived from Social Presence Theory, the 
counterarguments apply analogously to both theories. 
4.1.2 Criticism of Social Presence Theory 
As early as 1988, Johansen, Vallee, and Spangler questioned the view of Short et 
al. (1976) that a particular level of social presence is a fixed feature of a given 
communication medium. Johansen et al. (1988) believe that social presence can 
be developed among discussants. Shortly thereafter, Hiltz, Turoff, & Johnson 
(1989) raised the question whether experimental time restrictions could be a factor 
contributing to participant equality in computer-mediated communication. In 
1992, Walther compared the more prevalent single-instance interaction studies of 
group discussions with longitudinal designs. He found that one-shot studies 
confirmed Social Presence Theory but that longitudinal studies exhibited a 
different picture. Over time, discussants in computer-mediated environments 
developed a way of conveying social status. Walther (1992) concludes that, given 
enough time, computer-mediated conversation partners should be able to signal 
social cues in much the same way as people talking face-to-face. Walther’s (1992) 
findings cast doubt on the applicability of Social Presence Theory for computer-
mediated communication relationships. Similarly, Baym (2002) suggests that 
people can develop close interpersonal ties in online environments that resemble 
offline connections. Not only are people able to establish rules of conduct and 
rituals online, but also do they develop roles similar to those in offline situations. 
What is crucial for social presence to come into being online is the expectation 
that there will be a long-term relationship between the discussants (Walther, 
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1996). It is this expectation that gives conversation partners an incentive to 
disclose and seek out more personal information. Whittaker (2003) makes a 
similar point asserting that differences between computer-mediated and face-to-
face situations are negligible and that inequality re-establishes itself when given 
unlimited time.  
A second line of criticism against the application of Social Presence Theory to the 
comparison of computer-mediated and face-to-face interaction was put forward by 
Spears and Lea (1992). They claim that, by focussing on individual situations of 
information exchange, Social Presence Theory overlooks the “pre-existing social 
categories, norms, and identifications which position communicators and define 
their relations to each other” (p. 44). The historical perspective, however, is an 
important element of the interpersonal relationship independent of whether the 
interaction happens online or offline. Communication may be very similar 
whether computer-mediated or personal, because people have a common history 
that guides their behaviour. What is more, people cultivate their social identity in 
new ways in a computer-mediated environment, due to the very reason that 
computer-mediated communication lacks the traditional relational cues of face-to-
face interaction (Myers, 1987). Email headers and signatures, for example, are 
used to convey category cues about sex, geographic location, and profession 
(Spears & Lea, 1992). Birnie and Horvath (2002) point to the fact that social 
online communities have become livelier than online networks without a social 
focus. This is interpreted as a falsification of the assumption that social signals 
cannot be transmitted via computers. They also highlight that sociable, casual and 
dominant ways of communicating are associated with intensified computer-
mediated interaction. Spears and Lea (1992) conclude that, ironically, computer-
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mediated communication may actually be more social than face-to-face 
interaction. 
Both types of criticism are directed at the technological determinism inherent in 
Social Presence Theory and Participation and Acceptance Theory. The academics 
mentioned above reject the notion that technology shapes communication 
patterns. Computer-mediated interaction does not necessarily create more equal 
participation and communication that is less social. Given enough time and taking 
alternative social cues into account, computer-mediated and face-to-face 
interaction have very similar properties. According to this view, online and offline 
interpersonal communication styles, relationships, and outcomes do not differ 
categorically. The view contrasts not only with proponents of Social Presence 
Theory, but also with recent work by technological determinists whose approach 
is best summarized by Herring (2004, p. 26): “Now, the question is no longer: 
does technology shape human communication, but rather, under what 
circumstances, in what way, and to what extent.”  
4.1.3 Social Network Theory 
Social Network Theory provides an alternative approach to Social Presence 
Theory and the technological determinism described in the previous section. 
Similar to the critics of Social Presence Theory, Social Network Theory discards 
Herring’s (2004) idea that technology shapes communication. It takes a somewhat 
different approach to both Spears and Lea (1992) and Walther (1992), though. 
Rather than asserting that computer-mediated and face-to-face interaction share 
comparable social and participatory properties which lead to comparable 
communication patterns, Social Network Theory postulates that computer-
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mediated communication supports offline social processes. The Internet 
supplements and extends offline behaviour. Social Network Theory does not view 
online and offline as separate spheres, but assumes that they are integrated with 
each other.  
Unlike proponents of Participation and Acceptance Theory, Social Network 
theorists do not believe that computers make introverted and subordinate 
individuals communicate more actively and even enables previously inactive 
persons to participate. According to Social Network Theory, computer-mediated 
interaction does not change the nature of communicative relationships; it 
primarily supports existing relationships. Social Network Theory views the 
computer as an additional medium that is used, first and foremost, by people who 
are already well connected. The closer people are socially linked, the more they 
will use the different communication media at their disposal (Birnie & Horvath, 
2002). Computer-mediated interaction is regarded as an additional element of the 
communication mix, not as a new arena for communication. Like earlier 
technological inventions, computers enable members of social networks to 
connect more seamlessly (Wellman, Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001).  
A closer look at the research focus of each theory helps to explain the differences 
between the conclusions reached when applying Social Presence Theory and 
Social Network Theory to the comparison between face-to-face and computer-
mediated communication. While Social Presence Theory research examines 
organisational groups, Social Network Theory analyses pairs of conversation 
partners. Social Presence Theory usually looks at how organisational groups 
interact in a single communication situation. Studies typically consider only one 
technology and one context at a time. It is implicitly assumed that what happens 
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in a given computer-mediated situation is sufficient to understanding the 
communication situation and relationship. This approach leads to an isolation of 
the communication technology from the wider pattern of interaction. In fact, the 
relational history of the people interacting is artificially excluded from the 
assessment. Social Presence theorists considered online interaction to be separated 
from everyday life (Haythornthwaite & Wellman, 2002). Almost inevitably, the 
communication technology becomes the determining factor, as discussants are not 
free to choose the communication technology according to their aims and 
relationship. Social Network Theory’s integrative method extends the research 
subject to the communicative relationship in its entirety including the whole range 
of communication tools available (Haythornthwaite & Nielsen, 2007). Computer-
mediated interaction is just one part of the communication infrastructure, albeit an 
important one that is embedded in all aspects of life (Bruce & Hogan, 1998; Star, 
1999). In certain situations, conversation partners intentionally choose computer-
mediated means of communication believing that they are best suited to fit their 
communicative goals (Joinson, 2007).  
In Social Network Theory, the strength of the social connection between a 
conversation pair plays an important role in determining the use of 
communication media. The concept of tie strength originates from Granovetter’s 
(1973) renowned article The Strength of Weak Ties. For Granovetter (1973, p. 
1361), the strength of a relationship is a function of “the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services” 
which characterize the tie. According to Social Network Theory, these factors 
influence which of the available communication media are used by two persons 
(Haythornthwaite, 2001). The closer a person’s contact with another individual, 
108 
 
the more likely they are to complement face-to-face interaction with 
asynchronous types of media, such as email. The “multiplexity” of the 
relationship increases (Haythornthwaite, 2005). What is more, the use of a given 
communication medium will differ depending on the tie strength. People employ 
communication media differently across the diverse relationships they have 
(Haythornthwaite & Nielsen, 2007).  
Numerous studies support Social Network Theory. Haythornthwaite and Wellman 
(1998) examined types of media used for different kinds of information exchange 
in a university research group and found proof of the multiplexity phenomenon: 
Pairs who communicated more regularly used a larger number of media. Email 
did not substitute face-to-face interaction. In fact, face-to-face and email were 
employed in much the same way and were correlated positively with each other. 
These results are in accord with those of Rice (1994) who analysed pairs in a 
research and development group. Individuals who used email to communicate 
were more closely tied than those relying solely on face-to-face and telephone 
contact. Rice (1994) also found a positive relationship between the sending of 
emails and the perceived rate of interaction.  
Birnie and Horvath (2002) studied the relationship of online social behaviour and 
traditional social behaviour on an electronic university campus. Online social 
interaction was correlated with sociability as well as with offline social 
communication. Moreover, the exchange and disclosure of personal information 
online, i.e. online intimacy, was correlated with the intimacy of social behaviour 
in the real world. Birnie and Horvath’s (2002) findings provide support for Social 
Network Theory, because computer-mediated communication complemented and 
extended offline social interaction. None of the evidence suggested that shy 
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people compensate a lack of offline communication by talking online. 
Gackenbach and Von Stackelberg (2007) also did not discover any evidence that 
introverted persons try to learn social exchanges online. And, Yang and Lester 
(2003) found that extroverted individuals communicated online more frequently 
(as cited in Gackenbach and Von Stackelberg, 2007).  
The thesis that computer-mediated communication complements traditional social 
behaviour is also supported by Koku, Nazer, and Wellman (2001) who examined 
a network of scholars. The more two persons interacted with each other, the more 
modes of communication did they use. Again, there was a positive correlation 
between computer-mediated and face-to-face communication. Pairs of academics 
chose their communication media based on what is “necessary or is handy” (p. 
1759). Computer-mediated communication, for example, was used to stay in 
touch between face-to-face encounters or to connect with geographically distant 
colleagues. Flanagin and Metzger (2001) also confirm that computer-mediated 
interaction is used in much the same way as more established technologies.  
Döring’s (1999) review of a number of German studies comes to a similar 
conclusion as the above researchers. According to Döring (1999), computer-
mediated communication simplifies, accelerates, and multiplies social exchange. 
The frequency of interaction within existing communication relationships 
increases with the use of computer-mediated forms without any reduction in face-
to-face interaction. In fact, those who use computers to interact also engage more 
frequently in face-to-face communication than those who refrain from computer-
mediated exchange.  
Wellman et al. (2001) conducted a survey of visitors to the National Geographic 
Society’s website. As in the other studies mentioned, visitors supplemented face-
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to-face with computer-mediated communication. Visitors integrated computer-
mediated communication into their daily routines without it impacting the 
frequency of face-to-face interaction. As early as 2004, in a study for the Pew 
Institute, 88 percent of Americans who were active online claimed that the 
Internet was part of their everyday lives (Fallows, 2004). Katz and Rice (2002) 
stress that the incorporation of online communication into our everyday routines 
is a general phenomenon that stretches across most areas of life.  
The relevant elements of both Social Presence Theory and Social Network Theory 
have been described in detail. It has become clear that the two theories rely on 
different assumptions, are derived from different contexts, and consequently draw 
opposing conclusions when applied to the comparison of face-to-face and 
computer-mediated communication. The question at the heart of this difference is 
whether technology influences the communication relationship and behaviour, or 
if the relationship determines media use.  
Despite the fundamental nature of the disagreement, one might be able to 
reconcile the two views. Warschauer (2003), for example, believes that feedback 
effects between communication technology and communication relationship need 
to be taken into account. While people choose a given medium for a particular 
purpose, the medium has an impact on the conversation pair. Likewise, Joinson 
(2004, p. 477) suggests that “the users’ personality, motives, and expectations 
lead to media choice, and that actual use of the media leads to changes in both 
psychological states and actual behavior.” Interpreting the relationship between 
medium and communication behaviour as reciprocal seems like a sensible 
approach. But at the same time, it means that we cannot provide unambiguous 
theoretical answers to the questions about online political discussion.  
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Hence, the data of the present survey will be analysed with a view to establishing 
whether Social Presence Theory or Social Network Theory is better suited to 
explain political communication online. More specifically, I will test the two 
building blocks of the Participation and Acceptance Theory, which springs from 
Social Presence Theory. Firstly, I seek to establish whether discussion 
participation is more equal online than face-to-face. Unfortunately, the VZ survey 
neither determined the respondents’ level of social anxiety or self-esteem nor is 
there a hierarchical order among VZ users. Hence, whether or not someone has an 
influence on the political opinions of others, i.e. is an opinion leader, will be used 
to approximate dominance. Along the lines of Social Presence Theory, one would 
expect non-leaders to participate more actively in discussion on the Internet, 
leading to an equalisation of participation between opinion leaders and non-
leaders.  
Separately, I will assess if there is a meaningful group of individuals who 
converse about politics online but not face-to-face. Based on this analysis, I will 
compare the characteristics of the different groups of discussants and non-
discussants, as another test of the equalisation hypothesis. Research shows that 
women as well as less educated, less gregarious, and less politically interested 
citizens are less likely to participate in discussions about politics (see section 2.3). 
Moreover, Social Presence Theory suggests that people with low self-esteem are 
prone to discuss politics on the Internet. Since we cannot test this variable directly 
based on our data, two proxies will be used for the purpose of analysis: The 
concept of personality strength includes measures of self-assurance and self-
assertiveness. And, internal efficacy, one’s confidence in comprehending and 
influencing the political process, may be regarded as a person’s political self-
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confidence. Hence, I will assess whether those who discuss politics online score 
lower on the above five variables than those who converse face-to-face. Any such 
finding could be seen as confirmation for the applicability of Social Presence 
Theory. 
 
Hypothesis 1.a: Political opinion leaders and non-leaders participate 
more equally, in terms of frequency, in political discussions online 
compared to offline. 
Hypothesis 1.b: There is a significant group of individuals who discuss 
politics online but refrain from doing so offline. 
Hypothesis 1.c: People who discuss politics online are more likely to be 
female and have lower education, social gregariousness, political interest, 
personality strength, and internal efficacy than people who discuss politics 
offline. 
 
4.2 Computer-mediated opinion leadership 
To date, little empirical work has been conducted on political opinion leadership 
online as it is defined in the current study. There are a number of studies, 
however, which provide some relevant insights, despite not focussing specifically 
on political opinion leadership on the Internet. These studies in related domains 
provide some indications that online opinion leaders and offline opinion leaders 
have similar characteristics. They also suggest that online opinion leaders rely 
heavily on the Internet as a source of information. But before going into these 
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questions, Social Network Theory and Social Presence Theory will be compared 
once more. 
4.2.1 Domains of influence of opinion leaders 
In analogy to the above discussion of interpersonal discussion on the Internet, the 
comparison between Social Network Theory and Social Presence Theory raises 
the question whether there is a group of opinion leaders whose influence is 
confined to the online realm. Social Network Theory suggests that computer-
mediated interaction supports existing communication relationships rather than 
changes their nature. Thus, one would not expect to find offline non-leaders 
exerting influence on the Internet. In contrast, Social Presence Theory holds that 
computer-mediated interaction can have an impact on communication patterns 
and create more equal exchange. Like Suler’s (2004) concept of different online 
selves, Social Presence Theory suggests that people are able to assume different 
roles online and offline. Thus, certain individuals are likely to exert influence only 
online. 
No research to date has juxtaposed online and offline opinion leaders in the realm 
of politics in order to examine this issue. Burson-Marsteller’s (2001a) work on e-
fluentials focuses on individuals who exert influence online as well as face-to-
face, but does not investigate whether there is a third category of opinion leaders 
who act only online. Similarly, the poli-fluentials identified by Darr and Graf 
(2007) exercise influence both online and offline. No separate analysis is carried 
out of those persons who act as opinion leaders only in the online world. Graf and 
Darr (2004) did look at online political citizens who are not at the same time 
offline influentials. But the concepts of online political citizens and of influentials 
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differ markedly from the definition of opinion leadership employed in this study 
(see section 3.2). Kavanaugh et al. (2006) isolated blog users who were not 
identified as offline opinion leaders. But since they did not single out political 
blog users from commercial blog users, no inference about the existence of 
online-only political opinion leaders can be drawn from their results.  
Some scholars in domains other than politics claim to have found evidence for the 
applicability of Social Presence Theory to opinion leadership. Sun et al. (2006), 
for example, maintain that reduced concern for the judgement of others and lower 
social unease have a positive effect on the assertiveness and confidence of opinion 
seekers. Due to the anonymous nature of computer-mediated communication the 
line between opinion leaders and opinion seekers is much more difficult to draw 
online. Sun et al. (2006) ground their conclusion on the correlation they find 
between music-related opinion seeking and opinion leading on the Internet. This, 
however, seems like rather weak evidence in support of their claim. The 
correlation could equally well be explained by the fact that opinion leaders are 
prone to seek opinions online. In my view, Sun et al. (2006) fall short of showing 
that computer-mediated communication makes offline opinion seekers turn into 
opinion leaders. Certainly, Sun et al.’s (2006) findings do not allow us to 
conclude that on the Internet opinion seekers are “able to exert influence on other 
people as opinion leaders do”, as Wiesner (2009, p. 56) so boldly asserts. 
In their recent book on opinion leadership, Dressler and Telle (2009) suggest that 
opinion seekers might communicate more actively online due to the anonymity 
the Internet affords. People who act as opinion seekers in real life may be more 
prone to exerting influence themselves in an online environment. But Dressler and 
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Telle (2009) conclude that further research needs to be carried out to confirm 
these assertions. Thus, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a meaningful group of opinion leaders whose 
influence is confined solely to the Internet. 
 
4.2.2 Characteristics of opinion leaders in different domains 
Prior research illustrates that offline opinion leaders are more likely than non-
leaders to be male and tend to be better educated, more gregarious, and more 
politically interested. They have higher internal efficacy and are located more 
towards the extremes of the political spectrum (see section 3.5). In line with 
Social Presence Theory one may expect offline non-leaders to be more active on 
the Internet. As a result, the differences in characteristics between opinion leaders 
and non-leaders should be less pronounced on the Internet than offline. What is 
more, online opinion leaders should score lower than offline opinion leaders on 
scales measuring personality strength and internal efficacy, the two proxies for 
self-confidence used in the present study. 
Given that few studies analyse the characteristics of online opinion leaders in the 
political domain, it is worth examining the literature on online opinion leadership 
in the realm of marketing. These studies provide a starting point for a more 
thorough investigation of the attributes of political online opinion leaders – an 
analysis that provides crucial information for those engaged in political 
campaigning. Regrettably, none of the research directly compares the attributes of 
offline and online opinion leaders. But, interestingly, several studies find online 
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opinion leaders to score higher on scales measuring the above characteristics than 
non-leaders, suggesting a certain similarity between online and offline opinion 
leaders. 
Smith, Coyle, Lightfoot, and Scott’s (2007) survey of visitors to a commercial 
website provides evidence that online and offline opinion leaders have 
comparable attributes. The data reveals a significant relationship between self-
reported online opinion leadership and the size of a person’s social network, a 
factor that is also associated with offline opinion leadership (see section 3.5). 
Similarly, Sun et al. (2006) show that the number of social ties online is 
connected to measures of music-related online opinion leadership. 
Another crucial study on marketing opinion leaders on the Internet is Burson-
Marsteller’s (2001a) work on “e-fluentials”. A person is an e-fluentials if she 
achieves a high score on Keller and Berry’s (2003) scale of offline civic 
participation (see section 3.3.4) and, at the same time, exerts product or company-
related influence online. Given their function as marketing opinion leaders, e-
fluentials give advice to others about twice as often as the average citizen. 
Burson-Marsteller’s (2001a) concept combines offline as well as online measures. 
Hence, it is not surprising that e-fluentials typically spread their experience with a 
company via both mediated and face-to-face channels. Moreover, it is far from 
astonishing that e-fluentials share several characteristics of offline opinion 
leaders. They tend to be slightly better educated than average and have high 
confidence in their opinions (Cakim, Kaushansky, Lytel, & Fay, 2006; Mittal, 
Holbrook, Beatty, Raghubir, & Woodside, 2008).  
One of the few exceptions that study online opinion leadership in a context other 
than marketing is the work examining political interests and opinions, political 
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discussions, and Internet usage of the citizens of Blacksburg County. The county 
is particularly interesting for studying online political interaction, because Internet 
penetration among the population reached the saturation point as early as 2001. 
Moreover, Blacksburg has an active community computer network that supports 
citizen participation. The network equips citizens with detailed information about 
community activities and provides a panel for discussion and a point of contact 
with public and civic organisations. It is worth highlighting, though, that 
Blacksburg presents anything but a representative sample. 85 percent of 
inhabitants are faculty members, other employees or students of the resident state 
university.  
Kavanaugh, Carroll, Rosson, Reese, and Zin (2005) examine civic Internet use, a 
concept related to our subject of investigation, in Blacksburg. Civic Internet use 
measures whether a person gets news online, answers questions on the Internet, 
posts information and expresses his opinion online, and takes part in interest 
groups via the Internet. Civic Internet use could be described as civic opinion 
leadership online, which is similar to but not the same as political opinion 
leadership online.  
Although the activities assessed by Kavanaugh et al. (2005) are not equivalent to 
political opinion leadership online, the findings provide a further indication that 
online opinion leaders have similar attributes as offline opinion leaders. 
Kavanaugh et al. (2005) establish a positive relationship between a person’s civic 
conversational and information Internet use and how informed she is about 
current news. The Blacksburg data also shows that Internet users for civic 
purposes are better educated and earned higher incomes than the average (Carroll 
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et al., 2005). This result is in line with Burson-Marsteller’s (2001a) discovery that 
e-fluentials are characterized by a relatively high socio-economic status.  
Kavanaugh et al. (2006) investigated the extent to which Blackburg’s citizens 
write, comment in, and read online blogs. Kavanaugh et al. (2006) used a scale 
similar to that of Keller and Berry (2003) to identify individuals who engage in 
offline political participation within the community. These two scales allowed 
Kavanaugh et al. (2006) to single out those offline political activists who are 
active in online blogs as well as those individuals who do not participate 
politically offline but engage in blogging. Those who are active in blogs and who 
also engaged in offline political participation were found to be part of a larger 
number of local organisations than those who blog but do not participate offline. 
They also have higher socio-economic status and are more likely to believe that 
the local community is able to solve problems.  
This evidence could be taken to show differences in characteristics between 
online and offline opinion leaders, if blogging as measured by Kavanaugh et al. 
(2006) is a suitable proxy for political opinion leadership online. Recent research 
indicates that bloggers have several characteristics traditionally associated with 
opinion leadership (Lenhart & Fox, 2006; Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009). Nonetheless, 
blogging activity in the Blackburg study cannot be used as an estimate of political 
opinion leadership online, because the analysis did not differentiate between 
political and private blogs. Blogging experience is not confined to reading, 
commenting on, and writing about political issues, but includes a wealth of 
communication about private and commercial matters. Hence, at best, blogging 
experience could be used to assess opinion leadership across online domains.  
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Another study that comes close to assessing the similarity of online and offline 
opinion leaders in the realm of politics is that conducted by Graf and Darr (2004). 
Based on a Nielsen Internet survey as well as a confirmatory U.S. nationwide 
telephone survey of a representative sample, Graf and Darr (2004) identified 
“online political citizens”. Online political citizens are individuals who, in the 
three months prior to the 2004 presidential election, have visited a political 
candidate or party website and engaged in at least two political activities online. 
Political activities online include making a political contribution, receiving 
political emails, sending or forwarding such emails, visiting or commenting on a 
political blog, contributing to political chats, and visiting websites to get political 
news.  
Graf and Darr (2004) compared those categorized as online political citizens with 
respondents identified as influentials using Keller and Berry’s (2003) scale (see 
section 3.3.4). The evidence supports the supposition that online and offline 
opinion leadership is correlated to a significant degree. In fact, close to 70 percent 
of online political citizens were identified as influentials. This compares to an 
average of 10 percent of influentials among the general population. Moreover, 
influentials were found to engage more actively than the average citizen in 
activities that can be regarded as immediate behavioural consequences of online 
opinion leadership. For example, 31 percent of influentials sent or forwarded a 
political email in the three months prior to the 2004 presidential election, 
compared to 7 percent of the general public. 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the concepts of influentials and online 
political citizens are different from the concepts of online and offline opinion 
leadership used in this study (see sections 3.2 and 3.3.4). Whether someone is an 
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influential depends on his level of political and civic participation, while offline 
opinion leadership as defined in this study measures people’s active and passive 
influence on the political opinions of others. The conception of online political 
citizens combines measures of information searching behaviour, political 
participation, and being exposed to others’ influence with certain behavioural 
consequences of online opinion leadership – namely forwarding, blogging, and 
chatting. Again, this approach differs from the present study which defines online 
opinion leadership as the act of trying to convince others of one’s political 
opinions and of being asked for political advice online.  
Although Graf and Darr (2004) use a different definition of opinion leadership, 
their findings regarding the characteristics of online political citizens provide an 
additional data point related to the present subject of investigation. Whereas 
females and males comprise equal portions of the general public and of Internet 
users, two thirds of online political citizens are men. Online political citizens are 
younger than the general public but older than the average Internet user. What is 
more, online political citizens are better educated and earn higher wages than the 
general public and the average Internet user. Online political citizens also have 
stronger community ties, participating more actively in local organisations than 
the other citizens. Notwithstanding definitional differences, Graf and Darr’s 
(2004) analysis suggests certain similarities between online and offline opinion 
leaders. 
It is Schmidt, Paetzolt, and Wilbers’s (2006) investigation of political bloggers in 
Germany that provides the most relevant data points on political online opinion 
leaders as defined in the present study. Schmidt et al. (2006) show that those who 
write about politics in their own blogs are more likely than the general public to 
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voice their political opinions in discussions with others. 83 percent of political 
bloggers voice their political opinions face-to-face, which compares to 72 percent 
among a representative German sample. If we accept political blogging as a proxy 
for online opinion leadership and voicing of one’s opinion in face-to-face 
situations as an adequate measure offline opinion leadership, Schmidt et al.’s 
(2006) evidence illustrates that the two concepts are related. Further comfort can 
be taken from Schmidt et al.’s (2006) finding that political bloggers, alike 
political opinion leaders, are better-educated and more likely to be male than the 
general population (cf. Abold, 2005).  
The above studies provide some indications that online and offline opinion leaders 
share similar attributes. At the same time, Social Presence Theory suggests that 
the differences between the general public and offline opinion leaders may be 
more pronounced than those between online opinion leaders and the population 
overall. As no research to date specifically examines political online opinion 
leadership as defined in this study, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3.a: Both online opinion leaders and offline opinion leaders 
are characterized by an above-average male/female ratio and above-
average levels of education, social gregariousness, political interest, 
personality strength, internal efficacy, and political extremity. 
Hypothesis 3.b: Online opinion leaders are more likely than offline 
opinion leaders to be female and are characterized by lower levels of 
education, social gregariousness, political interest, personality strength, 
internal efficacy, and political extremity as compared to offline opinion 
leaders. 
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4.2.3 Sources of opinion leaders in different domains 
Now that the equalisation hypothesis suggested by Social Presence Theory and 
the attributes of online opinion leaders more generally have been examined in 
detail, I will turn to a question of considerable interest to political campaigners. In 
order to convey their message to opinion leaders in an effective fashion, those 
running a political campaign need to know which sources of political information 
opinion leaders rely on. 
As discussed earlier (see section 3.6), several studies find evidence that both 
influentials and those with a strong personality use the Internet more frequently to 
gather political information than the general public. Further research is necessary 
to connect these findings to offline opinion leadership as defined in this study by 
showing that it is also associated with a high level of political Internet use. But it 
seems likely that such a relationship exists. Websites are particularly attractive for 
opinion leaders, because they supply information in an efficient and flexible way 
(Wiesner, 2009). Information is available on demand and in a timely fashion. 
What is more, online content can be customized to fit the opinion leaders’ needs 
(Shah et al., 2005). 
As with offline opinion leadership, few academics to date have examined the 
relationship between the use of electronic sources of political information and 
online opinion leadership. The studies on marketing opinion leaders mentioned 
above, again, give helpful indications. Sun et al. (2006) find a significant 
association between music-related opinion leadership online and Internet use, for 
example to access subject-specific newsgroups. Burson-Marsteller (2001a, 2001b) 
illustrates that e-fluentials use the Internet more extensively than others. They 
frequent opinion sites and company websites more regularly, they tend to confirm 
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company information with the help of additional online sources, and they 
participate habitually in discussion forums and news groups. Sohn’s (2005) 
analysis of members of Korean online digital camera communities finds no 
evidence that online opinion leaders visit company websites and social 
communities more frequently to gather information. But he establishes that online 
marketing opinion leaders rely more heavily on online newsletters, newsgroups, 
and forums.  
In contrast to the above marketing-oriented studies, Shah et al. (2005) as well as 
Hardy and Scheufele (2005) examined the relationship between online exchange 
about civic and political matters and electronic information gathering. Shah et al. 
(2005) show that the correlation with civic messaging is stronger for online 
information seeking than for newspaper and television news use. Online 
information seeking includes receiving information online and visiting news, 
government, social group, or politician websites. Civic messaging is somewhat of 
a mixed measure including both political discussion via email and activities like 
recruiting volunteers online. Hardy and Scheufele (2005) also test the single-item 
variable political online chat and illustrate that chatting about politics is related to 
Internet news use.  
Neither of the listed researchers has investigated the relationship between political 
opinion leadership online and the use of the Internet for obtaining political 
information. What is more, further evidence is required regarding the relationship 
between Internet use for campaign information and offline opinion leadership as 
defined in this study.  
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Thus, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 4.a: Online opinion leaders are more likely to use the Internet 
as the main source of campaign information than non-leaders. 
Hypothesis 4.b: Online opinion leaders use online sources of campaign 
information more frequently than non-leaders.  
Hypothesis 4.c: Offline opinion leaders are more likely to use the Internet 
as the main source of campaign information than non-leaders. 
Hypothesis 4.d: Offline opinion leaders use online sources of campaign 
information more frequently than non-leaders.  
 
4.3 Perceived strength of computer-mediated influence 
So far, different theories and their implications for political discussion and 
opinion leadership online have been discussed. The overarching issue has been 
whether face-to-face and computer-mediated communication differ in the way 
people talk about politics and in how individuals seek to influence one another. A 
related question is how people perceive the relative influence of different modes 
of communication on their political opinions. If the Internet changes how people 
discuss politics and influence each other, it is worth investigating how people 
judge the impact of online discussions on their political opinions relative to other 
sources of influence.  
4.3.1 Influence relative to other sources 
Traditionally, researchers have focused on comparing the impact of the mass 
media and personal face-to-face discussions on political opinions (see section 
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3.4.2). Much less research has been conducted on the relative influence of 
computer-mediated and face-to-face communication. This is surprising, as the 
importance of persons who act as multipliers online is steadily increasing 
(Güldenzopf & Hennewig, 2010) and since social interaction is regarded as the 
most important Internet use, particularly among younger age groups (Cummings, 
Butler, & Kraut, 2002). In 2007, 75 percent of German 14 to 19 year-olds spent at 
least half their online time communicating with others via email, chat, and other 
Internet technologies. For 20 to 29 year-olds online communication constitutes 40 
percent of the time spent online (De Sombre, 2010). Given these figures, an 
analysis of the relative persuasive strength of online and offline interaction may 
yield interesting results.  
Social Presence theorists argue that it is more difficult to exert influence via 
media with low social presence and that, consequently, face-to-face 
communication is perceived as having a higher impact on people’s opinion 
formation than computer-mediated exchange (Spears & Lea, 1992). Fish, Kraut, 
Root, and Rice (1992) suggest that this phenomenon may be particularly relevant 
for intricate normative matters, such as politics. They find that people see 
electronic communnication as less suitable for complex and socially controversial 
subjects because of its low social presence.  
As described earlier, Walther (1992) is among those criticising the conclusions 
drawn from Social Presence Theory (see 4.1.2). In more recent work, Walther 
(1996, 1997) goes beyond his earlier claim that computer-mediated and face-to-
face situations are similar in terms of social presence. He uses the concept of 
„hyperpersonal“ social interaction to describe online behaviour. Because of the 
asynchronicity and anonymity of computer-mediated communication, individuals 
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are prone to revealing personal information. Users have more control over what 
and how they disclose information, which increases their willingness to do so 
(Joinson, 2007). Discussants expose more information about their mind-set, 
personality, and opinions and receive more such information about the person 
they are conversing with (Walther & Tidwell, 1995). Joinson (2004) confirms 
Walther’s (1996) thesis of hyperpersonal interaction and finds meaningfully more 
self-disclosure online than offline.  
According to Walther (1996, p. 28), computer-mediated communication facilitates 
“forms of interaction that exceed what we may accomplish face-to-face, in terms 
of our impression-generating and relational goals.” This statement could be read 
as claiming that computer-mediated relationships are closer and more influential 
than face-to-face ones. But I think that such an interpretation misses Walther’s 
(1996) point. On the one hand, Walther (1996) qualifies his assertion by saying 
that it holds only “in some cases”. Computer-mediated communication is not 
generally more personal or social than face-to-face conversations. On the other 
hand, increased self-disclose is not necessarily associated with a perceived 
increase in influence. Hence, Walther’s (1996) thesis about hyperpersonal social 
interaction does not provide any guidance as to the relative influence of online 
and offline communication. 
As empirical research on the subject is limited, it is worth reviewing the available 
data on non-political word-of-mouth despite the unique characteristics of political 
opinion formation. Studies comparing the “social richness” of the two modes of 
communication, that some believe to be behind potential differences in persuasive 
strength, show mixed results. Foulger (1990) who asked experienced computer 
users to rank different media in terms of social richness found email to perform at 
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least as well or better than face-to-face interaction. In contrast, Schmitz and 
Fulk’s (1991) study of a network of scholars shows face-to-face communication 
to be perceived as more socially rich than email. Similarly, Liebig and Schütze’s 
(2001) work reveals that organisational project teams prefer face-to-face 
communication for complex tasks, because of the richness of in-person 
interaction.  
In one of the first studies directly comparing the value of offline and online word-
of-mouth, Steffes and Burgee (2009) examined how students choose their 
university professors. Students more frequently used electronic forums than they 
spoke to friends to get advice on the quality of professors. Steffes and Burgee 
(2009) interpret this as proof of the fact that online word-of-mouth is perceived as 
more influential than face-to-face conversations. I believe that this is a false 
generalization. Given the large number of professors, most friends will have no 
experience with a certain lecturer. Since it would not make sense to consult a 
friend on a professor he does not know, people may turn to online forums as the 
second best option. In my point of view, no inference can be made about the 
relative influential strength of online and offline interpersonal communication.  
In an analysis of commercial word-of-mouth, Subramani and Rajagopalan (2003) 
suggest that online communication is more powerful than face-to-face interaction. 
The ability to influence a large number of people simultaneously online and the 
diverse set of electronic communication media that are available enable flexible 
and efficient communication. While Subramani and Rajagopalan (2003) state that 
online influence is more potent, they do not provide evidence to support their 
claim. Furthermore, Sun et al. (2006) quote Phelps, Lewis, Mobilio, Perry, and 
Raman (2004) as saying that online word-of-mouth is more persuasive than face-
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to-face communication due to the Internet’s pace, expediency, and ability to reach 
a large number of people. I believe that Sun et al. (2006) misinterpret Phelps et al. 
(2004).  Phelps et al. (2004) simply highlight differences between the two modes 
of influence without making a statement as to which is more powerful.  
It turns out that it is difficult to find a conclusive theoretical or empirical 
foundation for one’s intuition that personal discussions have more sway than 
electronic conversations. Hence, it seems worth comparing people’s perception of 
the influential force of face-to-face interaction and computer-mediated 
communication. In line with Social Presence Theory, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5: People perceive face-to-face communication to have a 
higher impact on their political opinions than online communication. 
 
4.3.2 Differences between perceived and actual influence 
Before turning to the empirical analysis of the research hypotheses, I will 
highlight potential discrepancies between perceived and actual influence. The 
studies mentioned in the previous section as well as our empirical investigation 
examine people’s perception of the strength of influence of different sources 
rather than actual influence effects. While perceived influence can certainly be 
considered a worthy subject of investigation, a number of studies show that 
people’s perception of influence can differ from real influence processes 
(O’Keefe, 2002).  
Research on mental contamination shows that our judgement and behaviour is 
sometimes influenced by unconscious mental processes. For example, people are 
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typically unaware that the extent to which they view others as adventurous 
depends on having previously memorized words related to adventurousness 
(Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Research on the perception of subliminal messaging 
illustrates that people sometimes cannot report the existence of a stimulus that led 
them to change their behaviour (Dixon, 1971). Storms and Nisbett’s (1970) and 
Zimbardo, Cohen, Weisenberg, Dworkin, and Firestone’s (1969) studies find no 
association between the degree of verbal report change and the degree of 
behaviour change among the examined groups (Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson, 
1977). In a study conducted by Collins, Taylor, Wood, and Thomson (1988), 
subjects generally judged vivid news stories to be more persuasive. Actual 
attitude change, however, was not found to depend on vividness. As Wilson and 
Brekke (1994) point out, people have only limited access to their mental 
processes. Collins et al. (1988) conclude that people assess influence not based on 
recollection but on interest and attention.  
Cohen’s (2003) work on group influence shows that people are often blind to the 
impact their social environment has on their behaviour. As Cohen (2003) points 
out, people tend to believe that their opinions are the result of objective evaluation 
of information and arguments. The diversity of labels different academics have 
assigned to this tendency speaks for its robustness. Ross and Ward’s (1996) 
“naive realism” denotes people’s disposition to take their experience of things, 
persons, and events to be a true reflection of reality. Pronin, Lin, and Ross’s 
(2002) “bias blind spot” account widens the scope of the concept to include 
judgements of arguments and of causal mechanisms. Pronin et al. (2002) claim 
that people generally view themselves as unbiased. Their studies show that people 
are able to identify motivational and cognitive biases in others, but underestimate 
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the influence biases have on themselves. This leads to the paradoxical result that 
people are more likely to identify the factors that influence others than those that 
influence themselves. Subjects often even consider their self-image to be correct, 
after being made aware of potential biases. Epley and Dunning (2000) conducted 
experiments that confirmed these findings.  
Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, and Lisle (1989) identified a tendency to quote rational 
reasons related to the issue in question rather than contextual or emotional factors 
as source of influence. Davison (1983) coined the term “third-person effect” to 
describe the phenomenon that people regard themselves as less impacted by 
persuasive communication and negative media reports than others. At the same 
time, people consider personal experience to play a larger role in their own 
opinion formation than in others’.  
The above described phenomena are examples of the human disposition to 
overestimate one’s own objectivity, which leads people to misperceive the 
influences they are exposed to. People’s preference to see themselves as impartial 
and uninfluenced by potentially manipulative sources causes what is generally 
referred to as a self-enhancement bias (Brown, 1986a). Only when people 
consider it acceptable to be affected, are they likely to recognize and report the 
influence (Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1995).  
The, often unconscious, urge for a positive self-image is not the only reason 
behind the frequently found gap between perceived and actual influence, however. 
There is evidence that people sometimes have limited knowledge of the origins of 
their preferences and behaviour independent of any self-enhancing motivations. 
At times, the influencee is unable to identify the source of influence or names 
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irrelevant factors as highly influential. In other cases, he does not even realize that 
his opinion has changed (Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson, 1977).  
Respondents in an experiment carried out by Markus (1986) gladly gave 
explanations for perceived changes in their own attitudes, even when the reported 
opinion transformation ran directly opposite to the actual change. Only 5 to 10 
percent of respondents who supplied directionally false observations of their own 
opinion change refrained from providing some kind of rationalization. 
Respondents not only altered their views, but they also unconsciously invented 
rationalizations for their new positions. Goethals and Reckman (1973) also found 
participants in a study to be unaware of the opinion change they had undergone. 
Wixon and Laird (1976) discovered that subjects adjusted their histories of 
opinion formation to make sense of attitude transformations.  
Findings like these led Bem and McConnell (1970) to formulate the Self-
Perception Theory, which holds that people derive explanations for their attitudes 
from observation of their own behaviour. And when their behaviour reveals only 
cues that are feeble and unclear, people’s ability to explain their opinions is 
similar to that of onlookers. Similarly, Markus (1986, p. 22) concludes “that we 
may legitimately question whether individuals are any more privy to their own 
attitudes or the processes culminating in those attitudes than are external 
observers”. 
Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson (1977) conducted experiments on people’s aptitude 
to correctly report the effects of a stimulus on their behaviour. They found that 
participants were “virtually never” correct in their perceptions about the impact of 
a stimulus (p. 242). In my opinion, these results have to be put into perspective, 
though. In describing their methodology, Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson (1977) 
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declare that the settings studied were constructed so that the subjects would not be 
able to identify the stimulus. It seems that the experimental design predetermined 
the results. Hence, the conclusion that people are practically never able to 
correctly perceive influences on their behaviour and opinions is not justified.  
Nonetheless, Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson (1977) provide interesting insights into 
the processes that may lead people to misperceive influence, when such 
misperception is present. They suggest that people draw on a set of general causal 
theories about typical processes of influence. General truisms derived from folk 
psychology rather than true introspection form the basis of their explanations. 
When asked to rationalize their behaviour, people search society’s collection of 
widely accepted principles that are habitually used to elucidate behaviour of the 
same kind. 
Moreover, Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson (1977) discuss the conditions under 
which self-reports are more likely to match reality. Most importantly, they 
highlight the importance of the time span between the occurrence of influence and 
the report. The larger the gap between the two, the less accurate the report tends to 
be. Another crucial factor is the type of memory people refer to when giving 
explanations for their behaviour. People are better at identifying stimuli stored in 
their verbal memory than in their emotional or vivid memory. The degree to 
which the causes of the response are plausible also determines the correctness of 
people’s reports. Unsurprisingly, people need to conceive the stimulus as a 
reasonable driver of their behaviour to be able to report on it. Hence, people 
should be more likely to understand and describe processes of informational than 
normative influence. 
133 
 
The above research discusses general reasons for discrepancies between actual 
and perceived influence processes. When comparing the perceived persuasive 
force of interpersonal communication and the media, one needs to be aware of 
another, more specific limitation. Research on direct cognitive media effects, such 
as agenda-setting and framing, has shown that the influence exerted by the media 
is often of a different nature than the influence of interpersonal discussions (cf. 
section 3.1). The media has a powerful impact on what topics are regarded as 
important by the citizens, while interpersonal discussions are the primary driver of 
citizens’ opinion on these topics. Since it is probably more difficult to identify 
indirect cognitive effects, like agenda-setting, people are likely to underestimate 
the influence of the media. 
Already in 1920, Lippmann suggested that the media is particularly powerful not 
at directly influencing opinions on particular topics but at setting the agenda of 
public discussion. Interestingly, Lazarsfeld (1948) also highlighted that the media, 
while not good at promoting a specific stand on an issue, has the ability to 
emphasize certain elements of the social world. The media influences which 
topics people discuss, whereas interpersonal discussions shape people’s opinions 
on these topics. Cohen (1963, p. 13) famously asserted that “the press may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about”.  
The first empirical study of Agenda-Setting Theory was conducted by McCombs 
and Shaw (1972) who surveyed 100 undecided voters in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina. The investigation of the respondents’ opinion formation process 
revealed a correlation between the perceived importance of an issue and the 
intensity of media coverage of that issue (Rogers, 2004). Since McCombs and 
134 
 
Shaw’s (1972) initial research, a number of studies have confirmed the agenda-
setting function of the media. The media has a direct influence on what people 
view as important. The amount of time and space the media allocates to a given 
story, the order in which news are presented, and sometimes a complete lack of 
coverage can have a substantial impact on people’s perception of a topic’s 
importance (Eichhorn, 2005; Sietman, 2005). More recent studies confirm the 
applicability of agenda-setting in online environments. Roberts, Wanta, and Dzwo 
(2002), for example, find evidence for agenda-setting effects of online news on 
electronic bulletin boards.  
Priming is an extension of Agenda-Setting Theory that explicitly includes the 
impact on political opinion formation (Meffert, 1999). By priming certain 
political issues, i.e. giving more attention to them, the media has substantial 
influence on the standards citizens use to evaluate politicians (Iyengar & Kinder, 
1997). This can be explained by the fact that people do not use all stored pieces of 
media information but rely primarily on the most prominent ones, when forming 
their views of political candidates (Peter, 2002). Like agenda-setting, the more 
specific priming concept is supported by numerous experimental and survey 
studies (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2002).  
Another important related concept regarding cognitive media effects is media 
framing. While agenda-setting and priming deal with which topics are reported 
with what frequency and prominence, framing is concerned with how a news item 
is presented (Sietman, 2005). The extent to which news reports are positive or 
negative and whether any individuals or institutions are credited with positive 
events or blamed for negative occurrences tend to influence people’s political 
views (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). People often attribute responsibility for 
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political events to specific individuals featured in the media. Through its framing 
function the media has an influence on these attributions (Iyengar, 1991).  
As has been shown, perceived and actual influence processes may diverge for a 
number of reasons. But even if they diverge, perceived influence is anything but a 
fruitless subject of investigation. Attribution Theory holds that people seek to 
uncover the origins of their own and others’ responses to influence. While these 
explanations may not always be accurate, they have a significant impact on 
people’s future behaviour. People’s acceptance of opinions is determined in part 
by their causal explanations of how they came to have them (Nisbett & DeCamp 
Wilson, 1977). Hence, despite the discrepancies between perceived and actual 
influence, it is worth examining the perceived relative strength of different 
sources. 
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5 Empirical analysis 
 
5.1 Method 
Now, that the research hypotheses have been derived from a number of theoretical 
concepts, they will be tested using evidence from a survey conducted on the 
largest online social network in Germany at the time of the 2009 federal election. 
Before analysing the empirical results in detail, I will briefly describe the social 
network, the survey sample as well as the survey design. Moreover, a summary of 
the most important measures and scales used in the survey will be presented. This 
summary also illustrates the reliability and convergent validity of the collected 
data. 
5.1.1 Survey 
The survey was carried out on StudiVZ and MeinVZ, two interconnected German 
social networking websites that I will refer to as the VZ networks. According to 
Comscore, the VZ networks were the largest online social network in Germany 
with 15.9 million unique users per month as of February 2010. The closest 
competitors were Facebook with 13.3 million and Wer-kennt-wen with 8.1 
million unique users (GFM-Nachrichten, 2010). StudiVZ was founded in 2005 
and is accessible only to university students. MeinVZ was founded in 2008 as a 
connected platform with the same functionality. Contrary to StudiVZ, however, 
MeinVZ is not restricted to those attending university. Registered members of 
either of the two communities can access the content published on both networks 
and communicate with the members of both platforms. 
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The VZ networks enable their members to cultivate a group of friends and to 
interact with them electronically. Alike other social networking websites, the VZ 
networks provide social support as well as the opportunity to exchange 
information (Ridings & Gefen, 2004). Each user has a personalized profile 
disclosing personal information either to all other members of the community or 
to a select group of friends. On their profile, users may choose to reveal 
information about their age, gender, religion, origin, contact details, education, 
profession, and interests. The profile also contains a picture and a list of the 
member’s friends within the VZ networks. Members can invite other members to 
become their friends, giving them access to their profile and their collection of 
photos. Once they have become friends in the community, they can exchange 
written messages and chat electronically. Users can also play games on the 
website and invite non-members to join the network. Moreover, users of the VZ 
networks are able to join groups that have been created by other members and that 
cover a range of different fields of interest. 
One such group is “Meine Stimme zählt!” (“My vote counts!”). It was started 
prior to the 2009 German federal election targeting politically interested 
individuals willing to publically support voter participation. Membership in the 
group is independent of political orientation and party affiliation. A logo showing 
the message “My vote counts!” was automatically displayed on the personalized 
profile of everyone who joined the group prior to the federal election. In addition, 
those who have signed up for the group are allowed to read and contribute to the 
political discussions on the group’s bulletin board. Hence, the group is an ideal 
location for examining the characteristics and behaviour of politically interested 
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social network members and to assess correlations between different political 
variables and concepts. 
On October 13, sixteen days after the federal election on September 27, the 
description on the main page of “My vote counts!” was altered to advertise the 
survey which provides the empirical foundation of this thesis. The amended text 
on the group page explained that the survey was being conducted by a PhD 
student at the University of Bamberg. It also highlighted that all those who 
successfully completed the questionnaire had a chance to win an iPod. Via a link 
in the text group members were able to access the online questionnaire. At the 
same time, all 218,000 group members received a community-internal email 
indicating that a new message had been posted on the group page. On October 19, 
the link to the survey was posted on five other political groups on the VZ 
networks with between 600 and 5,500 members each. On November 9, a 
community-internal reminder email was sent to all group members, again 
indicating a new post on the group page. The link to the online questionnaire was 
active until December 2, when the survey was closed. 
Of the 4,310 individuals who started the questionnaire 1,606 respondents 
completed it at least until the antepenultimate question on age and gender. 
Following a quality check of the data, 90 respondents were deleted from the 
sample leaving a total of 1,516 cases. The quality check adjustment sought to 
identify and erase those respondents who had only “clicked through” the 
questionnaire, for example to take part in the iPod raffle. To ensure that only 
diligent respondents are included in the sample, the average answer time was 
calculated for each individual question. Respondents who, across all questions, 
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were on average 60 percent or more below the average time to answer a question 
were excluded from the sample.  
The low response rate of less than 1 percent can partially be explained by the fact 
that most group members probably never became aware of the existence of the 
survey. Given the main purpose of the group – namely expressing support for 
voter participation – it is unlikely that many members visited the group page 
proactively after the federal election. Moreover, the notification email sent to all 
group members indicated only the fact that a new message had been posted on the 
group page, but did not make explicit reference to the survey. In addition to these 
specific issues, there are more general reasons why online surveys may not 
achieve response rates similar to those of traditional collection methods. As 
Couper (2000) points out, technical problems may hinder respondents from 
starting or completing an online survey, while confidentiality concerns may 
dampen people’s willingness to participate. 
Since the survey was only advertised to members of six selected political groups 
on the VZ networks, the sample makes no pretension to being representative of 
either the German general public or of German Internet users. As with other 
convenience samples collected via political websites, the results can be expected 
to be biased with regards to political interest, education, age, and gender (Faas & 
Schoen, 2009). Furthermore, the sample is unlikely to correctly reflect the average 
characteristics of members of political groups on the VZ networks. The low 
response rate probably creates substantial non-response bias and, thus, increases 
the likelihood that those who are more politically interested and more politically 
active participate in the survey (Umbach, 2004). 
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Yet, it is not possible to adjust the sample according to the average characteristics 
of the group members. Applying a weighting in any meaningful fashion would 
require knowledge of key variables, such as political interest, for all group 
members. This data, however, is not available. Consequently, the descriptive 
statistics below should be seen primarily as a source of information about the 
characteristics of politically interested individuals who are active in online social 
networks. Apart from the specific descriptive information, the data set provides 
insights into relationships among different political measures. Evidently, the 
validity of these results stretches beyond the VZ sample.  
5.1.2 Measures 
The most central measures for the purpose of this study include scales of opinion 
leadership, political discussion, and personality strength. Respondents were also 
questioned about different political attributes, most notably political interest and 
efficacy. In addition, variables measuring socio-demographic characteristics and 
media usage were included in the survey. 
 
Table 2: Opinion leadership scale 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3 = "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree"
a. In personal discussions/on the Internet, I am asked for advice on political questions.
b. In personal discussions/on the Internet, I try to convince others of my political opinions.  
 
Alike all measures used in this study, opinion leadership is assessed on the basis 
of people’s self-reports. Similar to Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), I use a two-item scale 
to measure opinion leadership as a behavioural variable (see Table 2). 
Respondents were asked to what extent others seek their advice on political topics 
and to what extent they try to convince others of their political views. The first 
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item measures passive opinion leadership, the second assesses active opinion 
leadership. Cross-correlation analysis shows that the two types of opinion 
leadership are closely related (r = .54 offline, r = .67 online; sig. < 0.001). 
A 5-point scale was used to capture each answer, allowing for an analysis of 
opinion leadership both as a continuous and as a dichotomous leader/non-leader 
variable. When applying a dichotomous distinction, respondents who chose “tend 
to agree” or “fully agree” for at least one of the two questions are classified as 
opinion leaders. At the same time, respondents can be located on a continuous 
scale ranging from 2 to 10 based on the sum of the scores for the two questions. 
This methodology was used to measure two concepts of opinion leadership. First, 
the two questions were asked with regards to “personal discussions” to measure 
offline opinion leadership. Then, they were rephrased to gather people’s 
behaviour “on the Internet”, online opinion leadership. 
It is worth highlighting that analyses relying on opinion leadership as a 
continuous measure may yield different results than those using a dichotomous 
operationalization of opinion leadership. As will be shown in the following 
sections, only 18 percent of respondents qualify as opinion leaders “on the 
Internet”. Hence, the discriminatory power of the distinction between online 
opinion leaders and non-leaders may be more limited than that of a scale that puts 
respondents into 9 categories of online opinion leadership. On this scale, no 
category comprises more than 32 percent of respondents. “In personal 
discussions” 54 percent of people qualify as opinion leaders, whereas no more 
than 19 percent of respondents fall into a single category on the 9-point scale of 
offline opinion leadership.  
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Alike Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944), the research design used in this study does not 
explicitly differentiate between the two functions of opinion leaders, (i) relaying 
information to others and (ii) influencing the evaluation of information and 
political opinion formation of others. At the same time, our measure of opinion 
leadership is clearly biased towards the second function, as reflected in the words 
“convince” and “advice”. This research design seeks to accommodate two facts 
about opinion leadership established in the above. While the significance of 
opinion leaders in the opinion formation of others is widely accepted, they play 
only a secondary role in the dissemination of information (section 3.4). Opinion 
leaders add to the information others receive from the media. But, more 
importantly, they validate, interpret, and evaluate media messages. Moreover, it is 
often difficult to separate the influence function from the information function, 
because the two tend to be intertwined. Hence, the present study relies on a 
measure of opinion leadership that reflects both the interdependence of the two 
functions and the prominence of the influence function.  
As a test of the validity of the opinion leadership scales, respondents were asked 
to provide data on the frequency with which they engage in four specific types of 
online behaviour – namely (i) sending political emails, (ii) contributing to 
political blogs or bulletin boards, (iii) twittering political content, and (iv) 
publishing own political commentary and analysis online. These activities can be 
seen as direct behavioural consequences of online opinion leadership. Hence, a 
strong relationship between online opinion leadership and these variables would 
provide comfort on the validity of the scale of online opinion leadership used in 
the present study. Indeed, the survey data confirms the strong expected connection 
between online opinion leadership and the four different measures of its 
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behavioural consequences. Correlations between each of the four activities and a 
dichotomous measure of online opinion leadership (r1 = .39, r2 = .50, r3 = .44, r4 = 
.25; sig < 0.001) as well as between each of the four activities and a continuous 
measure of online opinion leadership (r1 = .46, r2 = .55, r3 = .52, r4 = .29; sig < 
0.001) are robust and significant. 
Political discussion activity and opinion seeking are assessed using a similar scale 
as the above one for opinion leadership. Respondents who “tend to agree” or 
“fully agree” that they talk to others about political questions are classified as 
political discussants. Those who “tend to agree” or “fully agree” that they seek 
others’ advice on political questions are categorized as opinion seekers, when 
using the two concepts as a dichotomous variable. Again, the 5-point scale also 
permits a continuous classification. As with opinion leadership, political 
discussion activity and opinion seeking were assessed separately “in personal 
discussions” and “on the Internet”. 
 
Table 3: Political discussion and opinion seeking scales 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree"
a. In personal discussions/on the Internet, I seek others' advice on political questions.
b. I talk to others face-to-face/on the Internet about political questions.  
 
A number of variables test the general characteristics of the respondents. Apart 
from the socio-demographic attributes of age, gender, and education, the survey 
assesses social gregariousness. Based on their number of friends in the VZ 
networks, respondents are classified into four categories of social gregariousness. 
This measure differs from traditional ways of estimating social gregariousness 
and, hence, may better be described as online social gregariousness. 
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Table 4: Reliability of the personality strength scale 
Cronbach's Alpha = 0.82 Corrected item- Cronbach's Alpha
total correlation if item deleted
1. I usually rely on being successful in everything I do. 0.46 0.80
2. I am rarely unsure about how I should behave. 0.47 0.80
3. I like to assume responsibility. 0.52 0.80
4. I like to take the lead when a group does things together. 0.55 0.79
5. I enjoy convincing others of my opinions. 0.48 0.80
6. I often notice that I serve as a role model for others. 0.60 0.79
7. I am good at getting what I want. 0.58 0.79
8. I am often a step ahead of others. 0.53 0.80
9. I have many things others envy me for. 0.39 0.81
10. I often give others advice and suggestions. 0.41 0.81  
 
The most important general characteristic investigated in the survey is the 
respondents’ personality strength. In order to ensure comparability with a recent 
representative poll, I used the version of Noelle-Neumann’s (1983) personality 
strength scale currently employed by the Allensbach Institute. A test of the scale’s 
internal consistency produced a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.82, well above the 
conventional reliability threshold of 0.7. As Table 4 shows, the scale could not be 
improved by deleting any of the items. Moreover, it can be considered 
unidimensional, because all items correlate well with the total. 
Moreover, people were queried about a number of political attributes. As shown 
in Table 5, the survey assessed people’s political interest, satisfaction with 
democracy, and strength of party identification, each on a 5-point scale. People 
were also asked to place themselves on an 11-point left/right scale according to 
their political orientation (1 = left, 11 = right). In addition, respondents specified 
their level of party identification and indicated whether they are a member of a 
political party. Particularly these latter three political characteristics are closely 
related, as cross-correlation analysis illustrates. Members of the CDU/CSU place 
themselves further to the right of the political spectrum (arithmetic mean = 7.6) 
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than those who are a member of the SPD (4.2) or Die Linke (2.0). Unsurprisingly, 
party membership and party identification are correlated (r = .32; sig. < 0.001). 
And, strength of party identification is associated with extremity on the left/right 
scale, albeit less strongly (r = .11 online; sig. < 0.001). 
 
Table 5: Scales measuring political attributes 
In general, how would you describe your level of interest in politics?
1 = "not at all interested", 2 = "less interested", 3 = "moderately interested", 4 = "fairly interested"
5 = "very strongly interested"
How satisfied are you, overall, with democracy as it exists today in German?
1 = "very dissatisfied", 2 = "fairly dissatisfied", 3 = "neutral", 4 = "fairly satisfied", 5 = "very satisfied"
In politics, people often speak of "left" and"right". Where would you place yourself on the below scale?
1 = "left", 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 = "right"
Many people in Germany consistently identify themselves with a particular political party, even though
they might from time to time vote for a different party. Do you generally identify with a specific party?
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke", 
7 = "another party", 8 = "none", 9 = "do not know"
How strong or weak is your identification with that party? 
1 = "very weak", 2 = "fairly weak", 3 = "neither weak nor strong", 4 = "fairly strong", 5 = "very strong"
Are you a member of a political party?
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke", 
7 = "another party", 8 = "none"  
 
Political efficacy is traditionally broken down into an external and an internal 
component. Finkel (1985, p. 893) defines external efficacy as “the belief that the 
authorities or regime is responsive to attempted influence” and internal efficacy as 
“the individual’s sense of political self-competence”. Balch (1974, p. 24) refers to 
a person’s “perceived probability of success at influencing public officials, or, 
alternatively, the political responsiveness of officials” and to the person’s 
“confidence in his own abilities, regardless of the political circumstances". In the 
present study, each form of efficacy was measured by two items reflecting the 
above definitions. With regards to internal efficacy, people were asked if they are 
confident to assume a leading role in a group dealing with political matters and if 
they consider politics to be particularly complicated (see Table 6). The external 
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scale gauges people’s views on whether politicians care about the public’s 
interests (see Table 7). Cross-correlation analysis confirmed the convergent 
validity of both scales. Due to the close similarity of the two statements 
measuring the external variable, the external efficacy correlation was higher than 
that of internal efficacy (r = .55 and r = .35, respectively; sig. < 0.001). 
 
Table 6: Internal efficacy scale 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree"
a. I am confident to take on a leading role in a group dealing with politics.
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1 = "fully agree", 2 = "tend to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend not to agree", 5 = "do not agree at all"
b. Politics is so complicated that someone like me does not always understand what's going on.  
 
 
Table 7: External efficacy scale 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree"
a. Politicians generally try to represent the public's interests.
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1 = "fully agree", 2 = "tend to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend not to agree", 5 = "do not agree at all"
b. Political parties are solely interested in winning votes, not in the public's opinion.  
 
Furthermore, respondents indicated what they considered to be Germany’s most 
pressing political problem (open question) and which party was best-qualified to 
solve it. As an additional test of convergent validity, the answers were compared 
to the respondents’ reports about their voting choices in the 2009 federal election. 
The two measures were significantly correlated (Cramer’s V = .70; sig. < 0.001). 
The questionnaire also assessed the strength of influence of different sources on 
the respondent’s opinion regarding the political problem cited in the previous 
question (see Table 8). By making reference to a specific problem, I sought to 
make it easier for the respondents to rank the sources of influence.  
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Table 8: Scales measuring the parties’ problem-solving competence and 
the influence of different sources 
In your view, what is currently the most significant political problem in Germany? (open question)
And, which political party is, in your view, most qualified to solve this problem?
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke", 
7 = "another party", 8 = "all equally", 9 = "none"
To what extent has each of the below factors influenced your opinion on the above topic?
1 = "not at all", 2 = "fairly weakly", 3 = "moderately", 4 = "fairly strongly", 5 = "very strongly"
a. Face-to-face discussions with friends, family or colleagues
b. Independent mass media content, e.g. newspaper articles, TV, magazines
c. Online communication with friends, family or colleagues, e.g. on social networks, via email  
 
Additionally, the survey included questions regarding the evaluation of the two 
main candidates, Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and about the 
media use and online activity of the respondents. Besides overall leisure time use 
of different mass media, people were asked to indicate their main source of 
campaign information as well as the frequency of use of various online sources of 
political information.  
5.2 Results and discussion 
As the description of the VZ sample illustrates, the data set gathered in the survey 
can be utilized for two different purposes. On the one hand, it enables us to gain a 
better understanding of the attributes of people who are politically active in online 
social networks. On the other hand, the empirical evidence allows us to test the 
hypotheses regarding the second and third-level differences between 
communication online and offline.  
To attain the first of these two ends, the VZ respondents will be compared with a 
representative sample. Among the representative group, I will differentiate 
between Internet users and non-users and will separate out those individuals who 
use the Internet to gather political information. A comparison between these so-
called political Internet users and the VZ respondents shows a meaningful degree 
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of similarity in terms of political attributes, despite large age and education 
differences. In conjunction with data from another representative sample, these 
findings suggest that those who use the Internet to get political information are 
characterized by high personality strength.  
5.2.1 Comparison to representative samples 
It has already been pointed out that the current sample is neither representative of 
the German population overall nor of German Internet users. It is, however, the 
most recent extensive data set about politically interested persons active on online 
social networks. Hence, one contribution of this study to the academic debate 
about political activity on the Internet is the descriptive comparison with the 
results of representative surveys. In the following, I will contrast the VZ sample 
with post-election data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). 
The post-election GLES survey was conducted in face-to-face interviews between 
September 28 and November 23, 2009. Using random sampling, 2,117 individuals 
were selected to participate in the survey. The general population out of which the 
respondents were chosen includes all those who are at least 16 years old, who are 
eligible to vote, and who live in private households in Germany. The GLES 
sample was weighted using iterative proportional fitting to reflect the distribution 
of age, gender, and education among the general population. As the VZ sample 
includes only respondents above the age of 17, 16 and 17 year-olds were excluded 
from the GLES sample for the purpose of comparing the GLES and the VZ data, 
resulting in a reduction of the GLES sample to 2,083 individuals. 
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Figure 6: Non-occupational Internet use and political Internet use among 
representative sample 
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In order to get a sense of the characteristics of German Internet users, I will also 
analyse a sub-group of GLES respondents who report to have used the Internet in 
their leisure time during the previous week (“Internet users”). As Figure 6 shows, 
57 percent of GLES respondents are Internet users based on this definition. 43 
percent used the Internet between 1 and 6 days during the previous week, while 
14 percent went online on a daily basis. As the GLES question regarding Internet 
use makes reference only to the previous week, the classification into Internet 
users most probably understates the proportion of Internet users among the 
German population. A TNS Infratest survey conducted between February and 
May 2010 among the German population over 13, for example, illustrates that 72 
percent of all Germans use the Internet (Initiative D21, 2010). 
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Figure 7: Average daily non-occupational Internet use among VZ sample 
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Note: N = 1,505 
 
While the measure of leisure time Internet use employed in the VZ survey is not 
entirely comparable to the above evidence, it gives an indication of the high 
relative Internet usage among VZ respondents. VZ respondents were asked how 
much leisure time they spend on average per day using the Internet. Only 7 
percent use the Internet less than an hour per day. As much as 14 percent use the 
Internet more than 5 hours per day in their spare time (see Figure 7). 
Another sub-group of GLES respondents that is analysed in the below is the group 
of “political Internet users”. Political Internet users are individuals who report 
having used the Internet during the previous week to obtain information about the 
campaign or about a political party. 25 percent among the GLES sample are 
categorized as political Internet users. Most of them used the Internet between 1 
and 6 days during the week, with only 1 percent of respondents reporting to use 
the Internet daily to get political information (see Figure 6). 
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Table 9: Socio-demographic and political characteristics: 
Representative sample in comparison to VZ sample 
All Internet Political All
respondents users Internet users respondents
Male 48% 54% 60% 56%
Age 49 41 41 25
High school degree
1
25% 38% 50% 74%
Political interest 0.44 0.48 0.56 0.68
Democracy satisfaction 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.57
Internal efficacy
2
0.52 0.58 0.66 0.58
External efficacy
3
0.35 0.39 0.44 0.44
Identify with a political party 66% 68% 80% 84%
Strength of party identification 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.71
Left-right scale
4
-0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 
Extreme political attitude
5
0.30 0.30 0.33 0.35
Party membership 5.1% 5.9% 8.9% 12.3%
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; scales rebased to 0 - 1; VZ survey minimum N = 1,449, except for strength of party  
   identification (PID) N = 1,132. GLES minimum N = 1,830, except strength of PID N = 1,257. GLES "Internet users" minimum  
  N = 1,076, except strength of PID N = 743. GLES "polit ical Internet users" minimum N = 485, except strength of PID N = 388.
1 Abitur
2 VZ survey: "Polit ics is so complicated that someone like me does not always understand what 's going on." GLES: "I often find it  
  hard to understand political topics." Five categories each: 0 = "fully agree", 1 = "do not agree at  all". 
3 "Polit ical parties are solely interested in winning votes, not in the public's opinion."; five categories: 0 = "fully agree", 0.5 = 
  "do not agree at  all"
4 Eleven categories: -1 = at  the left, 0 = at the center, 1 = at  the right of the political spectrum
5 Six categories: 0 = at  the center, 1 = at the left  or right of the polit ical spectrum
GLES VZ survey
 
 
Having defined the terms Internet users and political Internet users, we can turn to 
Table 9. It juxtaposes various socio-demographic and political characteristics of 
the VZ respondents with the attributes of the three groups of GLES respondents. 
While the VZ sample is similar to GLES Internet users in terms of gender 
distribution, average age and education level differ substantially. The mean age of 
VZ respondents is about half that of the representative sample and a full 16 years 
below the average among GLES Internet users. The percentage of individuals 
holding a high school degree among VZ respondents is three times that of the 
representative sample. Neither of these findings is particularly surprising, given 
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that the VZ networks originally were a social networking website exclusive to 
university students. 
In terms of political variables, the average levels of political interest and party 
membership among the VZ sample are well above those of both the GLES sample 
overall and the GLES Internet users. A total of 12 percent of VZ respondents are a 
member of a political party, compared to 5 percent among the representative 
sample and 6 percent of GLES Internet users. These figures are especially 
noteworthy, because party membership typically is related to age. Despite the 
significantly lower average age of VZ respondents, they are substantially more 
likely to be a party member. 
Given the high level of political interest, one would expect VZ respondents to 
report higher levels of internal efficacy. Even though the internal efficacy average 
among the VZ sample is above that of the representative group, it is in line with 
the internal efficacy indicated by GLES Internet users. This unexpected finding 
may be explained by differences in the phrasing of the survey questions. While 
the GLES survey asked if political issues are “often difficult to comprehend” for 
someone, the VZ questionnaire tested whether the respondents “not always 
understand” politics. Obviously, there is a difference between believing that it is 
sometimes hard to follow politics and stating that this is often the case. 
Although VZ respondents and the representative group are similarly happy with 
the functioning of democracy in Germany, the external efficacy variable shows 
that VZ respondents have more faith in politicians to pursue what is in the 
public’s interest. In line with the data on party membership, VZ respondents are 
characterized by a stronger average identification with a political party. Finally, 
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VZ respondents are located slightly more towards the left of the political spectrum 
and have somewhat more extreme political views. 
The VZ data, despite its specific nature, may be taken to support the continuing 
social divide, an important element of the often-cited digital divide among the 
population. According to research on the social divide, different age groups, men 
and women, and people with different educational backgrounds do not use the 
Internet to an equal extent (Norris, 2001). As Table 9 shows, Internet users are 
younger, more likely to be male and better-educated than the general public. Not 
all these discrepancies may be equally persistent, though. As disparities between 
the sexes in terms of Internet use have already disappeared in the U.S., one would 
expect the gender gap in Germany to close over time. But whether age and 
education-related differences will vanish with time is less clear (Mossberger, 
Tolbert, & McNeal, 2008). Proponents of the stratification model of the diffusion 
of Internet use believe that some social strata may never attain a 90 percent 
Internet access rate (Van Dijk, 2006). 
In order to take a closer look at the significance of the differences between the 
political Internet users among the GLES sample and the VZ respondents, Table 10 
juxtaposes the 95 percent confidence intervals around a range of characteristics 
for the two groups. Interestingly, the proportion of males is higher among the 
political Internet users than in the VZ sample. It is worth noting, however, that the 
confidence intervals around the means of the two groups overlap. The same is true 
for the confidence intervals around party membership and party identification 
averages. Despite this lack of statistical significance, the fact that VZ respondents 
are more likely to be a member of a political party is impressive when considering 
the traditional association between age and party membership. 
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Table 10: Socio-demographic and political characteristics: Political 
Internet users among representative sample in comparison to 
VZ sample 
Male 60% 56% 65% 56% 53% 59%
Age 41 40 43 25 24 25
High school degree
1
50% 45% 54% 74% 72% 77%
Political interest 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.68 0.66 0.69
Democracy satisfaction 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.58
Internal efficacy
2
0.66 0.63 0.68 0.58 0.56 0.59
External efficacy
3
0.44 0.41 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.46
Identify with a political party 80% 77% 84% 84% 82% 86%
Strength of party identification 0.70 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.72
Left-right scale
4
-0.13 -0.17 -0.10 -0.14 -0.16 -0.12 
Extreme political attitude
5
0.33 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.36
Party membership 8.9% 6.5% 11.4% 12.3% 10.6% 13.9%
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; scales rebased to 0 - 1; VZ survey minimum N = 1,449, except for strength of party  
   identification N = 1,132. GLES "political internet users" minimum N = 485, except strength of strength of party identification 
   N = 388.
1 Abitur
2 VZ survey: "Polit ics is so complicated that someone like me does not always understand what 's going on." GLES: "I often find it  
  hard to understand political topics." Five categories each: 0 = "fully agree", 1 = "do not agree at  all". 
3 "Polit ical parties are solely interested in winning votes, not in the public's opinion."; five categories: 0 = "fully agree", 0.5 = 
  "do not agree at  all"
4 Eleven categories: -1 = at  the left, 0 = at the center, 1 = at  the right of the political spectrum
5 Six categories: 0 = at  the center, 1 = at the left  or right of the polit ical spectrum
interval interval
GLES - Pol. Internet users VZ survey
95% confidence 95% confidence
 
 
The two groups are similar in terms of the related measures of democracy 
satisfaction and external efficacy. As highlighted above, the counter-intuitive 
inverse relationship between the discrepancies in political interest and internal 
efficacy can probably be explained by difference in the questionnaire. Finally, VZ 
respondents and political Internet users are similar in terms of the two variables 
measured on the left/right scale. Both groups tend towards the left of the political 
spectrum and their political orientations are almost equally extreme. Overall, 
despite the age and educational disparities in the target population there is little 
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difference between the GLES political Internet users and the VZ respondents in 
terms of political characteristics other than political interest. 
 
Table 11: Confidence intervals around socio-demographic and political 
characteristics: Representative sample in comparison to VZ 
sample 
Male 48% 46% 50% 56% 53% 59%
Age 49 48 50 25 24 25
High school degree
1
25% 23% 27% 74% 72% 77%
Political interest 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.68 0.66 0.69
Democracy satisfaction 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.58
Internal efficacy
2
0.52 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.56 0.59
External efficacy
3
0.35 0.34 0.36 0.44 0.43 0.46
Identify with a political party 66% 64% 68% 84% 82% 86%
Strength of party identification 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.72
Left-right scale
4
-0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.14 -0.16 -0.12 
Extreme political attitude
5
0.30 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.36
Party membership 5.1% 4.1% 6.0% 12.3% 10.6% 13.9%
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; scales rebased to 0 - 1; VZ survey minimum N = 1,449, except for strength of party 
  identification N = 1,132. GLES minimum N = 1,830, except strength of party identification N = 1,257
1 Abitur
2 VZ survey: "Polit ics is so complicated that someone like me does not always understand what 's going on." GLES: "I often find it  
  hard to understand political topics." Five categories each: 0 = "fully agree", 1 = "do not agree at  all". 
3 "Polit ical parties are solely interested in winning votes, not in the public's opinion."; five categories: 0 = "fully agree", 0.5 = 
  "do not agree at  all"
4 Eleven categories: -1 = at  the left, 0 = at the center, 1 = at  the right of the political spectrum
5 Six categories: 0 = at  the center, 1 = at the left  or right of the polit ical spectrum
95% confidence
interval
GLES VZ survey
95% confidence
interval
 
 
When these results are seen in conjunction with Table 11, an interesting picture 
emerges. The table shows that there are statistically significant differences 
between VZ respondents and the general population for all variables. At the same 
time, the VZ sample and GLES political Internet users are similar in terms of six 
out of the seven examined political variables (excluding internal efficacy for lack 
of comparability). Notwithstanding significant age and educational discrepancies, 
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VZ respondents closely mirror many of the political characteristics of political 
Internet users within a representative sample. 
The resemblance of GLES political Internet users and the VZ sample is also 
backed by the comparison of second votes cast (see Figure 8). The distribution of 
votes among the representative sample is almost identical to the actual election 
outcome. The voting profile of political Internet users and VZ respondents is quite 
different from the official result, though. The second votes of both groups are 
distributed more equally across parties with significantly less support for the 
major parties, CDU/CSU and SPD. Whereas the vote percentage for Die Linke is 
similar to the representative sample, it is slightly higher for the FDP and 
significantly higher for the green party. The only noteworthy difference in voting 
between the GLES political Internet users and VZ respondents is the very strong 
support for the recently established Internet-focused Piratenpartei among the VZ 
sample. The data suggests that the Piratenpartei has a disproportionately large 
following on the VZ networks, a finding that is supported by the fact that just 
before the 2009 general election almost three times as many people were 
registered as fans of the Piratenpartei on the VZ networks than of any other 
political party. 
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Figure 8: Second vote: Representative sample in comparison to VZ 
sample 
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Note: Second vote as % of those who voted and who disclosed their vote in the respective survey. VZ survey: % of 
nonvoters not available. 
 
In spite of the similarity between GLES political Internet users and VZ 
respondents in terms of political characteristics, given the age gap between the 
two groups one would expect to find discrepancies in political media use. A study 
by the Allensbach Institute conducted in 2010 illustrates that people under 30 are 
45 percent more likely than the general public to use the Internet to gather 
information about political topics (De Sombre, 2010). What is more, the use of 
the Internet for private communication is significantly associated with age. 67 
percent of 18 to 29-year-olds communicate with others online at least several 
times per week, compared to 36 percent of 45 to 59-year-olds.  
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Figure 9: Main source of campaign information: Representative sample 
in comparison to VZ sample 
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Figure 9 confirms the expected difference in patterns of political media usage. 
The proportion of people who consider newspapers, the radio, and personal 
discussions to be their main source of campaign information is fairly similar. But 
Internet and television use differs substantially among the three groups. Political 
Internet users are almost twice as likely as VZ respondents to name television as 
their most important source. At the same time, twice as many VZ respondents rely 
first and foremost on the Internet to obtain campaign information. As expected, 
the differences are still more pronounced when comparing the representative 
sample with the VZ respondents. Television is the main source for the vast 
majority among the representative sample. But only 6 percent among the general 
public considers the Internet to be the key resource for campaign information. 
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Figure 10: Online campaign information seeking: VZ sample 
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Note: Blue bars show visits to party websites only and do not reflect individuals who visited a candidate but not a party 
website. 
 
More specific evidence on political information consumption online reveals a 
picture similar to the statistics on main sources (Figure 10). Only 12 percent 
among the general public visited a candidate or party website during the 2009 
campaign. This compares to 51 percent of political Internet users and as many as 
76 percent of VZ respondents. As little as 4 percent among the representative 
sample received an email or text message from a political party during the 
campaign. Among political Internet users the figure was 2 ½ times larger at 10 
percent. At the same time, the VZ survey shows that 56 percent of respondents 
read a political email during the campaign. One has to bear in mind, though, that 
this second statistic is not entirely comparable. VZ respondents were asked 
whether they had read a political email, whereas the GLES survey sought to 
establish if a person had received an email or text message from a political party. 
Unfortunately, the GLES data does not include any information about the 
personality strength of the respondents. Hence, I use a study carried out by the 
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Allensbach Institute in 2008 to compare the personality strength of VZ 
respondents to a representative sample of the German population. The 
“Allensbacher Markt- und Werbeträger-Analyse” study is conducted annually to 
assess the characteristics of consumers of different kinds of German media. In 
2008, more than twenty-thousand individuals were selected based on quota 
sampling and were interviewed in person. Using iterative factorial fitting the 
interview results were weighted to mirror the German general public in terms of 
gender, age, and household size. A disproportionate weight was ascribed to the 
population between 14 and 60 years of age, due to their particular relevance for 
the analysis of media use. 
 
Figure 11: Personality strength: Representative sample in comparison to 
VZ sample 
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The difference in personality strength between the representative sample and the 
VZ respondents is rather striking (see Figure 11). VZ respondents are almost six 
times more likely to have a very strong personality than the general public. 
Almost the entire VZ sample is characterized by above average personality 
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strength. The Allensbach Institute classifies those with strong and very strong 
personality as opinion leaders. Based on this definition, more than 4 of 5 VZ 
respondents but only 1 of 4 average Germans are classified as opinion leaders. For 
the purpose of comparison to a representative sample we operationalize opinion 
leadership in terms of personality strength, because there is no recent 
representative German sample measuring opinion leadership as defined elsewhere 
in this study (see Table 2).  
It has already been established that the VZ data set is neither representative of the 
German population overall nor of German Internet users or political Internet 
users. As we have seen, however, the VZ respondents are similar to political 
Internet users among the representative sample in terms of most political 
characteristics. Hence, there is reason to believe that individuals who use the 
Internet to obtain political information are substantially more likely to act as 
opinion leaders in interpersonal discussions. It is worth emphasizing, though, that 
at this stage the link between opinion leadership and Internet usage for obtaining 
political information is suggestive rather than conclusive. 
5.2.2 Computer-mediated interpersonal communication 
Before looking at the relationship between informational Internet use and opinion 
leadership in more detail, I will focus on the comparison of interpersonal political 
discussion online and face-to-face. More specifically, I will analyse the VZ data 
in order to answer three questions raised in the theoretical discussion. Does the 
Internet equalize patterns of discussion participation by affecting the relative level 
of discussion among opinion leaders and non-leaders? Is there a significant group 
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of people who are engaged in political discussions online but not face-to-face? If 
so, how does this group compare to those who discuss politics face-to-face? 
Applying Social Presence Theory to online communication suggests that the 
Internet equalizes discussion participation. Communication roles are more flexible 
when people discuss online, because shy and introverted individuals express 
themselves with an increased forthrightness (Vallee & Spangler, 1979). This 
equalisation hypothesis, however, contradicts the view of Social Network 
theorists that online behaviour is an extension of existing offline communication 
relationships. Those who feel compelled to converse with others about politics 
face-to-face are the same kind of people who discuss political issues online. The 
medium does not change the propensity to communicate of those less active in 
face-to-face situations. 
As a first test of the merits of the equalisation assumption, I will compare the 
degree to which opinion leaders and non-leaders discuss politics. The VZ survey 
data does not allow us to test how frequently opinion leaders and non-leaders 
speak up in individual discussion situations. It does, however, illustrate how much 
opinion leaders and non-leaders discuss politics overall. If the equalisation 
assumption is applicable to online discussions about politics, one would expect 
online non-leaders to participate more in online discussions than offline non-
leaders participate in face-to-face discussions (hypothesis 1.a).  
Based on Table 12, we can reject this hypothesis. In fact, discussion participation 
of opinion leaders and non-leaders is significantly more unequal online than 
offline. The online discussion activity of online opinion leaders is similar to the 
face-to-face discussion level of offline opinion leaders. But online non-leaders are 
substantially less active in discussing politics online than offline non-leaders are 
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in discussing face-to-face. The mean difference between discussion levels of 
online opinion leaders and non-leaders is almost twice as high as the mean 
difference between the discussion activity of offline leaders and non-leaders. 
Controlling for Internet usage does not alter the findings in a meaningful way. 
Even if we only include those 25 percent of respondents who use the Internet for 
more than four hours per day, discussion activity of opinion leaders and non-
leaders is much more similar face-to-face than on the Internet.  
 
Table 12: Political discussion activity of opinion leaders and non-leaders 
offline and online 
Opinion leaders
Non-leaders
   N
   Mean difference
   95% confidence interval 0.21 0.26 0.43 0.50 0.21 0.32 0.34 0.47
1 More than 4 hours of leisure time Internet usage per day (top 25% of respondents)
0.24 0.46 0.27 0.40
1,464 1,464 364 364
0.80 0.78 0.80 0.79
0.56 0.32 0.53 0.39
All respondents Heavy Internet users
1
Offline Online Offline Online
 
 
For further evidence related to the supposed equalisation phenomenon, it is worth 
examining the data on hypothesis 1.b. If Social Presence Theory can be applied to 
political discussion about politics, we would expect to find a sizeable group of 
people who do not discuss politics face-to-face but only online. Sun et al. (2006) 
expect these individuals to be more assertive and confident on the Internet, 
because they are less concerned about others’ judgements than they would be 
face-to-face. Along the same lines, Stromer-Galley (2002) suggests that there is a 
group of people who engage in political discussions only online for fear of being 
challenged or seeming uninformed in face-to-face situations. Like Sun et al. 
(2006), Stromer-Galley (2002) does not supply sufficient proof for her 
conclusion, though.  
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Table 13: Domains of political discussion 
N
   Discussants offline and online 358 24.3%
   Offline-only discussants 559 37.9%
   Online-only discussants 42 2.8%
Discussants 959 65.1%
Non-discussants 515 34.9%
Total 1,474  
 
Table 13 illustrates that the group of people who discuss politics only on the 
Internet is very small, constituting just 2.8% of respondents. It is worth reminding 
ourselves that the VZ sample is comprised of individuals who are highly Internet-
savvy and particularly prone to communicating online. If only 2.8% percent of 
VZ respondents talk about politics solely online, the conclusion that very few 
among the general public fit the online-only profile is especially convincing. 
 
Table 14: Characteristics of offline discussants and online discussants 
Male 60% 57% 63% 66% 61% 71%
High school degree 81% 78% 83% 76% 72% 81%
Political interest 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.83
Internal efficacy 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.70
Personality strength 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.80
interval interval
Offline discussants Online discussants
95% confidence 95% confidence
 
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; offline discussants minimum N = 880; online discussants minimum N = 379 
 
Table 14 could be seen as the final blow to the notion that discussion participation 
is more equal on the Internet. Those who discuss politics online are significantly 
more politically interested than those who converse about political matters face-
to-face. They also score higher on the personality strength scale and in terms of 
internal efficacy. It seems that the bar for engaging in political discussions is not 
lowered but raised on the Internet.  
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This conclusion is particularly powerful, because it is congruent with the findings 
regarding the first two hypotheses. The analysis of hypothesis 1.a suggests that 
the Internet amplifies the patterns of communication participation found in face-
to-face situations. While opinion leaders discuss politics to a similar degree online 
and offline, non-leaders are significantly more passive on the Internet than they 
are face-to-face. Those less likely to talk about politics offline, at the same time, 
show disproportionately less willingness to engage in political discussions online. 
The examination of hypothesis 1.b reveals that the online environment motivates 
only a small number of previously passive individuals to engage in interaction.  
Before we conclude that the Internet simply extends offline behaviour and has no 
impact on the nature of discussion relationships, however, let us take a closer look 
at the characteristics of those who discuss politics solely online. One may object 
that this group of just 42 individuals, or 2.8 percent of the sample, is too small to 
be subjected to meaningful statistical analysis. But, in my view, it is worth the 
while to include online-only discussants in the comparison. 
The comparison of Table 14 and Table 15 reveals an interesting picture. It is true 
that online discussants, taken as a single group, are characterized by higher values 
of the examined variables. But we can now see that the difference is driven by the 
fact that most people who discuss politics online also do so face-to-face. It is 
those offline discussants who are most interested in politics and have the highest 
values of efficacy and the strongest personalities who converse about politics on 
the Internet. This phenomenon masks another crucial finding: Those who discuss 
politics solely online score lower on all these variables than those who talk about 
political matters face-to-face. Or, to put it differently, the kinds of people that are 
associated with limited discussion participation offline are more likely to talk 
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about politics solely on the Internet. And, despite the small number of online-only 
discussants, the differences in terms of political interest and internal efficacy to 
the offline-only group are of statistical significance.  
 
Table 15: Characteristics of discussants and non-discussants 
Male 49% 45% 53% 54% 39% 69%
High school degree 66% 62% 70% 56% 41% 71%
Political interest 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.63 0.57 0.69
Internal efficacy 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.52 0.44 0.59
Personality strength 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.63 0.78
Male 56% 52% 60% 67% 62% 72%
High school degree 82% 78% 85% 79% 74% 83%
Political interest 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.83 0.81 0.85
Internal efficacy 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.70 0.68 0.72
Personality strength 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.81
interval interval
Non-discussants Online-only discussants
95% confidence 95% confidence
interval interval
Offline-only discussants Discussants offline & online
95% confidence 95% confidence
 
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; non-discussants minimum N = 493; online-only discussants minimum N = 40; 
offline-only discussants minimum N = 532; discussants offline & online minimum N = 338 
 
Overall, neither Social Presence Theory nor Social Network Theory alone can 
explain interpersonal communication participation on the Internet. In aggregate, 
online communication extends or even amplifies the patterns of discussion found 
in face-to-face situations. 90 percent of those who discuss politics online also do 
so offline. What is more, it is those offline discussants who are more politically 
interested and efficacious and have stronger personalities who also converse with 
others on the Internet. At the same time, however, the data reveals an opposing 
effect, which is less powerful but no less interesting. The small group of people 
who discuss politics solely online comprises a disproportionate number of women 
and of less-educated, less politically interested and less efficacious individuals, 
when compared to offline-only discussants. The Internet is indeed able to 
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motivate some of those who refrain from talking about political matters face-to-
face – potentially due to a lack of efficacy and personality strength – to participate 
in political discussions. 
5.2.3 Computer-mediated opinion leadership 
Having examined the applicability of Social Presence Theory and Social Network 
Theory to online political discussions, I now turn to the analysis of online opinion 
leadership. First, a few hypotheses about online opinion leadership derived from 
the two above theories will be tested. In a second step, the characteristics and 
sources of information of opinion leaders will be assessed.  
5.2.3.1 Domains of influence 
In analogy to the above considerations related to online discussion, Social 
Presence Theory implies that there is a group of opinion leaders whose influence 
is confined solely to the online realm. Dressler and Telle (2009) suggest that 
people who do not exert influence face-to-face may be more prone to influence 
others on the Internet due to the anonymity of the online space. While Dressler 
and Telle (2009) are careful to point out that further research is required to 
confirm their proposition, Wiesner (2009) puts forward a bolder assertion. 
Making reference to a study conducted by Sun et al. (2006), she concludes that 
offline non-leaders are as likely as offline opinion leaders to influence others on 
the Internet.  
Based on the evidence in Table 16, one can confidently reject Wiesner’s (2009) 
claim. While a third of offline opinion leaders can also be classified as opinion 
leaders on the Internet, a mere 4 percent of offline non-leaders can be described as 
online opinion leaders. Hence, offline opinion leaders are substantially more 
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likely than offline non-leaders to be online opinion leaders. What is more, the 
group of online-only opinion leaders is insignificant. Among this sample of 
Internet-savvy individuals, the group of people who exercise influence solely 
online makes up just 2 percent of the total. Thus, we can discard hypothesis 2. 
Social Network Theory seems correct in that computer-mediated interaction 
supports existing communication relationships rather than changes their nature. 
 
Table 16: Domains of political opinion leadership 
N
   Opinion leaders offline and online 238 16.2%
   Offline-only opinion leaders 533 36.3%
   Online-only opinion leaders 29 2.0%
Opinion leaders 800 54.5%
Non-leaders 669 45.5%
Total 1,469  
 
5.2.3.2 Characteristics 
Another test of the applicability of Social Presence Theory is hypothesis 3.b, 
which suggests that online opinion leaders score lower on a number of variables 
than offline opinion leaders. At the same time, studies of marketing opinion 
leadership and of concepts related to political opinion leadership indicate a certain 
similarity between online and offline opinion leaders. The discussion of 
hypothesis 2 has shown that offline opinion leaders are significantly more likely 
than offline non-leaders to act as opinion leaders on the Internet. In fact, the 
correlation between online and offline opinion leadership is r = .35 (sig < 0.001). 
Hence, one would expect online opinion leaders to differ from the general public 
in a similar, albeit less prominent fashion as offline opinion leaders (hypothesis 
3.a).  
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For the purpose of the analysis, I will differentiate between three separate groups: 
non-leaders, offline-only opinion leaders, online opinion leaders. The later 
includes both those who exercise influence solely online as well as those who 
influence others both face-to-face and on the Internet. And, one needs to bear in 
mind that those who talk offline as well as online make up close to 90 percent of 
the group.  
 
Table 17: General characteristics of opinion leaders and non-leaders 
Non- Overall Cramer's Sig.
leaders Offline-only Online V
Male 47% 60% 73% 56% 0.20 0.000
Level of education
1
0.43 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.06 0.047
   Below high school degree 29% 21% 24% 26%
   High school degree 57% 61% 60% 58%
   University degree 15% 18% 16% 16%
Social gregariousness
2
0.47 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.09 0.001
Non- Overall Eta Sig.
leaders Offline-only Online
Personality strength 0.65 0.77 0.82 0.73 0.30 0.000
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; scales 0-1; Non-leader minimum N = 620, offline-only opinion leaders minimum 
  N = 508, online opinion leaders minimum N = 247
1 Three categories: 0 = "below high school degree", 0.5 = "high school degree" (Abitur), 1 = "university degree"
2 Measured by the number of friends on the VZ network; four categories: 0 = "0-49 friends", 0.33 = "50-99 friends", 
  0.66 = "100-149 friends", 1 = "150+ friends"
3 Average daily non-occupational internet use; seven categories: 0 = > 1/2 hour, 1 = > 5 hours
Opinion leaders
Opinion leaders
 
  
The comparison of the general characteristics in Table 17 provides support for the 
similarity between offline and online opinion leaders when compared to the non-
leaders. Both offline-only opinion leaders and online opinion leaders are 
characterized by an above-average level of social gregariousness. These findings 
are in line with Smith et al.’s (2007) work which shows marketing opinion leaders 
to be more socially gregarious than the average. It is worth mentioning, however, 
that the present study measures social gregariousness by the number of friends in 
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the VZ networks. Hence, the term online social gregariousness may be more 
appropriate (see section 5.1.2). 
The Blacksburg studies indicate that online opinion leaders have a higher average 
level of education (Carroll et al., 2005). And, the VZ survey data confirms that 
offline-only opinion leaders as well as online opinion leaders are better educated 
than non-leaders. The difference, however, is fairly small and the relationship 
between the variables is barely statistically significant. There are two potential 
explanations for the subtlety of the difference found. It could be that the socio-
economic similarity between opinion leaders and non-leaders is a pre-requisite for 
the exercise of influence (Schenk & Döbler, 2002). Thus, opinion leaders are only 
somewhat but not substantially better educated. Another possible reason may be 
the low variance in terms of education among the sample. Users of the VZ 
networks have a very high average education level. Hence, the correlation 
between education and other variables may be lower among the VZ sample than 
among the general public (cf. Schoen, 2004). 
Like online opinion leaders, Graf and Darr’s (2004) “online political citizens” are 
better educated than the average. What is more, two thirds of them are male. An 
even stronger relationship is found among VZ respondents. As per Table 17, 
almost three quarters of online opinion leaders on the VZ networks are men. This 
compares to 60 percent males among offline-only opinion leaders. The data on 
personality strength paints a similar picture. Given that personality strength is an 
important antecedent of opinion leadership, it is far from surprising that both 
online opinion leaders and offline-only opinion leaders are characterized by 
particularly high levels of personality strength.  
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Whereas there is strong support for hypothesis 3.a, the results do not confirm the 
applicability of Social Presence Theory. Online opinion leaders are slightly less 
educated than offline-only opinion leaders. But the difference is almost negligible. 
Online opinion leaders are also less gregarious than offline-only leaders, yet the 
difference is anything but striking. More importantly, personality strength levels 
and the gender distribution among the three groups clearly contradict the 
equalisation hypothesis. Similar to the analysis of discussion participation, we 
find that those who are active online are characterized by stronger personalities. 
And, men make up a much higher proportion of online opinion leaders than of 
offline opinion leaders, a discrepancy that may be related to the digital divide 
discussed in section 5.2.1.  
 
Table 18: Political characteristics of opinion leaders and non-leaders 
Non- Overall Eta
leaders Offline-only Online
Political interest 0.55 0.77 0.83 0.68 0.51
Internal efficacy 0.46 0.65 0.72 0.58 0.45
Strength of party identification 0.65 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.29
Identify with a political party 77% 90% 88% 84% 0.17
Democracy satisfaction 0.54 0.63 0.53 0.57 0.17
External efficacy 0.42 0.50 0.49 0.46 0.16
Extreme political attitude
1
0.31 0.34 0.44 0.35 0.16
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; scales 0-1; for all etas: sig < 0.001; Non-leaders minimum N = 626, except for strength of   
  party identification N = 444; offline-only opinion leaders minimum N = 523, except for strength of party identification N = 444;  
  online opinion leaders minimum N = 260, except for strength of party identification N = 218
1 Six categories: 0 = at the center, 1 = at the left  or right of the political spectrum
Opinion leaders
 
 
A similar picture emerges with regards to political interest, internal efficacy, and 
strength of party identification. Both offline-only opinion leaders and online 
opinion leaders are significantly more interested in politics, have a stronger sense 
of internal efficacy, and identify more closely with a political party than non-
leaders. What is more, online opinion leaders score higher on all these variables 
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than offline-only opinion leaders. Again, we find that the Internet not simply 
replicates but amplifies the differences present in face-to-face communication (cf. 
section 5.2.2).  
The relationship is strongest for political interest (Eta = 0.51), supporting the 
importance of political interest as the motivational basis for offering advice to 
others on political matters (O’Cass, 2002). Opinion leaders are likely to believe in 
their ability to comprehend and influence the political process. Thus, the 
relationship between internal efficacy and the categories of opinion leadership is 
almost as strong as with political interest.  
 
Figure 12: Satisfaction with democracy of opinion leaders and non-leaders 
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Note: Non-leaders N = 667; offline-only leaders N = 532; online leaders N = 266 
 
The association between opinion leadership and variables measuring contentment 
with politicians and with the political system is more complex. Both offline-only 
opinion leaders and online opinion leaders trust politicians more than non-leaders 
to be responsive and to do what is in the interest of the citizens (external efficacy). 
But while offline-only opinion leaders are more satisfied with German democracy 
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than non-leaders, online opinion leaders are no more content with democracy than 
non-leaders (see Figure 12). These findings are somewhat contradictory, as one 
would expect contentment with the political system to go hand in hand with trust 
in the politicians running the political system.  
Interestingly, a similarly ambiguous relationship is found in studies investigating 
external efficacy and political trust of offline opinion leaders. Nisbet’s (2005) 
cross-national analysis shows that external efficacy and influentialness tended to 
be associated positively, but that trust in the political system was typically 
negatively associated with opinion leadership. In only a few countries the 
established correlations were statistically significant, though. Bockman and 
Gayk’s (1977) empirical evidence also reveals a slightly negative relationship 
between opinion leadership and attitudes towards the outcomes of the political 
system. O’Cass and Pecotich (2005), however, find voting satisfaction to be 
positively related to opinion leadership. Overall, it seems that there is no clear-cut 
relationship between different categories of opinion leadership and variables 
measuring contentment with politicians and the political system. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the above results, the low level of democracy 
satisfaction of online opinion leaders compared to offline-only opinion leaders 
may account for the disparity in terms of the extremity of their political positions. 
Online opinion leaders are positioned more towards the extremes of the political 
spectrum than offline-only opinion leaders and non-leaders (see Table 18). As in 
Hellevik and Bjørklund’s (1991) study, the distribution of the proportion of online 
opinion leaders in each category along the left/right scale is U-shaped. 18 percent 
of VZ respondents are classified as online opinion leaders. But online opinion 
leaders make up more than a third of those at the extreme left and close to half of 
174 
 
those at the extreme right (see Figure 13). These results are in line with the claim 
put forward by some scholars that high levels of internal efficacy combined with 
low levels of contentment with the political system create more extreme political 
views (Bockman & Gayk, 1977). 
 
Figure 13: Online opinion leaders as a proportion of all respondents 
located in each category along the left/right scale 
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Note: N = 260 
 
It is worth highlighting, however, that the political positions of online opinion 
leaders are not extreme by any means (see Figure 14). Less than 20 percent of 
online opinion leaders place themselves in the four categories at the far right and 
far left of the political spectrum. 60 percent of online opinion leaders are located 
with the five moderate categories. Online opinion leaders are not politically 
extreme. Their political views are simply less moderate than those of non-leaders 
and offline-only opinion leaders. And, when the political positions of online 
opinion leaders diverge from the moderate middle, more often than not they 
diverge towards the left of the political spectrum. 
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Figure 14: Opinion leaders and non-leaders along the left/right scale 
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Note: Non-leaders N = 626; offline-only leaders N = 523; online leaders N = 260 
 
To sum up, the VZ data confirms hypothesis 3.a with the exception of political 
extremity. Both online opinion leaders and offline-only opinion leaders are 
characterized by an above-average male-female ratio and above-average levels of 
education, social gregariousness, political interest, personality strength, and 
internal efficacy. The same is true for strength of party identification as well as 
external efficacy. At the same time, we can reject the notion that opinion 
leadership is more equal online than offline in terms of general and political 
attributes. With regards to gender, personality strength, political interest, internal 
efficacy, strength of party identification, and political extremity the differences 
present in face-to-face communication are amplified on the Internet. Online 
opinion leaders score higher on each of these scales than offline-only opinion 
leaders. 
In conjunction with the correlation between online and offline opinion leadership 
established at the beginning of this chapter, these findings raise an important 
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question: Is the relationship between online opinion leadership and the above 
socio-demographic and political characteristics a direct or an indirect one via 
offline opinion leadership? Theoretically, it seems plausible that certain socio-
economic and political characteristics drive one’s propensity to act as an opinion 
leader in real life and that this propensity increases one’s inclination to also 
influence the political views of others via the Internet. This causal chain is 
particularly convincing, since the Internet is a relatively new and less prevalent 
form of communication. At the very least, this causal connection seems much 
more likely than one that flows in the opposite direction.  
In order to arrive at an answer, regression analysis of opinion leadership and the 
socio-demographic and political characteristics will be conducted. It is worth 
highlighting that, in contrast to the mean comparisons above, the regression 
variable offline opinion leadership includes both offline-only opinion leaders and 
those offline opinion leaders who are also active online. Only in this way are we 
able to test the role of offline opinion leadership in explaining online opinion 
leadership.  
Throughout the analysis logistic and linear regression will be juxtaposed, which 
has the added benefit of being able to assess the discriminatory power of the 
dichotomous definition of opinion leadership used in the mean comparison. While 
logistic regression, like the mean comparison, operationalizes opinion leadership 
as a dichotomous variable, linear regression relies on a continuous measure of 
opinion leadership. One might expect that the continuous measure of online 
opinion leadership may be more suitable for the purpose of regression analysis, 
because under the dichotomous definition only 18 percent of respondents qualify 
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as online opinion leaders, whereas on the 9-point scale of online opinion 
leadership no more than 32 percent of respondents fall into any single category.  
 
Table 19: Determinants of online opinion leadership 
Political interest 2.82** (0.57) 0.29** (0.04)
Strength of party identification 2.16** (0.52) 0.18** (0.04)
Democracy satisfaction -1.35** (0.39) -0.14** (0.03)
Internal efficacy 1.47** (0.52) 0.15** (0.04)
Personality strength 1.17*   (0.48) 0.14** (0.03)
Gender 0.50*   (0.20) 0.02    (0.02)
Level of education -0.39    (0.30) -0.08** (0.02)
External efficacy 0.21    (0.48) 0.05    (0.04)
Social gregariousness 0.03    (0.24) -0.00    (0.02)
(Constant) -6.51** (0.59) -0.17** (0.04)
Adjusted r
2
0.23    
Nagelkerke's r
2
0.26    
-2LL 810.5    
Chi2 174.8** 
N 1,002    1,002    
Note: Unstandardized coefficient with standard error in brackets; ** sig < 0.01, * sig < 0.05, all other variables are not significant;
independent variables on scales of 0-1
Binary logistic regression OLS regression
 
 
The above table illustrates, however, that the switch from a dichotomous to a 
continuous variable does not affect the results in a meaningful way. Both 
analyses, alike the mean comparison, show political interest to be most closely 
associated with online opinion leadership. Strength of party identification, internal 
efficacy, and personality strength also share a significant positive relationship 
with online opinion leadership. As those who engage in opinion leadership on the 
Internet are on average less satisfied with democracy, the negative relationship 
between the two variables in not unexpected. The associations between both 
external efficacy and social gregariousness and online opinion leadership are not 
significant when the other variables are taken into account. And, the level of 
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education and gender differences are either insignificant or contribute only 
marginally to explaining the variation in online opinion leadership.  
 
Table 20: Determinants of online opinion leadership including offline 
opinion leadership as a control variable 
Offline opinion leadership 4.63** (0.58) 0.51** (0.04)
Democracy satisfaction -1.43** (0.41) -0.14** (0.03)
Strength of party identification 1.54** (0.56) 0.10*   (0.04)
Gender 0.47*   (0.21) 0.02    (0.01)
Political interest 0.95    (0.64) 0.07    (0.04)
Internal efficacy 0.75    (0.55) 0.06    (0.04)
Personality strength 0.07    (0.51) 0.03    (0.03)
Level of education -0.31    (0.31) -0.07** (0.02)
External efficacy 0.09    (0.51) 0.03    (0.04)
Social gregariousness -0.11    (0.25) -0.02    (0.02)
(Constant) -6.12** (0.62) -0.08    (0.04)
Adjusted r2 0.35    
Nagelkerke's r2 0.35    
-2LL 732.3    
Chi2 247.5** 
N 997    997    
Note: Unstandardized coefficient with standard error in brackets; ** sig < 0.01, * sig < 0.05, all other variables are not significant;
independent variables on scales of 0-1
Binary logistic regression OLS regression
 
 
As a next step, offline opinion leadership is included in the regression analysis as 
a control variable. Consequently, the relationships between political interest, 
personality strength, and internal efficacy and online opinion leadership are no 
longer significant. Even though the variable strength of party identification retains 
a significant relationship with online opinion leadership when offline opinion 
leadership is taken into account, its explanatory power is reduced substantially. 
The negative relationship between the level of education and online opinion 
leadership is unlikely to be meaningful given the very high level of education 
across the entire VZ sample. Together with Table 21 these results indicate that the 
relationship between online opinion leadership and the most important political 
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characteristics is indirect in nature. Offline opinion leadership is associated with 
political interest, personality strength, internal efficacy, and strength of party 
identification. And, online opinion leadership is first and foremost related to 
offline opinion leadership. In many regards, those who influence others on the 
Internet are akin to those who exert influence offline. From a campaigning 
perspective, this suggests that the information tailored to the personal and political 
attributes of offline opinion leaders is suitable also for people who exercise their 
influence on the Internet. 
 
Table 21: Determinants of offline opinion leadership 
Political interest 4.08** (0.47) 0.44** (0.03)
Personality strength 2.03** (0.36) 0.23** (0.03)
Internal efficacy 1.54** (0.43) 0.19** (0.03)
Strength of party identification 1.33** (0.45) 0.17** (0.03)
Social gregariousness 0.40    (0.21) 0.03    (0.02)
Gender 0.23    (0.16) 0.02    (0.01)
Level of education -0.16    (0.26) -0.03    (0.02)
External efficacy 0.35    (0.43) 0.04    (0.03)
Democracy satisfaction 0.31    (0.36) -0.01    (0.03)
(Constant) -6.41** (0.51) -0.18** (0.03)
Adjusted r2 0.47    
Nagelkerke's r
2
0.40    
-2LL 1,013.8    
Chi2 356.8** 
N 1,008    1,008    
Note: Unstandardized coefficient with standard error in brackets; ** sig < 0.01, * sig < 0.05, all other variables are not significant;
independent variables on scales of 0-1
Binary logistic regression OLS regression
 
 
Finally, let us take a brief look at the small number of online-only opinion leaders 
to see whether the data confirms the interesting pattern found in discussion 
participation on the Internet (see section 5.2.2). Indeed, Table 22 shows that 
online-only opinion leaders differ markedly from those who influence others 
solely face-to-face. Whereas 60 percent of offline-only opinion leaders are male, 
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women make up a stunning 63 percent of those who exert political influence 
solely on the Internet. Moreover, online-only opinion leaders are on average less 
well-educated, less politically interested and less efficacious and they have 
weaker personalities than their offline-only counterparts. As with political 
discussions, the Internet facilitates the participation of a small number of 
individuals possessing attributes traditionally associated with low levels of 
activity. And, this effect works against the general amplification of differences 
that we find in online communication. 
 
Table 22: Characteristics of opinion leaders and non-leaders 
Male 47% 43% 51% 37% 18% 56%
High school degree 71% 68% 75% 62% 44% 80%
Political interest 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.64 0.56 0.72
Internal efficacy 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.39 0.56
Personality strength 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.60 0.77
Male 60% 56% 64% 77% 72% 82%
High school degree 79% 75% 82% 77% 72% 83%
Political interest 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.87
Internal efficacy 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.75 0.72 0.77
Personality strength 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.86
interval interval
Non-leaders Online-only opinion leaders
95% confidence 95% confidence
Offline-only opinion leaders Offline & online leaders
95% confidence 95% confidence
interval interval
 
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; non-leaders minimum N = 636; online-only opinion leaders minimum N = 27; 
offline-only opinion leaders minimum N = 512; offline & online opinion leaders minimum N = 224 
 
5.2.3.3 Sources 
The above examination of the characteristics of opinion leaders active on the 
Internet may be of some relevance for the field of political campaigning. But 
those running a political campaign are typically even more interested in an 
analysis of the political information sources of those who influence the political 
opinions of others. Thus, I will compare the online opinion leaders’ use of the 
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Internet for obtaining campaign information with that of non-leaders and offline-
only opinion leaders. 
 
Figure 15: Main source of campaign information of opinion leaders and 
non-leaders 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Internet Personal 
discussions
TV Newspapers Radio Other
Non‐leaders Offline‐only leaders Online leaders
 
Note: Non-leaders N = 661; offline-only leaders N = 532; online leaders N = 267 
 
As Figure 15 shows, the vast majority of online opinion leaders use the Internet as 
their main source of campaign information. In fact, more than half of the online 
opinion leaders rely chiefly on the Internet for campaign information. None of the 
other media is quoted as key source by more than 15 percent of online opinion 
leaders. These findings are in line with Shah et al.’s (2005) results regarding civic 
messaging, a measure that could also be described as civic opinion leadership 
online. According to Shah et al. (2005), the correlation between online civic 
messaging and online information seeking is stronger than the relationship 
between online civic messaging and either newspaper or television news use.  
What is more, online opinion leaders are significantly more likely to use each of 
eight different kinds of electronic sources of campaign information (see Table 
23). More than 80 percent of online opinion leaders read a political email in the 
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run-up to the general election, for example. This compares to 63 percent of 
offline-only opinion leaders and 40 percent of non-leaders. Thus, there is strong 
support for both hypothesis 4.a and 4.b. 
 
Table 23: Sources of campaign information of opinion leaders and non-
leaders 
Non- Overall Eta
leaders Offline-only Online
Internet as main source 39% 41% 53% 42% 0.11
Read political email 40% 63% 81% 56% 0.43
Frequency of use:
1
   News media websites 0.47 0.64 0.72 0.58 0.28
   Indep. political groups in social netw. 0.27 0.37 0.54 0.35 0.31
   Political party websites 0.23 0.35 0.53 0.33 0.38
   Candidate profiles in social networks 0.19 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.34
   Government websites 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.26
   Politician websites 0.13 0.24 0.37 0.21 0.35
   Supporter networks 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.30
Overall frequency of use
2
0.26 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.42
Note: Arithmetic means or percentages; for all etas: sig < 0.001; Non-leader minimum N = 629, offline-only opinion leaders  
  minimum N = 512, online opinion leaders minimum N = 256
1 Seven categories: 0 = "never", 1 = "daily"
2 Sum of the 7 measures listed above; rebased to 0-1
Opinion leaders
 
 
The comparison between the VZ respondents and the representative sample in 
section 5.2.1 suggests a close relationship between political Internet use and 
personality strength. Almost the whole VZ sample, a group of politically active 
online individuals, is characterized by above-average personality strength. Thus, it 
is likely that not only online opinion leaders but also offline opinion leaders rely 
on the Internet for obtaining political information to a disproportionate extent. 
And, one may expect offline opinion leaders to name the Internet as their central 
political information source more often than non-leaders.  
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But, as Figure 15 shows, offline-only opinion leaders among the VZ sample do 
not quote the Internet as their main source of information significantly more 
frequently than non-leaders do. While 53 percent of online opinion leaders rely 
first and foremost on the Internet for obtaining campaign information, around 40 
percent of both non-leaders and offline-only opinion leaders do so. This result 
may be explained by the fact that the VZ sample is biased towards individuals 
who make disproportionate use of the Internet. 39 percent of non-leaders among 
the VZ respondents quote the Internet as their main source. In comparison, only 
21 percent of political Internet users among the representative sample use the 
Internet as the main source of campaign information (see Figure 9). 
Given these results, it is necessary to analyse the online information gathering of 
offline-only opinion leaders in more detail. Contrary to hypothesis 4.c, there is 
hardly any meaningful difference between offline-only opinion leaders and non-
leaders in terms of their reliance on the Internet as the main source of campaign 
information. But, as suggested by hypothesis 4.d, offline-only opinion leaders 
make significantly more use of every online source of political information than 
non-leaders (see Table 23). 63 percent of offline-only opinion leaders, for 
example, read a political email during the 2009 campaign. This compares to 40 
percent of non-leaders. Whereas 22 percent of offline-only opinion leaders read a 
political email at least once a week, only 9 percent of non-leaders read emails 
about politics on a weekly basis (see Figure 16). In summary, offline-only opinion 
leaders make disproportionate use of the Internet for obtaining political 
information, but they are not more likely than non-leaders to use the Internet as 
their main source. 
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Figure 16: Reading of political email of opinion leaders and non-leaders 
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Note: Non-leaders N = 638; offline-only leaders N = 513; online leaders N = 260 
 
Linear regression will be utilized to provide an alternative perspective on the 
relationship between opinion leadership – both online and offline – and Internet 
use for obtaining campaign information. For the purpose of the analysis, Internet 
use for obtaining campaign information is operationalized as an index combining 
the frequency of use of seven different kinds of political websites (see Table 23 
for details). Offline and online opinion leadership are measured as dichotomous 
variables. Taken together, the two dichotomous measures of opinion leadership 
account for 18 percent of the variance in Internet use for obtaining campaign 
information. Those who are neither online opinion leaders nor offline opinion 
leaders have an average score of 14 on the scale of Internet campaign information 
use ranging from 1 to 50. The average score of offline opinion leaders is 5 points 
higher, whereas the average score of opinion leaders who are active online is 7 
points higher than the reference group. While the connection is stronger for online 
opinion leadership, both offline and online opinion leadership are linked to 
Internet use for campaign information. It seems that the Internet is a useful tool 
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for reaching not only those who influence others online but also the much larger 
group of individuals who influence the political views of others in face-to-face 
situations. 
5.2.4 Perceived strength of computer-mediated influence 
Ever since Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) famous work, researchers have examined the 
perceived persuasive force of interpersonal communication and the mass media. 
Like the majority of studies to date, the VZ data confirms that people generally 
consider face-to-face discussions to have a stronger impact on their political 
opinions than mass media sources. As Table 24 shows, VZ respondents overall 
regard interpersonal discussions as more impactful. But the mean scores of face-
to-face conversations and of mass media on a scale from 0 to 1 diverge by only 
0.03 points and the difference does not pass the 95 percent significance threshold. 
Among those who use the Internet most actively, the perceived difference 
between offline discussion and mass media is twice as large in absolute terms 
(mean difference of 0.06).  
But the aim of this thesis is not to compare the well-researched effects of face-to-
face communication and the mass media. Instead, I will focus on the persuasive 
force of interpersonal interaction on the Internet. As hypothesized, people 
perceive face-to-face interaction to have a significantly higher impact on their 
political views than communication online (hypothesis 5). As Table 24 shows, the 
absolute difference between offline and online discussions about politics is 0.21 
on a scale ranging from 0 to1. 
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Table 24: Perceived strength of influence 
Arithmetic
mean
All respondents
   Offline discussion 0.641 0.625 0.656
   Mass media online and offline 0.611 0.595 0.627
   Online discussion 0.428 0.410 0.446
Heavy Internet user1
   Offline discussion 0.637 0.603 0.670
   Mass media online and offline 0.578 0.542 0.614
   Online discussion 0.508 0.471 0.545
Online talk > offline talk2
   Offline discussion 0.628 0.557 0.700
   Mass media online and offline 0.582 0.512 0.652
   Online discussion 0.602 0.529 0.675
Note: Scales 0-1; five categories: 0 = "not at  all influenced by...", 1 = "very strongly influenced by..."; N = 1,298
1 More than 4 hours of leisure t ime Internet usage per day (top 25% of respondents, N = 320)
2 Respondents who more frequently talk about polit ics online than offline (N = 76)
95% confidence
interval
 
 
Part of the discrepancy may be explained by the fact that many people do not use 
the Internet with high frequency, since irregular Internet use is bound to impact 
the perception of online communication. This connection between Internet use 
and the perceived relative influence of online discussions is supported by the 
evidence on heavy Internet users. Among this group of people, who use the 
Internet most actively, the gap between the influence of online discussions and 
offline conversations is substantially smaller. Nonetheless, even heavy Internet 
users view online discussions about political issues are significantly less relevant 
for their political opinion formation than face-to-face interaction.  
As even those who use the Internet most frequently more often talk about politics 
face-to-face than on the Internet, it is worth examining the effect of the relative 
frequency of discussion on perceived influence. Hence, I will look at the small 
group of respondents who report to discuss politics more frequently online than 
offline. As this group comprises only 76 individuals, the results obtained do not 
187 
 
pass any tests of significance. Nonetheless, they provide an indicative answer to 
the question whether differences in the frequency of discussion might be able to 
explain the gap in perceived influence between offline and online discussions. 
Interestingly, even individuals who converse more often about politics online than 
offline perceive face-to-face interaction to have a larger impact on their political 
opinions than discussion on the Internet (arithmetic means of 0.628 and 0.602). It 
seems that factors other than frequency affect people’s perception of relative 
influence on their political views. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
One could argue that the Internet has had a greater impact on politics than 
any technological invention since the invention of the printing press nearly 
six hundred years ago. 
Olson and Nelson (2010, p. 50) 
 
This thesis began with an account of how interpersonal political discussions 
contribute to the health of our democratic system. Conversations about politics 
facilitate the dissemination of knowledge within the electorate and contribute to 
the citizens’ understanding of political issues. They widen the range of arguments 
people take into account when forming their opinions. And, they enhance people’s 
comprehension of different viewpoints and lead people to reflect on their own 
opinions. When people discuss politics with others, the clarity, consistency, and 
ideological coherence of their opinions tend to increase. Opinion expression 
makes it easier to organize one’s views and to incorporate new information into 
one’s existing knowledge. This increase in the quality of people’s political 
opinions can be expected to have a beneficial impact on the output of the 
democratic system. Moreover, political discussion activity is closely associated 
with civic and political participation, both of which are generally believed to 
strengthen the citizens’ self-government.  
And, while not everyone may agree with Olson and Nelson’s (2010) above 
assertion, many share the view that the Internet is altering the way people talk 
about politics. The Internet allows us to respond to political news by 
instantaneously sharing and discussing it with others around the globe at virtually 
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no cost. What is more, the exchange with like-minded others or with those 
holding divergent political viewpoints takes place in an environment that is often 
more anonymous and where social pressure tends to be lower than face-to-face. 
Several academics believe that these unique characteristics of online 
communication have a positive effect. As the Internet makes it easier for people to 
participate in political discussions and to share their personal views, those who 
refrain from discussing politics in-person are motivated to interact with others 
online. Lowered social anxiety and reduced inhibition lead to an equalisation of 
discussion participation on the Internet. Certain individuals simply feel more 
comfortable speaking up online than in face-to-face situations. 
Since an empirical confirmation of such beneficial effects is still outstanding, the 
current study sought to provide clarity by addressing the subject from several 
angles. Firstly, the level of discussion activity of opinion leaders was compared to 
that of non-leaders. If discussion participation was more equal, one would expect 
online non-leaders to engage more frequently in discussions than offline non-
leaders. Moreover, the VZ data was examined to assess whether there is a 
meaningful group of individuals who discuss politics solely online. If a significant 
number of people chose to discuss politics only on the Internet, this could be 
regarded as strong evidence for the equalisation hypothesis.  
But the analysis of the VZ data illustrates that, in aggregate, the equalisation 
hypothesis is not applicable to interpersonal political discussions. Online 
discussion activity is not more equal than face-to-face conversation participation, 
when opinion leaders and non-leaders are compared. Non-leaders are not more 
active on the Internet than they are offline. Moreover, the power of the Internet to 
motivate those to discuss politics who are inactive face-to-face is very limited. 
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Less than 3 percent of respondents belong to the group of online-only discussants. 
As the VZ sample is comprised of individuals who are particularly prone to 
communicating online, the conclusion that very few among the general public 
discuss politics only online is particularly convincing. Thus, we can conclude in 
line with Social Network Theory that the Internet supports rather than changes the 
patterns of discussion existent in face-to-face situations.  
What is more, we find that the differences present in face-to-face interaction are 
amplified when people communicate online. Discussion participation of opinion 
leaders and non-leaders is substantially more unequal online than offline. Even 
among frequent Internet users, online non-leaders are significantly less active in 
discussing politics online than offline non-leaders are in talking about politics 
face-to-face. Particularly those who are less active political discussants seem to 
regard the Internet as a rather unpolitical medium. People who discuss politics on 
the Internet are more interested in politics and more efficacious and have stronger 
personalities than those who discuss political matters face-to-face. Apparently, the 
threshold for participation is higher on the Internet than offline. 
The analysis of opinion leadership activity produces similar results. Just 2 percent 
of respondents report to influence others solely online. And, those who act as 
opinion leaders face-to-face are significantly more likely to influence others on 
the Internet. Around a third of offline opinion leaders but only 4 percent of offline 
non-leaders are classified as online opinion leaders. In my view, these findings are 
especially noteworthy for two reasons. On the one hand, they refute the claim put 
forward by some scholars that offline non-leaders are likely to act as opinion 
leaders on the Internet. On the other hand, this is the first empirical evidence 
showing that online-only opinion leadership is a rare phenomenon.  
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Moreover, the differences between online opinion leaders and non-leaders are 
more pronounced than the differences between offline-only opinion leaders and 
non-leaders. Online opinion leaders are characterized by higher levels of 
personality strength, political interest, internal efficacy, and party identification 
than offline-only opinion leaders. On the left/right scale, the political views of 
online opinion leaders are less moderate than those of non-leaders and of offline-
only opinion leaders. Overall, the results match the findings on political 
discussions showing that the Internet raises the bar for participation.  
I have argued that the above conclusions are especially robust, because VZ 
respondents are particularly prone to communicating online. If among this group 
that is so familiar with the Internet hardly anyone talks or influences solely online, 
the percentage of online-only discussants and influencers is probably even lower 
among the general population. But, one could equally argue that the amplification 
of differences found online can partially be explained by the distinctive nature of 
the sample. VZ respondents are prone to using social networks when they 
communicate about politics on the Internet. And, interaction on social networks is 
characterized by relatively high social presence, because it is less anonymous than 
many other forms of online communication. In fact, one could make the case that 
the social presence of online social networks exceeds that of casual face-to-face 
conversations. When VZ users discuss politics in groups like “My vote counts!”, 
they may be recognized by a larger number of people they know than in many 
face-to-face situations. When one is exposed to such a large number of friends at 
the same time, one may be much more aware of one-self and of the counterparties 
than in offline conversations about politics. I am not overly concerned about this 
objection, however, because VZ respondents will use many other forms of 
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electronic communication to discuss politics, for example email and chat. But 
since the survey does not allow us to compare the frequency of use of the various 
modes of online communication, empirical evidence not collected on a social 
networking site is needed to provide further comfort. 
Despite the disheartening overall conclusions concerning the equalisation 
hypothesis, a look at the small group of online-only discussants provides a 
glimmer of hope for Internet enthusiasts. While online discussants, taken as a 
single group, are characterized by especially high values of those attributes 
associated with face-to-face political talk, online-only discussants are rather 
different. Those 10 percent of online discussants who do not converse about 
politics face-to-face comprise a disproportionate number of women and of less 
educated, less politically interested and less internally efficacious people. In other 
words, those individuals associated with limited discussion participation offline 
are more likely to talk about politics solely on the Internet. Interestingly, the 
differences between these online-only discussants and those who talk about 
politics face-to-face in terms of internal efficacy and political interest are 
particularly significant.  
Again, the analysis of online-only opinion leaders yields similar results. 63 
percent of those who influence others solely online are female, which compares to 
40 percent among offline-only opinion leaders. People whose influence is 
confined to the online realm are also less politically interested and score lower on 
scales measuring internal efficacy and personality strength. Both analyses suggest 
that the Internet may, after all, provide a space for political interaction for some of 
those who are less confident in political matters. While the bar for participation 
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for most people is higher online, some people seem to feel less inhibited on the 
Internet. 
In my view, these findings constitute a significant contribution to the academic 
debate about the Internet’s impact on political life. The results may help to 
reconcile not only Social Presence Theory and Social Network Theory but also 
the reinforcement hypothesis and the mobilisation hypothesis of political 
participation online. The idea that the Internet has the ability to inform, activate, 
and organize previously passive individuals is typically referred to as the 
mobilisation hypothesis. Others are convinced that the Internet amplifies existing 
disparities in political engagement by strengthening those who are already 
advantaged (Norris, 2000). The VZ sample suggests that aggregate data pointing 
to a reinforcement of differences online may be insufficient for rejecting the 
mobilisation view. The present study has focused on participation in political 
discussions and opinion leadership. But, in light of the evidence, a reassessment 
of the Internet’s impact on political participation more generally may yield 
interesting results.  
Having analysed the equalisation hypothesis, it is worth reviewing the data on the 
characteristics of online opinion leaders from another perspective. As we have 
seen, the characteristics of online opinion leaders, in aggregate, are more 
pronounced than those of offline-only opinion leaders. In conjunction with the 
observed strong correlation between offline and online opinion leadership, this 
finding raises the question whether the relationship between online opinion 
leadership and the above political characteristics is direct or indirect in nature. 
Either the above listed characteristics directly predict a person’s propensity to act 
as an opinion leader on the Internet. Or, alternatively, these characteristics 
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determine a person’s tendency to influence others face-to-face, which, in turn, 
drives the person’s propensity to act as an online opinion leader. Such an indirect 
connection seems theoretically plausible, as the Internet is a comparatively new 
communication medium.  
The results suggest that personality strength, political interest, and internal 
efficacy are only indirectly linked to online opinion leadership. When offline 
opinion leadership is included as a control variable, these three antecedents lose 
their explanatory power with regards to online opinion leadership. Of the political 
variables included in the analysis only democracy satisfaction and strength of 
party identification maintain a statistically significant connection to online 
opinion leadership. Those offline opinion leaders less satisfied with our 
democratic system and those who identify closely with a political party are more 
likely to also act as opinion leaders on the web. It seems that certain personal 
characteristics drive offline opinion leadership and that online opinion leadership 
is primarily a consequence of offline opinion leadership. Nevertheless, 
longitudinal studies are required to substantiate this view. 
Overall, those who exert influence online are similar to those who influence 
others face-to-face in many important respects. Their levels of education, 
personality strength, political interest, strength of party identification, and internal 
efficacy are quite comparable. These results are of practical relevance to those 
running political campaigns, because the above attributes are crucial inputs for 
political campaigners designing messages to mobilize opinion leaders. The data 
illustrates that the information fitted to the characteristics of those who exert 
influence face-to-face is probably also appropriate for opinion leaders on the 
Internet.  
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While it is important to understand the characteristics of opinion leaders, having 
detailed information on their sources of political information is even more crucial 
for campaigners. It is through these sources that opinion leaders can be mobilized 
and provided with arguments to spread among the general public. The problem 
with traditional media, such as television, is that opinion leaders constitute only a 
minority of the audience. Hence, using traditional media to spread information 
that is tailored to the political knowledge and information requirements of opinion 
leaders is impractical and inefficient. Information tailored to opinion leaders 
would likely be too sophisticated and, hence, unsuitable for the majority of the 
audience, the non-leaders.  
The data from the present study suggests that the Internet may be a more efficient 
channel for providing opinion leaders with campaign information. The VZ sample 
shows that both online opinion leaders and offline-only opinion leaders rely on 
the Internet for obtaining political information significantly more than non-leaders 
do. Moreover, the comparison between the VZ respondents and a representative 
sample suggests a close relationship between political Internet use and personality 
strength, a key antecedent of opinion leadership. Among the VZ sample, a group 
of individuals who rely heavily on the Internet for obtaining political information, 
more than 80 percent are classified as opinion leaders by the Allensbach 
personality strength scale. This compares to just 26 percent among the general 
public. It would be premature to conclude that opinion leaders make up the 
majority of political Internet users, however, not least because of the the likely 
non-response bias in the sample. A representative study of political Internet users 
would be required to draw such a conclusion. But, we can safely say that the 
Internet constitutes a channel that allows campaigners to address a 
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disproportionate number of individuals that act as opinion leaders both face-to-
face and online.  
The data suggests that Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) Two-Step Flow Model may have 
a noticeable role to play not just in individual political opinion formation but also 
in the dissemination of online campaign information. A central proposition of the 
model is that opinion leaders are more exposed to the media than non-leaders and 
that the relatively high level of media use enables opinion leaders to act as bridges 
between the media and non-leaders. It has been established that opinion leaders 
are more exposed to campaign information on the Internet than non-leaders. 
Moreover, opinion leaders probably draw on the political information they have 
gathered online when they influence the views of others. Thus, it seems likely that 
a noteworthy part of the campaign information available online reaches the 
general public via opinion leaders. In their study, Norris and Curtice (2007, p. 9) 
come to a similar conclusion: “If party websites and related online resources reach 
opinion leaders and if, in turn, opinion leaders are among those most keen on 
initiating discussions about politics with fellow citizens and on engaging in 
persuasion, then what appears on the Internet may reach the wider public via a 
two step process.” Norris and Curtice (2007) also point out that this two-step 
process becomes increasingly important as newspaper and television news 
audiences continue to decline. It is worth highlighting, though, that the two-step 
flow is likely to reach only some of the non-leaders. Many will receive the 
information directly from the Internet and others will not receive the information 
at all. Further research is required to examine how much of the online information 
flows directly to non-leaders and to assess how opinion leaders use the 
information from the Internet in their discussions with others. 
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One may object that this supposed two-step flow, if it exists, is bound to be 
temporary in nature. As the Internet becomes more integrated into people’s lives, 
more and more non-leaders will access online sources of campaign information 
directly. I fully acknowledge that the Internet constitutes a moving target – as 
Kluver, Jankowski, Foot, and Schneider (2007) have so fittingly put it. Even 
during the time between my analysis and its publication the Internet may have 
undergone meaningful change. Hence, any objection pointing to the transitory 
nature of online phenomena is hard to refute definitively. 
At the same time, a convincing argument can be made for the lasting nature of the 
online two-step flow. Internet sources are not only well-suited to the information 
requirements of opinion leaders. They are also tailored to the information 
processing skills that opinion leaders are more likely to possess. Mossberger, 
Tolbert, and Stansbury (2003) point out that the use of online sources requires a 
higher level of information literacy than the use of other media. Information 
literacy is defined as the ability to effectively utilize information resources and to 
identify valuable pieces of information. Individuals with a high level of education 
and those who frequently engage in interpersonal discussions are generally better 
at assessing the credibility and quality of information (Huber, 2009). Given their 
above-average level of education and their active engagement in discussions, 
opinion leaders are prone to be particularly information literate. This may explain 
their strong reliance on online information sources. Thus, the disproportionate 
Internet use for campaign information of opinion leaders and the supposed two-
step flow of online information may actually persist over time. 
To obtain a view on the relative importance of interpersonal communication 
online and offline, the third-level differences between the two modes of 
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interaction have been assessed. The results demonstrate that people consider face-
to-face discussions to have a considerably higher impact on their political views 
than interpersonal communication on the Internet. Since even heavy users of the 
Internet discuss politics less often on the Internet than they do face-to-face, it is 
not unexpected that people generally regard online discussions as less impactful. 
Interestingly, those individuals who more frequently talk about politics online 
than offline also regard interpersonal communication on the Internet as less 
important for their political opinion formation. So, it is not just the generally 
lower level of discussion activity online that explains the relatively low influence 
of political discussions on the Internet. 
It remains an open question, why even the most active Internet users discuss 
politics less often online than offline, and why even those who talk more about 
politics online than offline view online conversations as less crucial for their 
political attitudes. Maybe Fish et al. (1992) are right that many people see online 
communication as less suitable for complex and socially controversial subjects 
because of its low social presence. And, maybe the low social presence reduces 
the persuasive force of online interaction even when people prefer to discuss 
politics on the Internet rather than face-to-face. But maybe the differences 
between face-to-face and online communication in terms of frequency and 
persuasiveness will simply fade with time. It seems that only future research will 
be able to provide elucidation.  
It has already been established that alike any survey-based research the validity of 
the present study depends on the accuracy of the respondents’ perception. It has 
also been pointed out that this limitation is of particular relevance for people’s 
descriptions of how external factors influence their views and behaviour. While 
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people may give fairly reliable accounts of their level of political interest and their 
media consumption, their perception of influence may well differ from real 
influence processes. Research shows that people sometimes find it hard to identify 
the factors that influence their opinions. At times, they do not even realize that 
their opinions have changed in response to a given source. In these cases, people’s 
reports of the strength of different sources of influence are bound to be inaccurate. 
The comparison of the persuasive force of interpersonal discussions with that of 
the media is further complicated by the fact that cognitive media effects may be 
more difficult for people to detect.  
Thus, additional research is necessary to test whether the findings of the present 
study with regards to perceived influence also apply to actual influence. 
Longitudinal data on political opinion formation and change in the run-up to 
elections should allow us to acquire a better understanding of the comparison of 
actual effects of interpersonal communication online and offline. It could also be 
interesting to conduct a field experiment comparing the influence of in-person and 
online communication on voter turnout (cf. Gerber & Green, 2000). 
In any event, the substantially higher perceived impact of face-to-face discussions 
together with the established disproportionate political Internet use of those who 
influence others in face-to-face discussions suggest an interesting conclusion. 
While the direct effect of online activity on people’s political opinions seems to 
be relatively limited, opinion leaders probably incorporate the information 
published and exchanged on the Internet in face-to-face discussions with others. 
And, as these in-person discussions have such a vital effect on people’s political 
views, the Internet’s role in political opinion formation, despite its indirect nature, 
seems to be rather important. 
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It is worth emphasizing that the VZ survey was advertised solely to select political 
groups on the VZ networks. Hence, alike other convenience samples collected on 
political websites, it is neither representative of the German general public nor of 
German Internet users. Moreover, the data probably does not reflect the attributes 
of the average member of a political group on the VZ networks. With a response 
rate below 1 percent the sample is likely to be biased towards high levels of 
political interest and participation.  
The comparison between the general public and the VZ respondents reveals 
statistically significant differences for all socio-demographic and political 
variables. VZ respondents are substantially younger, better educated, more 
satisfied with the democratic system, more politically interested, and have higher 
internal efficacy. At the same time, VZ respondents are more likely to be male, to 
be situated towards the left of the political spectrum, to be a party member, to 
identify closely with a political party, and to hold a more extreme political 
attitude.  
Among the representative group, one can differentiate between those who do and 
those who do not use the Internet to gather political information. Despite large 
remaining age and education differences, VZ respondents closely mirror many of 
the political characteristics of the so-called political Internet users within a 
representative sample. In fact, there are no statistically significant differences 
between the two groups for six out of the seven examined political variables. 
Moreover, the voting profile of political Internet users and VZ respondents 
diverges from the official result in a comparable fashion. Both groups show 
significantly more support for the green party and substantially less for the two 
major parties than the general public. Overall, VZ respondents are fairly similar to 
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political Internet users among the representative sample. Hence, the validity of 
this study’s analysis of differences between online and offline communication 
does not seem to be restricted to the VZ sample. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Self-designating scales 
Keller and Berry’s (2003) “influentials” scale 
 
Here is a list of things some people do about government and politics. Have you 
happened to have done any of these things in the past year? Which ones? 
1) Written to or called any politician at the state, local, or national level. 
2) Attended a political rally, speech, or organized protest of any kind. 
3) Attended a public meeting on town or school affairs. 
4) Held or run for a political office. 
5) Served on a committee for some local organization. 
6) Served as an officer for some club or organization. 
7) Written a letter to the editor of a newspaper or magazine or called a live radio 
or TV show to express an opinion. 
8) Signed a petition.* 
9) Worked for a political party. 
10) Made a speech. 
11) Written an article for a magazine or newspaper. 
12) Been an active member of any group that tries to influence public policy or 
government. 
 
* Not included in respondent scores, but used to test for social desirability.  
 
Darr and Graf’s (2007) “poli-fluentials” scale 
 
A person described as an “Influencer” answered “yes” to any three of these: 
1) Made a speech on a political topic. 
2) Wrote an article for a magazine or newspaper on a political topic. 
3) Was an active member of an advocacy group, that is, one that tries to influence 
public policy or government. 
4) Wrote a letter or sent an email message to any public official at the state, local 
or national level.  
5) Wrote a letter or sent an email to the editor of a newspaper or magazine. 
6) Attended a political rally, speech, or protest. 
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7) Called alive radio or TV show to express an opinion on politics or public 
policy.  
 
A person described as a “Political” answered “yes” to any two of these: 
1) Leading up to the November 7, 2006, election, did you perform volunteer work 
for a political campaign? 
2) Thinking back to the 2004 presidential election, did you donate money to any 
candidate, political party, or a group promoting or opposing a cause or issue? 
3) Leading up to the November, 7, 2006, election, did you donate money to any 
candidate, political party, or a group promoting or opposing a cause or issue? 
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Appendix B: Teaser page for VZ survey 
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Appendix C: Survey questionnaire 
A. Personality strength (English)     
Here is a list of statements. How well does each item describe you and your personality? 
1 = "perfectly", 2 = "fairly well", 3 = "not well", 4 = "not at all"   
  Answer weighting 
  1 and 2 = Yes 3 and 4 = No 
a. I usually rely on being successful in everything I do. 13  7  
b. I am rarely unsure about how I should behave. 14  7  
c. I like to assume responsibility. 15  7  
d. I like to take the lead when a group does things together. 17  8  
e. I enjoy convincing others of my opinions. 15  7  
f. I often notice that I serve as a role model for others. 16  8  
g. I am good at getting what I want. 14  7  
h. I am often a step ahead of others. 18  9  
i. I have many things others envy me for. 15  9  
j. I often give others advice and suggestions. 14  7  
Categories of personality strength     
a. Very strong (opinion leaders) 151  129  
b. Strong (opinion leaders) 128  114  
c. Above average 113  98  
d. Moderate 97  84  
e. Weak 83  76  
      
A. Personality strength (German)     
Hier sind verschiedene Eigenschaften. Wo würden Sie sagen: Das passt auf mich...? 
1 = "voll und ganz", 2 = "eher", 3 = "eher nicht", 4 = "überhaupt nicht"   
a. Gewöhnlich rechne ich bei dem, was ich mache, mit Erfolg.     
b. Ich bin selten unsicher, wie ich mich verhalten soll.     
c. Ich übernehme gerne Verantwortung.     
d. Ich übernehme bei gemeinsamen Unternehmungen gern die Führung.   
e. Es macht mir Spaß, andere Menschen von meiner Meinung zu überzeugen.   
f. Ich merke öfter, dass sich andere nach mir richten.     
g. Ich kann mich gut durchsetzen.     
h. Ich bin anderen oft einen Schritt voraus.     
i. Ich besitze vieles, worum mich andere beneiden.     
j. Ich gebe anderen öfter Ratschläge, Empfehlungen.     
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B. Political opinion leadership (English)     
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree" 
a. In personal discussions, I am asked for advice on political questions.   
b. In personal discussions, I try to convince others of my political opinions.    
Opinion leaders: Those who answered "tend to agree" or "fully agree" to at least one of the statements. 
      
B. Political opinion leadership (German)     
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz" 
a. Ich werde zu politischen Themen in persönlichen Gesprächen um Rat gefragt.   
b. Ich versuche, andere in persönlichen Gesprächen von meiner politischen Einstellung zu überzeugen. 
      
C. Political opinion seeking and political discussion (English)   
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree" 
a. In personal discussions, I seek others' advice on political questions.   
b. I talk to others face-to-face about political questions.     
      
C. Political opinion seeking and political discussion (German)   
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz" 
a. Ich frage andere in persönlichen Gesprächen zu politischen Themen um Rat.   
b. Ich unterhalte mich in persönlichen Gesprächen über politische Themen.   
      
D. Political opinion leadership online (English)     
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree" 
a. On the Internet, I am asked for advice on political questions.   
b. On the Internet, I try to convince others of my political opinions.    
Opinion leaders: Those who answered "tend to agree" or "fully agree" to at least one of the statements. 
      
D. Political opinion leadership online (German)     
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz" 
a. Ich werde zu politischen Themen im Internet um Rat gefragt.   
b. Ich versuche, andere im Internet von meiner politischen Einstellung zu überzeugen. 
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E. Political opinion seeking online and political discussion online (English) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree" 
a. On the Internet, I seek others' advice on political questions.   
b. I talk to others on the Internet about political questions.     
      
E. Political opinion seeking online and political discussion online (German) 
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz" 
a. Ich frage andere im Internet zu politischen Themen um Rat.   
b. Ich unterhalte mich im Internet über politische Themen.     
      
F. Political characteristics (English)     
In general, how would you describe your level of interest in politics?   
1 = "not at all interested", 2 = "less interested", 3 = "moderately interested", 4 = "fairly interested" 
5 = "very strongly interested"     
How satisfied are you, overall, with democracy as it exists today in German?   
1 = "very dissatisfied", 2 = "fairly dissatisfied", 3 = "neutral", 4 = "fairly satisfied", 5 = "very satisfied" 
In politics, people often speak of "left" and" right". Where would you place yourself on the below 
scale? 
1 = "left", 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 = "right"     
Many people in Germany consistently identify themselves with a particular political party, even though 
they might from time to time vote for a different party. Do you generally identify with a specific party? 
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke",  
7 = "another party", 8 = "none", 9 = "do not know"     
How strong or weak is your identification with that party?      
1 = "very weak", 2 = "fairly weak", 3 = "neither weak nor strong", 4 = "fairly strong", 5 = "very strong" 
Are you a member of a political party?     
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke",  
7 = "another party", 8 = "none"     
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F. Political characteristics (German)     
Einmal ganz allgemein gesprochen: Wie stark interessieren Sie sich für Politik?   
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "weniger stark", 3 = "mittelmäßig", 4 = "ziemlich stark", 5 = "sehr stark" 
Wie zufrieden sind Sie - alles in allem - mit der Demokratie, so wie sie in Deutschland heute besteht? 
1 = "sehr unzufrieden", 2 = "ziemlich unzufrieden", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "ziemlich zufrieden",  
5 = "sehr zufrieden"     
In der Politik wird oft von "links" und "rechts" gesprochen. Wo würden Sie sich einordnen? 
1 = "links", 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 = "rechts"     
Viele Menschen in der Bundesrepublik neigen längere Zeit einer bestimmten Partei zu, obwohl sie  
auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen Sie - ganz allgemein  
gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu? Wenn ja, welcher?   
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke",  
7 = "andere Partei", 8 = "keiner", 9 = "weiß nicht"     
Wie stark oder schwach neigen Sie dieser Partei zu?     
1 = "sehr schwach", 2 = "ziemlich schwach", 3 = "mäßig", 4 = "ziemlich stark", 5 = "sehr stark" 
Sind Sie Mitglied einer Partei?     
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke",  
7 = "andere Partei", 8 = "nein"     
      
G. Internal efficacy (English)     
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree" 
a. I am confident to take on a leading role in a group dealing with politics.   
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "fully agree", 2 = "tend to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend not to agree", 5 = "do not agree at all" 
b. Politics is so complicated that someone like me does not always understand what's going on. 
Overall internal efficacy measures the sum of the answers to both questions.   
      
G. Internal efficacy (German)     
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz" 
a. Ich traue mir zu, in einer Gruppe, die sich mit politischen Themen befasst, eine aktive Rolle zu  
übernehmen.     
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "voll und ganz", 2 = "eher", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher nicht", 5 = "überhaupt nicht" 
b. Die ganze Politik ist so kompliziert, dass jemand wie ich nicht immer versteht, was vor sich geht. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
210 
 
H. External efficacy (English)     
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree" 
a. Politicians generally try to represent the public's interests.     
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
1 = "fully agree", 2 = "tend to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend not to agree", 5 = "do not agree at all" 
b. Political parties are solely interested in winning votes, not in the public's opinion. 
Overall external efficacy measures the sum of the answers to both questions.   
      
H. External efficacy (German)     
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz" 
a. Die Politiker bemühen sich im Allgemeinen darum, die Interessen der Bevölkerung zu vertreten. 
In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?     
1 = "voll und ganz", 2 = "eher", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher nicht", 5 = "überhaupt nicht" 
b. Die Parteien wollen nur die Stimmen der Wähler, ihre Ansichten intessieren sie nicht. 
      
I. First and second vote (English)     
At the federal election on September 27 you were allowed to place two votes. One for a candidate 
in your voting district and one for a party. Which candidate and party did you vote for? 
1 = "CDU/CSU", 2 = "SPD", 3 = "FDP", 4 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 5 = "Die Linke",  
6 = "another party", 7 = "do not know anymore"     
      
I. First and second vote (German)     
Bei der Bundestagswahl am 27. September konnten Sie ja zwei Stimmen vergeben: Die Erststimme  
für einen Kandidaten aus Ihrem Wahlkreis, die Zweitstimme für eine Partei. Was haben Sie bei  
dieser Bundestagswahl auf Ihrem Stimmzettel angekreuzt?     
1 = "CDU/CSU", 2 = "SPD", 3 = "FDP", 4 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 5 = "Die Linke",  
6 = "andere Partei", 7 = "weiß ich nicht mehr"     
      
J. Candidate evaluation (English)     
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Angela Merkel/Frank-Walter  
Steinmeier? Angela Merkel/Frank-Walter Steinmeier is...     
1 = "do not agree at all", 2 = "tend not to agree", 3= "neutral", 4 = "tend to agree", 5 = "fully agree",  
6 = "unable to judge"     
a. ... a strong leader.     
b. ... trustworthy.     
c. ... likeable.     
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J. Candidate evaluation (German)     
In wie weit treffen folgende Aussagen Ihrer Meinung nach auf Angela Merkel/Frank-Walter  
Steinmeier zu? Angela Merkel/Frank-Walter Steinmeier ist...   
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "eher nicht", 3 = "teils/teils", 4 = "eher", 5 = "voll und ganz", 6 = "kann ich 
nicht beurteilen"     
a. ... führungsstark.     
b. ... vertrauenwürdig.     
c. ... ist als Mensch sympathisch.     
      
K. Problem-solving competence and relative influence of different sources (English) 
In your view, what is currently the most significant political problem in Germany? (open question) 
And, which political party is, in your view, most qualified to solve this problem?   
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke",  
7 = "another party", 8 = "all equally", 9 = "none"     
To what extent has each of the below factors influenced your opinion on the above topic? 
1 = "not at all", 2 = "fairly weakly", 3 = "moderately", 4 = "fairly strongly", 5 = "very strongly" 
a. Face-to-face discussions with friends, family or colleagues   
b. Independent mass media content, e.g. newspaper articles, TV, magazines   
c. Online communication with friends, family or colleagues, e.g. on social networks, via email 
      
K. Problem-solving competence and relative influence of different sources (German) 
Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach gegenwärtig das wichtigste politische Problem in Deutschland? 
Und welche Partei ist Ihrer Meinung nach am besten geeignet, dieses Problem zu lösen? 
1 = "CDU", 2 = "CSU", 3 = "SPD", 4 = "FDP", 5 = "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", 6 = "Die Linke",  
7 = "andere Partei", 8 = "alle Parteien gleich gut", 9 = "keine"   
In wie weit hatten folgende Faktoren einen Einfluss auf Ihre Meinung zu diesem Thema? 
1 = "überhaupt nicht", 2 = "ein wenig", 3 = "weniger stark", 4 = "ziemlich stark", 5 = "sehr stark" 
a. Persönliche Gespräche mit Freunden, Familie oder Kollegen   
b. Unabhängige Medieninhalte (z.B. Zeitungsartikel, Fernsehen, Zeitschriften)   
c. Kommunikation mit Freunden, Familie oder Kollegen im Internet (z.B. soziale Netwerke, Email) 
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L. Media use (English)     
How many hours of your leisure time per day do you spend on average using the following media? 
1 = "less than half an hour", 2 = "half an hour to an hour", 3 = "1-2 hours", 4 = "2-3 hours, 5 = "3-4  
hours", 6 = "4-5 hours", 7 = "more than 5 hours"     
a. TV     
b. Newspapers     
c. Radio     
d. Internet     
Where did you get the most information about the federal election campaign?   
1 = "TV", 2 = "newspapers", 3 = "radio", 4 = "Internet", 5 = "personal discussions", 6 = "another 
source" 
How often did you use the below online sources to get information about the federal election  
campaign?     
1 = "never", 2 = "rarely", 3 = "once a month", 4 = "several times per month", 5 = "once a week",  
6 = "several times per week", 7 = "daily"     
a. News media websites, e.g. Spiegel Online, Süddeutsche Online, FAZ Online, Bild online, etc. 
b. Independent political groups in social networks, e.g. Wahlzentrale, "Meine Stimme zählt!" 
c. Political party websites     
d. Candidate profiles in social networks     
e. Websites of the federal, regional and local government     
f. Politician websites     
g. Supporter networks of parties or politicians, e.g. teAM Deutschland, wahlkampf09 
h. Reading of political emails     
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L. Media use (German)     
Wie viele Studen verbringen Sie täglich im Durchschnitt mit folgenden Medien in Ihrer Freizeit? 
1 = "weniger als eine halbe Stunde", 2 = "zwischen einer halben und einer ganzen Stunde",  
3 = "1-2 Stunden", 4 = "2-3 Stunden, 5 = "3-4 Stunden", 6 = "4-5 Stunden", 7 = "mehr als 5 Stunden" 
a. Fernsehen     
b. Zeitung     
c. Radio     
d. Internet     
Woher bekamen Sie die meisten Informationen über den Wahlkampf zur Bundestagswahl? 
1 = "Fernsehen", 2 = "Zeitung", 3 = "Radio", 4 = "Internet", 5 = "persönliche Gespräche",  
6 = "andere Quelle"     
Wie häufig nutzten Sie folgende Quellen im Internet, um sich über den Wahlkampf zur Bundestags- 
wahl zu informieren?     
1 = "nie", 2 = "selten", 3 = "einmal im Monat", 4 = "mehrmals im Monat", 5 = "einmal pro Woche",  
6 = "mehrmals pro Woche", 7 = "täglich"     
a. Nachrichtenportale (z.B. Spiegel Online, Süddeutsche Online, FAZ Online, Bild online, etc.) 
b. Parteiunabhängige Gruppen in sozialen Netzwerken (z.B. Wahlzentrale, "Meine Stimme zählt!") 
c. Internetseiten der Parteien     
d. Profile von Kandidaten in sozialen Netzwerken     
e. Internetseiten der Bundesregierung, der Landesregierung oder der Ministerien 
f. Internetseiten von Politikern     
g. Unterstützer Portale der Parteien und Politiker (z.B. teAM Deutschland, wahlkampf09) 
h. Lesen von politischen Emails     
      
M. Political participation online (English)     
How often did you engage in the following activities during the federal election campaign? 
1 = "never", 2 = "rarely", 3 = "once a month", 4 = "several times per month", 5 = "once a week",  
6 = "several times per week", 7 = "daily"     
a. Donating to a political party     
b. Participating in political polls     
      
M. Political participation online (German)     
Wie häufig waren Sie im Wahlkampf auf die folgenden Weisen politisch aktiv?   
1 = "nie", 2 = "selten", 3 = "einmal im Monat", 4 = "mehrmals im Monat", 5 = "einmal pro Woche",  
6 = "mehrmals pro Woche", 7 = "täglich"     
a. Online-Spenden an eine Partei     
b. Beteiligung an politischen Umfragen     
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N. Opinion leadership behavior online (English)     
How often did you engage in the following activities during the federal election campaign? 
1 = "never", 2 = "rarely", 3 = "once a month", 4 = "several times per month", 5 = "once a week",  
6 = "several times per week", 7 = "daily"     
a. Sending emails with political content, e.g. party information, to friends, acquaintances or colleagues 
b. Publishing own political commentary or analysis on the Internet   
c. Contributing to political blogs or bulletin boards     
d. Twittering political content     
      
N. Opinion leadership behavior online (German)     
Wie häufig waren Sie im Wahlkampf auf die folgenden Weisen politisch aktiv?   
1 = "nie", 2 = "selten", 3 = "einmal im Monat", 4 = "mehrmals im Monat", 5 = "einmal pro Woche",  
6 = "mehrmals pro Woche", 7 = "täglich"     
a. Verschicken von Emails mit Parteiinformationen/Videos an Freunde, Bekannte, Arbeitskollegen 
b. Eigene politische Kommentare und Analysen ins Netz stellen   
c. Beteiligung an Foren und in Blogs zu politischen Zwecken   
d. Twittern zu politischen Zwecken     
      
O. Level of education (English)     
What is your highest-level degree?     
Categories 1-3 below = "below high school degree"     
Categories 4-5 below = "high school degree"     
Categories 6-8 below = "university degree"     
      
O. Level of education (German)     
Welches ist Ihr höchster allgemeiner Bildungsabschluss?      
1 = "bin zur Zeit Schüler", 2 = "Hauptschulabschluss", 3 = "Mittlere Reife, Realschulabschluss,  
Fachschulabschluss", 4 = "Fachhochschulreife, Abschluss einer Fachoberschule", 5 = "Abitur, 
allgemeine oder fachgebundene Hochschulreife", 6 = "Abschluss Fachschule, Meister-, Techniker- 
schule, Berufs- oder Fachakademie", 7 = "Fachhochschulabschluss", 8 = "Hochschulabschluss 
(Bachelor, Master, M.A., Diplom, Staatsexamen, Promotion)   
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